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ABSTRACT 
ANTONIO N. FINS: Pan American Dialectic: The Impact of Liberal and Nationalist 
Ideologies on U.S. Policy Toward Latin America from Good Neighbor to the Cold War, 1933-
1949 
(Under the direction of Michael H. Hunt) 
 
 
     The premise of this dissertation is that tension between liberal and nationalist ideology 
sparked Cold War tension in the Americas in the post-World War II era. In making this 
argument, the dissertation advances the scholarly debate in the field by positing that ideology, in 
the form of internal political and economic trends, not the emerging superpower rivalry, fueled 
Cold War tension in the hemisphere. The dissertation proves this argument by tracing political 
and economic conflict in the Western Hemisphere diplomacy dating back to the Good Neighbor 
policy. In five case studies, the dissertation shows how different features of economic 
diplomacy led to conflict between the united States and key Latin American nations from 1933 
to 1949. Those features are: trade policy, monetary policy, control of natural resources, 
competitive economics and political rivalry. The dissertation’s case studies focus on Cuba, 
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and the Bolivarian republics, Colombia and Venezuela.    
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PREFACE 
 
The following dissertation was successfully defended in May 2001. However, due to personal 
reasons, it was not submitted for degree conferral until 2009. As such, it reflects the 
historiography, research and viewpoints in the field up to May 2001, but not beyond. 
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Prologue 
 
 Card Games, Historiogaphy and the Pan American Dialectic 
Author’s Note: The following dissertation was successfully defended in May 2001. However, 
due to personal reasons, it was not submitted for degree conferral until 2009. As such, it 
reflects the historiography, research and viewpoints in the field up to May 2001, but not 
beyond. 
     The debate was as much a fixture in the ritual as the shuffling of cards and the unfiltered 
cigarettes. Every Monday afternoon, my paternal grandfather and his card mates, all exiles from 
Cuba, gathered for a game of cards and a discussion of politics in a central Miami apartment. 
Politics meant conflict in faraway places like Vietnam, a topic dropped soon after the oldest son 
of one of the players died there in combat in July 1968. The topic that was always shuffled was 
Cuba – specifically, communism and Fidel Castro. 
     Too young to understand the intensity of the discussion, I surmised that it was a serious 
matter by the amount of blame and finger-pointing shuffled, stacked and cut throughout the 
course of the afternoon. Who lost Cuba? The communists in Cuba. The corrupt Batistianos. 
Fidel Castro. His brother, Raul. Che Guevara. The Soviets. The United States. The Mafia. John 
Kennedy. More than for assignation of fault, however, the card table discussion was a struggle 
for comprehension. With all the commonality that appeared to bind Cuba – as well as the other 
Latin American nations – to the United States, why had there been such a deep diplomatic, 
economic, and social split between the United States and many of the hemisphere’s countries in 
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the decades following the Second World War? 
     This question was a particularly sharp one for my grandfather’s generation, given the bright 
hopes and grand expectations they harbored earlier in their lives. Having come of age in Cuba 
between the Great War and the Great Depression, they followed the political arena in 
Washington as closely as they had in Havana, especially during the Pan American1 renaissance 
of the early 1930s. This inter-American vision was largely a nineteenth century, post-colonial 
construct, but Pan Americanism quickly became synonymous with Franklin Roosevelt, the 
Good Neighbor Policy,2 and hemispheric liberalism. In their day, my grandfather and his friends 
listened to FDR and his diplomats speak optimistically about an integrated hemisphere, buoyed 
by a more equitable distribution of the fruits of everyone’s labor. They saw this U.S. president 
and his diplomats back up their dreamy talk with apparent deeds. In the face of a near civil war 
in 1933 Cuba, FDR abrogated the Platt Amendment and broke with past precedents in 
refraining from sending troops. After the Mexican government seized U.S. oil refineries in 
1938, FDR acquiesced to the taking. It seemed Washington had turned a page and was truly 
committed to a new deal for Latin America, too. 
     This retro-Pan American moment certainly swept up my grandfather and his card mates. As 
                     
1
 Pan Americanism is generally defined as the belief in shared interests in the hemisphere and 
regional leadership by the United States. For early scholarship focused on Pan American 
ideology and beliefs, see Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin America Policy of the United States 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1943); J. Fred Rippy, Latin America and the 
Industrial Age, (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1944); and Frank Tannenbaum Whiter 
Latin America? (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Co. 1934).  
 
2
 The Good Neighbor’s origins date are traced to Herbert Hoover’s approach to hemispheric 
diplomacy. See Alexander DeConde, Herbert Hoover’s Latin America Policy (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1951) and Robert Freeman Smith, “Latin America, the United 
States and the European Powers, 1830-1930,” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, 6 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 118-19. 
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they emerged from the Depression, the political wrangling in Cuba and World War II, the 
promise of a new and better era appeared attainable. For a moment, they believed, it really did 
appear to them as if the countries of the hemisphere formed “one great continental community” 
held together by “their common political, economic, and cultural ties.”3 Then, in the early 
1950s, the Pan American vision turned fuzzy. By the mid-1960s, it was gone. My grandfather 
and his friends instead found themselves playing cards in a cramped and smoky apartment in a 
foreign city grasping for reasons to explain how the Pan American Century of progress had 
unraveled within the span of a generation – their generation. 
     Growing up in the shadow of the Cold War they bequeathed to my generation, I, too, 
searched for ways to explain the troubled state of inter-American diplomacy and commerce. 
Conventional wisdom held that the region was merely divided in the heated confrontation 
between the world’s two nuclear superpowers, their incompatible ideologies, and their rival 
camps. But by the time I entered graduate school in the autumn of 1991, that simplistic 
explanation had lost its conviction. The past decade of graduate and independent study, and the 
dissertation that it has produced, offers an intriguing alternative explanation. Rather than the 
Cold War, an answer to the perplexing questions, and the sources of so much anxiety and 
frustration, is found in the Good Neighbor years that my grandparents and others had recalled 
with so much hope and promise. 
     This dissertation’s central argument is that the early 1930s marked a watershed in Pan 
American political economy, or the way that political pressures affect economic and monetary 
policies across the hemisphere. The unraveling of the free trade and free investment liberal 
                     
3
 Editorial in Miami Business (May 1952), p. 2, box “The Miamian, 1952-1965,” South 
Florida Historical Museum, Miami, Fla.  
 4
consensus that governed inter-American commerce up to 1930 set the hemisphere’s 
hegemonic economic and political order against itself. While the region’s industrial power, 
the United States, continued to champion liberal commercial treaties and arrangements, the 
countries that fed U.S. manufacturers with raw materials, from Mexico to Brazil, attempted 
to break ranks. To varying degrees, these nations turned against export-oriented development 
to pursue nationalist and inward-looking strategies designed to cultivate autonomous 
economic growth. The liberal-nationalist hemispheric conflict of the 1930s and 1940s that 
underlay the Good Neighbor ultimately produced diplomatic confrontation, armed violence, 
and massive demographic shifts that altered the daily lives, and futures, of millions of people 
across the Americas. 
     The focus of the Good Neighbor Policy, this dissertation hypothesizes, was the Roosevelt 
Administration’s push for economic liberalism in the hemisphere. FDR and his diplomats 
insisted that opening doors to trade and investment offered relief from the ill effects of the 
Depression. In addition, they argued that cross-border commerce and business partnerships 
reduced tension and established interdependent bonds that might avoid conflicts between 
countries and peoples. The logic of the Good Neighbor Policy, and the promise of this Pax Pan 
Americana, is that participation in a communal economic network was the way to hemispheric 
peace and prosperity. 
     This liberal program ran counter to emerging nationalist macroeconomic strategies that 
simultaneously coalesced across Latin America. Nationalism was partly a by-product of the 
political, economic and social currents that raced through countries like Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela in the first decades of the century. The nationalists’ 
blueprint reserved raw materials for domestic industry instead of for export. The strategy also 
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blocked imports of manufactured goods in order to promote industrialization within national 
borders. Nationalists backed rules that impeded currency flows to stabilize currencies, slow 
inflation, and improve living standards. The nationalist agenda also included provisions for 
tight regulation of foreign companies and expropriation of businesses when such measures 
served the larger national interest as defined by the state. Not only did these policies run counter 
to Washington’s liberal model, they specifically emerged from suspicions and skepticism 
toward the norteamericanos and their liberal program.4 Indeed, in many ways, it was a reaction 
to the liberal agenda. 
     To show how the liberal-nationalist dialectic played out, this dissertation examines five 
diplomatic episodes between 1933 and 1949. The countries chosen accounted for the bulk of 
U.S. capital and commerce invested in Latin America in the 1930s.5 The first case study 
treated by the dissertation is the 1933 revolution in Cuba, where liberals in the Roosevelt 
Administration insisted that a treaty to bolster U.S.-Cuba trade was necessary to quell the civil 
strife engulfing the island. The next chapter looks at U.S. efforts to reassert free currency 
exchange flows in Brazil in the mid-1930s. The following case study analyzes the U.S.-
Mexican standoff over the 1938 expropriation of U.S.-owned oil refineries in Mexico. In the 
fourth study, the post-World War II confrontation between the United States and Argentina gets 
a fresh examination as a stand-off over political and economic models rather than personality 
                     
4
 Tulio Halperin Donghi, The Contemporary History of Latin America, John Charles 
Chasteen, ed., (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 161.  
 
5
 Cuba, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela accounted for the bulk of the 
$3.9 billion in U.S. Latin American investment in 1938. The countries accounted for almost 
85 percent of total Latin America trade – the bulk of which went to the United States – in 
1938. These statistics are cited in from Joan Raushenbush, Look at Latin America (New 
York: Foreign policy Association, 1940) pp. 109-112, 126-132.  
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clashes and post- World War II anti-Nazism. The final chapter looks at U.S. policy toward 
Colombia and Venezuela in the aftermath of the April 1948 rebellion in Bogota. This chapter 
shows how U.S. policy-makers used Cold War containment policies to curtail Latin American 
economic nationalism. Each chapter focuses on a different country and a different issue in the 
contest between economic liberalism and nationalism. Each confrontation, or dispute, reveals 
how the liberal and nationalist models and approaches to macroeconomic policy competed 
against each other across the region. 
     This story and the conclusions it yields transcend the current literature on the Good Neighbor 
epoch. The historiography on this era remains divided over the goals and achievements of 
FDR’s Latin America policy. On one side, a group of scholars argues the Good Neighbor was a 
serious effort to chart a new course in hemispheric relations with a non-intervention pledge, 
whether or not it succeeded in doing so.6 Another school of historians insists that Roosevelt was 
no better than the dollar diplomats of the earlier, interventionist era. They argue that Good 
Neighbor restraint resulted from a preference for other policy options stressing more subtle 
                     
6
 Discussions of non-intervention pledges, more so than questions of political economy, 
dominate the best known work in the Good Neighbor library. See Bryce Wood, The Making 
of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). 
  Several works that focus specifically on the Good Neighbor Policy’s economic diplomacy 
argue that the Roosevelt program attempted to break from past diplomacy-with-guns tactics, 
though they admit the effort produced mixed results. See Lloyd C. Gardner’s Economic 
Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Richard 
Steward, Trade and Hemisphere: The Good Neighbor Policy and Reciprocal Trade 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975); Paul Varg, “The Economic Side of the Good 
Neighbor Policy: The Reciprocal Trade Program and Latin America,” Pacific Historical 
Review 45 (February 1976), pp. 47-71; and Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. 
Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1910-1985 (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1985), pp. 15-32, 101-27.  
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pressure and forms of coercion.7 Wherever U.S. interests faced a challenge, the Roosevelt 
Administration acted with resolve equal to that of its predecessors to either co-opt opponents8 
or suppress them in a varying array on countries including Cuba, Argentina and Mexico.9 
Scholarly consensus is found in the explanations for the Good Neighbor’s demise. Historians 
generally agree that the Good Neighbor ceased to exist, as a genuine attempt to alter diplomacy 
or as a mask for less altruistic intentions, at the nascent stages of the Cold War.10 
                     
7
 The skeptical works argue that the Good Neighbor was a veiled attempt to reassert U.S. 
hegemony and domination. See David Green, The Containment of Latin America, (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1972); Jules Benjamin, “The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin 
America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay,” Diplomatic History, 11 (Spring 
1987), pp. 91-112; Gordon Connell-Smith The United States and Latin America: An 
Historical Analysis of Inter-American Relations (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 
1974); Robert Freeman Smith, ed., The United States and the Latin American Sphere of 
Influence (Malabar, Fla: Krieger Publishing, 1981); Lloyd Meacham, The United States and 
Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961); Lester 
Langley, The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 1985), pp. 137-61; and Frederick Marks, Wind Over Sand: The Diplomacy 
of Franklin Roosevelt Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988), pp. 217-50.  
 
8
 For discussion centered on Washington’s desire to co-opt internal challenges in other 
nations see Stephen Randall, The Diplomacy of Modernization: U.S. Colombian-Relations, 
1920-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); Randall B. Woods, The Roosevelt 
Foreign Policy Establishment and the Good Neighbor Policy: The United States and 
Argentina, 1941-1945 (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979); Knut Walter, The 
Regime of Anastasio Somoza, 1936-1956 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1993); and Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin 
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 290-315. 
 
9
 For discussions of U.S. attempts to thwart nationalist challenges in Latin America, see 
Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy, 1917-1942 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1972); Irwin Gellman, Roosevelt and Batista: Good Neighbor 
Diplomacy in Cuba, 1933-1945 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973); and 
Ronald Newton, The “Nazi Menace” in Argentina, 1937-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1993).  
 
10
 Examples of this school include Roger Trask, “The Impact of the Cold War on U.S.-Latin 
American Relations, 1945-1949,” in Diplomatic History, 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 271-284; F. 
Parkinson, Latin America, The Cold War and World Powers, 1945-1973: A Study in 
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     This dissertation, instead, takes a fresh look at the Good Neighbor by arguing that its brand 
of U.S. economic liberalism clashed with coherent and competing Latin American nationalist 
ideologies. These two ideologies pre-dated the 1930s. However, the Great Depression set them 
against each other in a dialectic that dominated public policy and diplomacy in the hemisphere 
for the next six decades. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the liberal-nationalist rivalry sparked 
friction and stalemate across the hemisphere. At the core of the disputes were meaningful and 
complex issues – from currency exchange rules to property rights – on which larger 
macroeconomic policies and political philosophies turned. 
     From crisis to crisis, the confrontations heated and then abated with face-saving 
compromises. These settlements were anything but harmonious accommodations, as Good 
Neighbor historiography often suggests. The brittle treaties, pacts, and gentlemen’s agreements 
yielded by standoff and stalemate only served to quell tensions temporarily, leaving each side to 
brood listlessly until the next flap. This unsettled and restless quality of inter-American 
relations, best explains why Pan American diplomacy remained volatile, and occasionally 
turned violent, through the balance of the century. 
     This study focuses on the years between 1933 and 1949 for several reasons. First, there is 
ample evidence in the historical literature to demonstrate that the Roosevelt government’s push 
for reciprocity in trade and investment marked a turning point in U.S. economic and foreign 
                                                                
Diplomatic History, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974); Stephen Rabe, “The Elusive 
Conference: U.S. Economic Relations with Latin America, 1945-1952,” in Diplomatic 
History, 6 (Summer 1978), pp. 279-284; Lester Langley, America and the Americas: The 
United States in the Western Hemisphere, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989); 
Samuel Bailey, The United States and the Development of South America, (New York: New 
Viewpoints Press, 1976); and Chester Pach, “The Containment of Military Aid to Latin 
America, 1944-1949,” in Diplomatic History, 6 (Summer 1982), pp. 225-44. 
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diplomacy following the failed protectionist policies that preceded this administration. And 
while economic nationalism was present during the earlier decades of the century,11 it did not 
pose as serious a threat to U.S. interests as these policies did after 1933. The dissertation will 
show that economic nationalism in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, and the governments that 
promulgated it, were much stronger than earlier ones. They also set the stage for more radical 
challenges in Latin America – Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1959, the Dominican Republic in 
1965 and Nicaragua in 1979. 
      This dissertation employs tools and methodologies currently in vogue in the diplomatic 
history field. One of those is to stress the role ideology played in steering inter-American 
diplomacy.12 The other is a concern with focusing beyond U.S. actions as described in U.S. 
documents and sources.13 Wherever possible, I have sculpted the opposing Latin American 
view from non-U.S. sources to show how the gaps in ideas and experiences and marked the 
Good Neighbor Policy. While the focus of this study is also on the public sector, I remain 
convinced there is a need to study the conduct of the state. There is value in the traditional 
diplomatic history focus on the state and its ability, either through its legislature, its finance 
                     
11
 Michael Krenn, U.S. Policy Toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1919-1929 
(Wilmington, De.: Scholarly Resources, 1990), pp. xiii-xv. 
12
 For readings on the influence of ideology, ethnicity and race in diplomacy see Michael H. 
Hunt Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) and Emily 
Rosenberg Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 
1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989). 
 
13
 See Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a 
Global American History,” in Diplomatic History 21 (Fall 1997), pp. 499-518; Louis Pérez, 
Jr., “History, Historiography, and Cuban Studies: Thirty Years Later,” in Damian Fernandez, 
ed., Cuban Studies Since the Revolution (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1992), pp. 
64-65; and Stephen Rabe, “Marching Ahead (Slowly): The Historiography of Inter-American 
Relations,” Diplomatic History, 11 (Spring 1987), p. 307.  
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ministry or its central bank, to set or alter economic policy. 
     This dissertation falls short of offering a complete analysis because of its dependence on 
U.S. archives and sources for primary research. To truly understand how the liberal-nationalist 
dialectic played out, an equally broad survey of primary and archival research must be 
conducted in the countries chosen for this study. That said, the dissertation does offer fresh 
perspectives on U.S. motives and interests. It offers a fresh look at what drove policy-makers’ 
actions, and how those actions affected strategic, commercial and diplomatic relations. Those 
who prefer international history and scholarly analyses that delve heavily into foreign archives 
might feel dissatisfied with the limitations in this work, but it should be taken into account that 
the goal herein is to broaden the conversation, thus spurring future research into the way 
ideology in the form of the liberal-nationalist rivalry molded policy in the hemisphere. 
     Moreover, a work that analyzes the failure of free trade and open investment policies in 
1930s Latin America in the midst of the liberal renewal of the past decade may seem 
anachronistic. Recently, a pair of scholars concluded in a widely read work that “U.S. 
businesses face a dazzling array of opportunities in Latin America’s new climate.”14 The 
privatization of state-owned enterprises does indeed seem to open a cornucopia of commercial 
possibilities, as do the proliferation of trading in the region’s stock exchanges. The region’s 
ability to recover from financial disasters - the Mexican peso crisis in 1995 and the devaluation 
of the Brazilian currency in January 1999 – is proof that this capitalist revolution has succeeded, 
neo-liberals say. 
     However, the Pan American liberal-nationalist dialectic of the 1930s and the ruptures it 
                     
14
 Paul Craig Roberts and Karen LaFollette Araujo, The Capitalist Revolution in Latin 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 4. 
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created raise relevant questions about present political economy in the Americas. The 
development of policy, especially economic policy, depends on the juncture of ideas and power. 
It has been said, “a good idea cannot become policy if it meets certain kinds of opposition, and 
a bad idea can become policy if it is able to obtain support.”15 At the heart of the Pan American 
dialectic was a battle over experiences, ideas and strategies that shaped the political economy of 
the region. In the 1930s, U.S. policy-makers and commercial interests blamed protectionism for 
the industrial and agricultural disaster called the Great Depression. In Latin America, the public 
debate pointed the finger at the “exploitative” liberal system that had ruled the region’s 
economics, finances, and development since 1870. The lesson of that extraordinary time, for 
yesterday, today and tomorrow, is that the success or failure of liberalism, whether in the form 
of an Alliance for Progress or a North American Free Trade Agreement, may well depend on 
perceptions, shaped by experiences, of equity, or the lack thereof. 
     Ultimately, my contribution to the field, through this dissertation, is to underline how the 
intrinsic economic interests of the United States and several Latin American countries 
clashed, and how this conflict defined hemispheric relations from the Good Neighbor to the 
dawn of the Cold War. By 1948, the United States and the republics of the Americas were 
more divided than ever before. These festering and irresolvable tensions fueled a decades-
long contest defined by covert operations, coup d’etats, and guerrilla insurgencies that would 
in turn produce wave after wave of immigrants and exiles dreaming of Pan America, but 
living and arguing the Cold War. 
                     
15
 Peter A. Gourevitch, “Keynesian Politics: The Political Sources of Economic Policy 
Choices,” in Peter A. Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas Keynesianism Across 
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 87-88. 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter I 
 
  The Rise of Liberalism and Nationalism 
Across the Western Hemisphere 
     The global financial depression that gripped the hemisphere during the early 1930s bolstered 
rival ideological approaches to Pan American politics, diplomacy and commerce. In the 
industrial United States, the Depression boomeranged against protectionism and renewed 
expansionist interest in foreign markets as an efficient way to foster prosperity and nurture 
democratic governance. Across Latin America, however, the Great Depression helped unravel 
the decades-old liberal guard and the export-oriented development system that bound the 
region’s agricultural fields and mining centers to industry in the United States and Europe. The 
Depression also bolstered political and economic philosophizing focused on inward-looking 
measures, such as trade barriers to protect nascent industry, as a strategy for development and 
progress. 
     The pendulum swings were not unprecedented in either sphere of the Pan American 
neighborhood. During the seventy-year span between the Civil War and the Great Depression, 
interests from different regions and economic sectors within the United States periodically 
pushed for extra-territorial expansion through liberal commercial arrangements and policies. 
But the dominance of agricultural political interests, the necessity to direct industrial output 
toward domestic industries, and the U.S. government’s preoccupation with coast-to-coast 
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settlement constrained inter-hemispheric liberalism and hegemony.16 In Latin America, 
nationalism and protectionism enjoyed occasional support.17 Nevertheless, political and popular 
support for the economic nationalist agenda typically receded as global demand for nitrates, 
precious metals, rubber, and other commodities periodically allowed the masters of the export 
economies to indulge in opulent excesses during so-called “dances of the millions.” 
     However, in the midst of a depression marked by the most sustained bout of deflation ever 
recorded, U.S. liberals and internationalists gained the upper hand for good. Open markets, 
liberals said, multiplied the sources of buyers and sellers. The ability to sell more, they added, 
created a basis for demand to outstrip supply, which raised prices. Moreover, liberal 
internationalists stressed that global commerce promoted peace: Countries with vested interests 
in each other’s economically productive quarters and financial welfare were less likely to war 
with each other. 
     Commercial expansionism found itself in vogue partly because of the backlash in the United 
States against the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff and other protectionist measures associated with 
the defeated and discredited Hoover Administration. The boomerang effect from such 
measures – by 1933 the tariff was actually blamed for worsening the Depression – proved so 
severe that it reoriented the focus and objectives of U.S. foreign economic policy for the 
                     
16
 See David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Trade and Investment: American Economic 
Expansion in the Hemisphere, 1865-1900 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998) 
and Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963).  
 
17
 See Paul Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in 
Postindependence Peru (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989) and Michael 
Krenn, U.S. Policy Toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America, (Wilmington, De.: 
Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1990), pp. 142-43. 
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balance of the century. After 1933, foreign economic policy focused on lowering protective 
tariffs instead of raising them. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement program offered by the 
Roosevelt Administration in 1933 was a fundamental step in this direction.18 
     Simultaneously, Latin American liberals’ grip on public policy and economic power broke, 
freeing space for nationalist, inward-looking strategies. Nationalism rose to the forefront of the 
1930s landscape as the emerging political actors blamed the Depression, in part or in whole, on 
previous liberal failures. In the wake of financial collapse, governments mulled ways to nurture 
nascent manufacturing sectors with tariffs and to capture a higher share of export-driven wages 
through nationalization of these industries. In addition, the public sector experimented with 
decrees intended to grant organized labor a stronger bargaining position against management at 
foreign-dominated industries. The nationalists advocated currency exchange restrictions to 
protect against swings in monetary values. The 1930s experimentation with nationalism 
ultimately led to the creation of bureaucratic state-owned enterprises, created stronger import 
substitution programs and erected trade barriers that dominated the public policy, commercial, 
and diplomatic arenas for generations to come. The effectiveness of these strategies is open to 
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critique – but it is unquestionable that the nationalist agenda came to dominate the debate.19 
     To be sure, the hemisphere’s rising liberal and nationalist orders faced internal opposition 
along the way. In the United States, the liberals of the 1930s confronted resistance from 
protectionists, whether New Dealers in Franklin Roosevelt’s government or isolationists in the 
Republican Party, speaking for constituents and interests opposed to opening domestic markets 
to foreign products. In Latin America, the challenge to nationalism emerged from liberals 
seeking to reestablish the old order and from more radical figures and parties arguing for even 
more resolute breaks with the world’s industrial core. Despite fits-and-starts, however, the end 
result was that the once stable and reliable financial and commercial links between the 
hemisphere’s premier industrial nation and its peripheral, supplier economies snapped in the 
early years of the 1930s. The aftermath of that break yielded a more volatile and fractious era. 
Good Neighbor Liberalism  
     The liberals in the new Roosevelt Administration viewed the growing unrest and 
militarization across the Pan American backyard with alarm, and they blamed the disconcerting 
trends on the precipitous drop in inter-hemispheric commerce and the isolation of countries and 
peoples. FDR's foreign policy team insisted that the only course out of the Depression and away 
from war lay in reopening hemispheric trade and investment lines to generate prosperity, defuse 
tension and promote political stability and tranquility. Vibrant international commerce, liberals 
asserted, created channels to unload excess production, bolster prices and end the deflationary 
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spin that marked the Depression. Trade, they said, also produced favorable by-products. 
Prosperity created an interdependent relationship among countries that liberals believed defused 
pressure for war and conflict by bolstering democratic governance and institutions. "The 
practice of the half-insane policy of economic isolation during the past ten years by America 
and the world is the largest single underlying cause of the world panic," charged the new 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. "The mad pursuit of economic nationalism has proved 
disastrous."20 
     A good example of how such “half-insane” policies courted disaster, Hull and others 
claimed, existed in Cuba. In less than ten years, the island’s standing as a U.S. trading partner 
dropped from sixth to sixteenth place. Sales of American exports on the island fell by 67 
percent to $57 million between 1924 and 1932.21 In that time, the liberals added, Cuban 
political and social institutions began to crumble. So, a society that under U.S. tutelage had 
moved toward democratic civility, the liberals said with dismay, had now slipped back toward 
chaos. Liberals insisted the nexus between the drop in U.S.-Cuba commerce and the rise in 
friction on the island was indisputable. Sumner Welles charged that protectionist measures 
“deprived our neighbors” of markets in the United States. He accused the tariff of pushing 
“some of the countries to the edge of national ruin with resultant unemployment and starvation 
for many millions of their peoples."22  
    Four hallmark features defined Good Neighbor liberalism as it evolved and gained 
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momentum under FDR’s sponsorship. First, it supported freer trade by reducing tariffs and by 
opposing financial policies that limited currency exchanges. It also championed the rights of 
private property owners and the preeminence of the international judicial system to resolve 
business disputes. And though FDR’s brand of liberalism fashioned a broader role for 
regulatory government, it still eschewed intrusive models that positioned the state as an 
economic manager or a central planning authority. Finally, the ascendant liberal faith rejected 
groups and actors it considered revolutionary or radical and formed alliances with individuals 
and groups favorably disposed to a liberal, Pan American agenda. 
     There is reason to argue that the administration’s liberal bent advanced self-serving 
motives.23 Liberals criticized public policy that either impeded U.S.-made exports to other 
countries or that reduced the supply of cheap raw materials for U.S. industry. Between 1921 
and 1925, U.S. farmers sold an average of $4.7 billion in commodities to its trading partners. 
By the end of 1932, with the Depression at full tilt, those exports shrank to $1.6 billion. U.S. 
merchants also bought far less from their trade partners – $4 billion a year from 1926 to 1930 
versus $1.4 billion in 1933.24 The free traders of the 1930s had their gaze clearly fixed their on 
returning to the profitable ways of the 1920s. Thor Watson, the president of International 
Business Machines Corporation, argued that the United States had to stand at the forefront of 
world economic planning given that “with six percent of the world's population, [the United 
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States] manufactures fifty percent of all the goods manufactured” and needed consumer 
markets.25 Civic groups also pressed for an open trade policy. Charles Franklin Jones, general 
manager of the Miami Board of Foreign Commerce, urged the organization to seek trade 
opportunities even as the Smoot-Hawley Act went into force. “The members of this board,” he 
said, “have no desire to sit still and think or to simply stand up and talk about what ought to be 
done to promote our foreign commerce with Latin America.”26 
     However, 1930s liberalism claimed a deeper ideological ancestry that preached a quasi-
evangelical belief in peace and prosperity through cross-border commerce. It was Woodrow 
Wilson, the father of twentieth century liberalism in U.S. politics, who most eloquently and 
convincingly spoke of expansion in the missionary language of Progressive uplift and 
modernization as an alternative to radical or revolutionary models.27 Wilson argued that 
economic diplomacy and foreign relations should foster human progress, nurture 
underdeveloped areas, and achieve the betterment of mankind by way of reformed and 
socially responsible democratic capitalism. This brand of liberalism insisted that prosperity 
from trade and investment incubated middle class democracy. Liberals said that democracy, in 
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turn, stabilized government and muted fluctuations between the extremes of the right and left. 
People from across the Americas, liberals insisted, shared this vision of unity and progressive 
Pan American economics and democracy.28 
    The ranks of diplomats and policy specialists within the Roosevelt government counted more 
than a few torchbearers of Wilsonian liberalism – starting with the president. A frequent 
traveler through the region, Franklin D. Roosevelt was better acquainted with Latin America 
than most of his predecessors. His support for non-interventionist policies and his call for a 
mutually beneficial economic integration struck the right chords in the region. Plus, FDR’s 
easy-going, at-home approach during his travels in the Americas won him popularity. At the 
very least, the U.S. president’s affable image neutralized suspicions about FDR that grew from 
his support for Mexican incursions by U.S. troops during the Wilson years and for boasting that 
he authored the Haitian constitution.29 
     Secretary of State Cordell Hull, a Tennessee native who fought in the Spanish-American 
War, was a life-long free trade advocate and the most adamant internationalist in FDR’s 
government. Hull’s free trade credentials dated as far back as his first years in Congress in the 
early 1900s. At the time, the Democratic Party “advocated unilateral reductions in tariff” levels 
and Hull was among the staunchest advocates for lower rates. As secretary of state, Hull was 
stubborn and relentless in his insistence on open markets. Soon after leaving the Senate for 
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FDR’s cabinet, Hull suggested the United States slash its tariffs unilaterally by 10 percent.30 
While impractical, Hull’s proposal revealed his determined liberal stance. He would ultimately 
achieve results at great professional and personal cost. 
     Another articulate advocate for a liberal rebirth was FDR’s chief Pan American specialist, 
Benjamin Sumner Welles. A career diplomat, Welles boasted plenty of experience in the 
Caribbean, Central America and South America. His first assignment in the region was at the 
U.S. embassy in Argentina during the First World War. He then headed the Latin America 
office at the State Department during Wilson’s second term. A graduate of Groton and 
Columbia University, Welles’ claims to fame were his mediation of the 1924 Honduran 
revolution as well as his attempts to resolve civil and political unrest in the Dominican 
Republic. Welles, too, was convinced there was a direct link between the precipitous decline in 
commerce around the globe, particularly in regards to Latin America, and the rise in conflict 
and anti-Americanism. 
     To be sure, the FDR-Hull-Welles triumvirate proved itself an uneasy and tense triangle. The 
three frequently bickered among themselves over policies and strategies – and one later scholar 
concluded it was hard to conceive how they managed to direct U.S. foreign policy.31 However, 
the common denominator that joined the trio together was their belief that world trade and 
cross-border prosperity offered the best way to jolt the hemisphere’s countries out of the 
Depression and avoid war. Because of that faith, and their commitment to pursuing a reopening 
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of markets over the next twelve years, FDR, Hull and Welles set the general direction for U.S. 
economic foreign policy for the balance of the century.32 
     The centerpiece of the Roosevelt government’s liberal project in the Americas was the 
reciprocal trade agreements program. Advocates for reciprocity insisted that the United States 
and its key trading partners should sign bilateral treaties providing tariff, customs, and other 
trade incentives and concessions on specific products and goods. The administration especially 
coveted treaties with Latin American countries, as following chapters will discuss. Reciprocity 
was ideally suited for Latin America, FDR and other liberals said, given the commonality of 
interests between the two regions: U.S. industry needed Latin American raw materials just as 
producers of those commodities needed markets. Thus, they suggested it might be easy for the 
United States to restore the “open market” in the hemisphere where there was a natural fit 
between north and south. 
     Roosevelt liberals encountered resistance, particularly within their own government. The 
slew of New Deal recovery programs pushed by the administration in its first one-hundred days 
closed U.S. markets even as the liberals pressed for open markets overseas. The Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration and National Recovery Act sought to end the Depression by 
sparking price increases partly by closing doors to cheaper foreign imports.33 The Agricultural 
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Adjustment Administration, for example, provided price supports for U.S. farmers. Created to 
please the rural electorate, the AAA essentially clogged efforts to expand trade by placing 
roadblocks to agricultural imports into the U.S. markets. 
     Inward-looking measures received support from George Peek, the White House trade 
advisor, and members of the White House kitchen cabinet dubbed the “brains trust.” These 
FDR advisors argued against what they viewed as counterproductive free trade programs they 
said would flood markets with imported foodstuffs – and drive down agricultural prices. Free 
trade, they insisted, hurt U.S. farmers, who would risk defaulting on loans, losing their farms 
and cause banks to fail.34 Facing political pressure over New Deal reforms in the United States, 
FDR initially vacillated between protectionism and free trade.35 
     However, other liberals, in and outside of the administration, did not waver or back down. 
One commentator in the 1930s referred to the increasingly adamant, if not obtuse, Hull as the 
“Galahad of internationalism in a nationalist administration.”36 In fact, Hull found plenty of 
support from other liberals within FDR’s government. Attorney Adolf Berle, who closely 
monitored Welles role in Cuba and later served as U.S. ambassador to Brazil, was among a 
handful of university professors and intellectuals that FDR frequently turned to for counsel. 
Others who toted the banner, to various degrees, included newspaper publisher Josephus 
Daniels, tycoon Nelson Rockefeller, diplomat William Phillips and businessmen Spruille 
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Braden. Outside the administration, scholars, businessmen and journalists also championed the 
missionary faith that free trade and protection for foreign private investment might set off a 
wave of prosperity, giving aid and comfort to those within. 
     Improved economic performance around the hemisphere, these advocates argued, would 
foster U.S.-style social and political institutions and open backward regions to the technological 
wonders of U.S. production, from radios to sewing machines to automobiles.37 For example, 
Robert Patchin, president of the W.R. Grace Co., worked to “spread the gospel” of Pan 
American liberalism. “The export of these [resources] is as essential to our foreign trade and, 
conjointly, to our domestic prosperity, as is the export of Latin America’s raw materials to 
hers,” wrote Patchin. “In a very special sense, the United States and Latin American republics 
are economically complementary to each other.”38 The complementary link, the Good Neighbor 
liberals concluded, rested on an indisputable conviction that trade and investment offered paths 
to peace and prosperity. 
      Ultimately, the liberals outnumbered, out-muscled and out-shouted their protectionist foes. 
By emphasizing more limited reciprocal treaties with individual countries, and not a broader 
free trade agenda, Hull enlisted enough support to convince FDR to push for reciprocal treaties 
in Congress in the spring of 1934. Congress ultimately approved the program over the 
objections of farmers, industrialists, and the protectionists at the White House. This 
achievement was no minor feat. Now the liberals had to convince the rest of the hemisphere to 
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trust in their open door regime as well. 
Economic Nationalism in Latin America 
     Just as the Great Depression forced a change in mindset among U.S. policy-makers, the 
economic meltdown jolted the thinking of governments and people across Latin America.39 The 
new leaders and forces stepping to the forefront in Latin America embraced a different formula 
from the one that Washington prescribed. This direction was decidedly anti-Pan American and 
anti-liberal. Protectionist measures included exchange controls that safeguarded currency stocks 
by limiting money swaps. Other measures included state intervention in the economy to 
influence manufacturing of products for domestic consumption and to strengthen labor’s hand 
during negotiations with multinational companies. To monitor and enforce these policies, the 
states enlarged those parts of their bureaucracy charged with regulating industry and agriculture. 
     Nationalists justified their policies with emotional calls to defend and recapture national 
pride and self-determination, but, more importantly, they also believed their program made 
economic sense. Nationalists adamantly insisted their dependence on the prices paid for their 
metals, coffee, sugar, and rubber ultimately tied their fate to the gyrations of the international 
markets. Through internal development measures, such as ownership of domestic industry, 
economic nationalism promised profit from domestic labor, not foreign hand-offs. While the 
turn toward liberalism in the United States was a rapid and immediate reaction to the 
Depression, the opposition to liberalism in Latin America had brewed for decades. Nationalism, 
                     
39
 Tulio Halperin Donghi, The Contemporary History of Latin America, John Chasteen ed., 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 209. The author writes that the Depression “had a 
rapid and devastating impact on Latin America” with “long-term implications for the political 
and economic formulas that characterized the mature neo-colonial order” existing from 1870 to 
1930. 
 
 25
in fact, developed from the financial volatility confounding the region since its integration into 
the global commodity market in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
     In part, the economic nationalist tide swelled higher and higher because of a combination of 
important demographic and social changes that occurred between 1870 and 1930. The first 
factor was the chronic and debilitating intra-class strife that persistently weakened the liberal 
political and economic groups that dominated government and finance. The second 
development paving the way for economic nationalism was the rise of popular groups in the 
cities and the countryside that challenged the liberal elite. The final ingredient was the volatility 
in the global commodity markets that periodically undermined stability and discredited the 
region’s liberal economies. Each of these factors played a determining role in the six countries 
examined in this dissertation. 
     The liberal, export-oriented trade and investment regime in Latin American developed after 
1870 when elite groups seized control of the export industries in Latin America and bound their 
plantations, underground mines, and export enclaves to the world trading system. The opening 
of European and U.S. markets for raw materials from Latin American agricultural lands and 
mining centers created avenues for enormous riches – and unleashed bitter friction. Battles 
ensued between elite groups struggling for control of railroads, customs houses, ports, and 
government patronage. The penetration of foreign capital in industry and agriculture meant 
many dominant local producers slowly ceased to be entirely national in origin, a development 
that fueled intra-elite warfare and anti-foreign sentiment. So, throughout its existence from 1870 
to 1930, the liberal-dominated order spawned intra-class friction as well as economic growth.40 
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The strife ultimately prevented the elites from investing riches derived from periodic export 
booms to solidify their hold on power – or to purchase a measure of longevity. 
     As elite factions warred among themselves, the second factor, a demographic evolution, 
occurred in many countries. The liberal push to commercialize agriculture and extractive 
industries created a rush to expand plantations and mining centers, triggering a struggle for 
labor.41 The consolidation within export producing zones displaced smaller landowners and 
peasants, who then relocated to burgeoning towns and villages. Immigration from Europe also 
bolstered growth in population centers and sparked an urban revolution as cities accumulated 
political and economic power.42 Urbanization forged a middle class that altered the balance of 
power in the hemisphere.43 These changes in economics and demographics reshaped political 
alliances, placing even more pressure on the established, elite-led orders. Where societies were 
once mostly dominated by landowning planters and the Catholic Church, modernity opened the 
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doors to working class labor, middle class white-collar types, and the military – all represented 
by an array of political parties and movements. 
     These emerging popular classes and groups fostered ideological diversity across the 
Americas. The 1930s challenge to the liberal paradigm came from a plurality of groups 
including anarcho-syndicalists and university intellectuals who mixed indigenous ideologies 
with European socialism, anarchism, and corporatism during the early decades of the century. 
These groups countered liberal dogma with their own nationalist visions and policies. They 
looked within national borders for solutions to the economic malaise. The fundamental tenets of 
the nationalist faith included tighter regulation of industries controlled by non-native capital to 
ensure that social justice and welfare initiatives were carried out through control of significant 
industries via nationalization or expropriation and establishing barriers to keep out 
manufactured imports that stunted internal industrialization. Economic nationalists promised 
uplift, too, but through a different process than export-driven growth. 
     The third factor, the economic volatility built into the liberal arrangement, revealed the 
inherent weaknesses, inequities and unreliability of the export-driven economic model in Latin 
America. Time and again, severe economic contractions followed booms. Monoculture 
societies like Cuba, for example, saw enjoyed riches when the price paid for sugar surged, but 
faced tremendous pressure when demand slackened and prices declined. During World War I, 
the disruption in trade with Europe led to the loss of markets and a precipitous decline in 
commerce, jobs, wages, and standards of living even in countries not dependent on one crop. 
Moreover, the export-dependent growth produced uneven development. Investment in critical 
infrastructure, such as railroads, aimed to serve commodities production, sometimes squeezing 
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local producers by favoring the facilities owned by foreign capital. 
     The roots of the initial nationalist challenge to liberalism are found in the demands for labor 
reforms that buzzed through urban centers, and which translated into public policy in a wide 
variety of ways. In turn-of-the-century Uruguay, the government of Jose Batlle y Ordoñez 
courted the labor sectors by establishing free primary education, an eight-hour workday, old-age 
pensions, and guaranteeing workers the right to strike.44 In Argentina, anarchist- and 
syndicalist-led strikes forced the ruling Conservatives to grant the right to vote to all males with 
the Saenz Peña Law of 1912. The emerging Buenos Aires middle classes later coalesced 
through the Radical Civic Union and seized power in 1916.45 
     By the second decade of the century, nationalism proved capable of dislodging the liberal, 
post-colonial order in Latin America. The most studied example of such a challenge is the 
Mexican revolution.46 Backed by foreign money, railroads were established and oil exploration 
began under the paternal tutelage of Porfirio Díaz. Industry surged, too, financed by the 
international customs houses and investment firms that served as gatekeepers of capital. The 
Díaz regime, however, crumbled in 1910 during a revolt against foreign domination of industry 
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and inequities in rural development. The new government and leaders failed to reach a 
consensus and, in fact, the country sank into civil war – a conflict that tempted its northern 
neighbor to intrude. The consolidation of the Mexican Revolution in the 1917 constitution 
produced a progressive provision, Article 27, that guaranteed national ownership of sub-soil 
rights. Mexico's revolution unnerved and unsettled elite classes elsewhere precisely because 
Díaz once appeared untouchable. 
     The mid-1920s drop in commodity prices, an omen of even tougher times ahead, fueled 
more unrest and impatience elsewhere. Tulio Halperin Donghi writes that “the crisis of the 
1930s came as a rude anticlimax to half a century of economic expansion composed of discreet 
local cycles of boom and bust” stimulated by productive consumption patterns in the United 
States and Europe.47 The Depression again forced Latin American politicians and economists to 
face the fact that their fortunes were tied to industry in faraway countries. This realization and 
reappraisal was evident in the countries surveyed by this dissertation – Cuba, Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina. 
     Brazil’s First Republic, which lasted from 1889 to 1930, owed much of its economic growth, 
political power and social transformation to a massive expansion of exports. European 
immigration, urbanization, and wider avenues for communication and transportation plus 
investment in manufacturing derived from the macroeconomic assimilation of the Brazilian 
economy into export markets.48 The export economy of the country’s First Republic brought to 
power an oligarchy of coffee planters and their clients, and they promoted changes and policies 
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that suited their needs. The system of patronage remained unchanged despite reformist demands 
for a wider dispersion of political power.49 The tide turned after the First World War when the 
conflict sapped European industry, leading to a steep decline in demand for – and the value of – 
Brazilian exports. The economic dislocation that followed fueled labor agitation, restlessness in 
the middle class and distrust within the military.50 
     In Cuba, the sugar economy that flourished in the decades after the Spanish-American War 
unraveled with the Great Depression. In a sixteen-year span between 1914 and 1930, the 
number of sugar mills on the island jumped more than four-fold to fifty-three – while the price 
of the grainy sweetener bolted from about 1.95 cents to 23 cents per pound between 1912 and 
1923. A six-fold surge in U.S. investment to $1.2 billion by 1924 also bolstered Cuba’s 
finances. The island’s prosperity fueled lavish spending by the upper class and the emergence of 
the bourgeois middle class.51 However, waning demand for Cuban sugar in the mid-1920s 
caused the inflated and dependent Cuban sugar-export economy to collapse. The economic 
crisis added more pressure to the political system, and the battle for power between Gerardo 
Machado and his political opposition.52 
     The 1930s crisis in Mexico followed a post-revolution decade of social and political turmoil. 
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Under Díaz, Mexican economic growth became more and more dependent on foreign markets 
and investments. International money and technological progress resulted in record-setting 8 
percent increases in the country’s gross domestic product. However, the Díaz government also 
produced disparities within the economy. Some agricultural enterprises were outfitted with 
modern machinery, others were left to primitive means. Some regions modernized, others were 
left unchanged.53 The civil war in 1910, and the resulting post-revolutionary governments of the 
1920s did little to alter the imbalances. Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Calles sought to create a 
modern economy that was capitalist and nationalist. But Mexico’s development, however, still 
relied on foreign investment and exports. Twenty years of internecine warfare passed, but the 
Mexican Revolution had not changed the fundamental structure of the country’s economy.54 
     Like Mexico, Argentina displayed evidence of uneven development. The years between 
1914 and 1930 witnessed significant increases in Argentine exports of chipped beef, wheat, and 
fuel production. The export boom led to increases in per capita income and living standards. 
But the period was also marked by a World War I depression blamed on the contraction in 
Argentina’s export markets and decline in commodity prices. The drop of demand for exports 
created a deficit in the country’s balance of payments that forced a reduction in imports and a 
subsequent decline in government revenues. Moreover the depressions increased 
unemployment in the urban centers, a drop in rural land prices and a rush of bankruptcies.55 The 
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Wall Street crash and the Great Depression placed severe fiscal constraints on the Argentine 
government led by President Hipolito Yrigoyen. Weakened by a reduction in resources, 
Yrigoyen’s presidency ended in September 1930 during a coup led by the military. 
Conclusion 
     These examples of mounting pressures were replicated in other Latin American countries. 
Across the region, 1930 marked the breakdown of the tenuous post-colonial grip of the liberal 
ruling elites. The discrediting of the export-oriented commercial system created opportunities 
for anti-liberalism to permeate both the public policy mindset and the intellectual debate in one 
form or another in many areas of Latin America. But nationalism was more than just a simple, 
knee-jerk reaction against liberalism. It developed into a distinct and coherent development 
model that placed faith in the state as the agent for internally focused solutions to the economic 
crisis. Those solutions emphasized exchange controls and high tariffs to bar the flow of 
manufactured goods into the region to bolster their own industrial centers. Where industry was 
owned by foreign money, the economic nationalist agenda preached nationalization of 
properties with compensation to owners only when feasible. 
     The political and social stability the nationalists envisioned did not necessarily depend on a 
one-man/one-vote system. Instead, it tended to rely on collective concepts, or corporatist visions 
of cartels and organizations working with the state to resolve disputes and reach settlements 
based on conceptions of a collective common good.56 Though the strains of nationalism evoked 
many different responses and solutions, the general philosophy was embraced by a wide array 
of groups and classes, from emerging industrialists to middle-class merchants to blue-collar 
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dockworkers to peasants. 
     The Depression had put the United States out of step with its neighbors in the Americas. 
FDR and his diplomatic team looked to raise U.S. prestige and interests through a 
reestablishment of a liberal order at the very moment that nationalists were turning to rival 
models and methods. This divergence of views and programs was the source of a feud that 
would rupture the illusions of Pan American unity. Signs of that illusion would first appear in 
Cuba in 1933 even as the liberal program was taking shape in Washington. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
Using Trade to Thwart Revolution in Cuba 
     The tension between the liberal agenda promulgated by the Roosevelt Administration and 
Latin American economic nationalism first surfaced in Cuba. In 1933, FDR and his diplomats 
confronted the increasingly violent revolt against Cuban President Gerardo Machado. Amidst 
the growing crisis, the Roosevelt liberals proposed a wide-ranging trade treaty they said would 
jumpstart the Cuban economy and ease pressure on the besieged Cuban leader. However, the 
key to negotiating the commercial accord ultimately depended on replacing Machado with a 
trusted, reliable ally who would promote export-oriented measures, a task that was infinitely 
more difficult in the diverse Cuban political arena of 1933. The intense drama that followed 
proved the strength and acceptance of nationalist groups and ideas on the island. 
     The difficulties that awaited the liberals in Cuba were not so evident when FDR sent Sumner 
Welles to Havana in May 1933 to launch Good Neighbor economic diplomacy. Welles’ 
followed in the footsteps of a previous “mediator,” Enoch Crowder, who likewise arrived in 
Cuba in 1921 to sort out a disputed election, stem revolt, and seed economic progress. Welles, 
however, found Depression-era Cuba embroiled in a complex set of disputes involving a wider 
web of protagonists. Besides the better known political protagonists from the establishment 
Conservative, Popular and Liberal parties, the opposition included a broad spectrum of anti-
Machado activists from labor unions, university student groups, and the Cuban Communist 
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Party.57 The long line of politicos on the scene, whether on center stage or in the background, 
offered a variety of competing visions for Cuba's development.58 Many of their platforms soon 
proved unpalatable to the Roosevelt liberals. The divergence in views and ambitions set the 
stage for the ensuing, intense diplomatic standoff between Cuba and the United States. 
     In fact, Good Neighbor liberalism in Cuba was a reactive policy to currents and events that 
Hull, Welles and other U.S. liberals found difficult to predict, discern, or control. Despite the 
economic power that U.S. interests wielded on the island, the factors that propelled the drama in 
Cuba were rooted in domestic organizations with nationalist views and plans. These groups 
included the professional middle class, labor unions, student groups, and intellectual 
societies. They also included a younger generation of Cubans born after the war of 
independence. The U.S. pledge to promote tranquility through trade and more U.S. tutelage 
simply proved unpalatable to these sectors of the emerging and developing Cuban society. 
These new groups and classes flatly rejected the Welles’ liberal offer, forcing U.S. diplomats 
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to change goals and tactics. After the fact, Good Neighbor advocates in contemporary 
diplomacy and later historiography argued that the Roosevelt program was a proactive approach 
to the hemisphere, but the Cuba episode suggests the opposite. 
      Almost from the moment he arrived in Cuba, Welles and his mission were not only 
engulfed in the anti-Machado uprising but also overwhelmed by the liberal-nationalist clash of 
ideas. First, Machado resisted the treaty. Then, a junta led by Ramon Grau San Martín, which 
followed Machado’s regime, was openly hostile to it. Refusing to leave Cuba without an 
accord, Welles turned again and again to cajoling in picking-and-choosing potential presidents 
and strongmen, even as his superiors in Washington decried intervention. Welles ultimately 
negotiated a favorable commercial treaty with a compliant Cuban government, but the 
nationalist genie had been unleashed in Cuba. 
     The Cuba episode, on the surface, suggested a liberal victory but, in reality, the treaty helped 
promote the very chronic economic and social volatility in Cuba that it was supposed to 
ameliorate. While Cuba received generous allotments and prices for sugar exports, the pact 
bonded the island to the cyclical twists in the commodity markets and undermined efforts to 
diversify the Cuban economy.59 The treaty further relegated the island’s finances to the 
management of foreign companies and financiers and left Cubans to battle over the one 
corporation they could dominate, the government. The damaging effects from these results, in 
the long run, fueled not only Cuban nationalist sentiments but a successful call for more radical 
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measures.  
Defining the Problem, Designing the Solution 
     On the evening of February 26, 1933, a freight train traveling to Esperanza, a town in Cuba's 
Matanzas province, suddenly bolted from the rails at the crack of a sharp explosion. The engine 
and eighteen cars ran off the tracks, killing the engineer and a conductor60 and elicited 
immediate suspicion from the government and the train’s owners that the blast was the work of 
saboteurs. The suspected attack on the railroad cars owned by the British United Railways of 
Habana was just one in a growing list of assaults on foreign companies and their representatives 
in Cuba. Two days before the Matanzas episode, suspicious explosions derailed four trains 
owned by other U.S. and British companies. Earlier in February 1933, Cuban police arrested 
two attorneys and three other employees of the law office of Rosales and Lavedon, the firm of 
choice for the National City Bank of New York and other U.S. companies. The violence and the 
arrests, reported one U.S. news correspondent, had turned Havana into a “gallery [of] 
disappearances and secret organizations."61 
     For the Roosevelt Administration, the increasing violence in Cuba presented the first 
important challenge to the Good Neighbor Policy of military restraint and Pan American 
liberalism. In early April, FDR’s foreign policy team quickly sized up the reason for the strife 
on the island: The combination of the Depression and repressive rule fueled unrest and 
violence. "As a result of all that has happened in Cuba [it] lies at our feet exhausted, bruised and 
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bleeding; but, full of submerged vitality, and if taken by the hand and put on her feet she will 
soon forget her troubles,” wrote Welles.62 
     The liberal blueprint to put Cuba back on her feet was a simple one. To foster prosperity on 
the island, Hull and Welles surmised that both the U.S. and Cuban governments needed to 
restore commerce. Massive U.S. purchases of Cuban sugar, they said, would promote Cuban 
economic progress. Once the island’s economy stabilized, the two senior diplomats believed 
they could rebuild a democratic government patterned after the one in the United States. As 
long as the strife continued, however, Hull feared that "the younger generation from whom the 
leaders of Cuba tomorrow must spring” only learned that changes in government resulted from 
“measures of violence and revolution" instead of constitutional government.63 
     The Roosevelt liberals suggested that the Machado government was at least partly to blame 
for the troubles on the island. Machado had annoyed U.S. officials by straying from the road 
toward democratic government and liberal economics during the late 1920s. FDR's foreign 
policy team did not look favorably on a series of constitutional changes in the island's 
government that had eliminated the vice-presidency, extended terms of office for the Cuban 
congress, and created a six-year presidential term. While Machado modified the political 
blueprint imposed by the Platt Amendment, Cuba also drifted from the U.S. economic orbit. In 
less than ten years, Cuba fell from sixth to sixteenth among U.S. trading partners. U.S. exports 
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to the island dropped 67 percent to $57 million between 1924 and 1933.64 The Havana 
newspaper Diario de la Marina calculated that Cuban purchases of U.S. products fell nearly 50 
percent to $58 million from 1931 to 1932, while purchases of Cuban goods dropped by about 
40 percent in the same period.65 
     Hull and Welles argued that a rebirth of trade and prosperity would bring Cuba back into the 
liberal fold and promote stable democratic governance. The first step in their plan was to 
negotiate a reciprocal treaty to lower tariffs and raise quotas on selected goods bought from 
Cuba. In April 1933, the administration decided Cuba should be the laboratory to test the 
development theory. In a statement calling for a new trade agreement, Welles noted that Cuba 
“is potentially one of the greatest customers of the American continent” of U.S.-made products 
and that the island “depends upon fair and generous treatment of the United States for her 
economic life.” The statement concluded that “there is no country of the Western Hemisphere 
with which our relations should be closer than with Cuba."66 
     Hull worried that the civil strife would continue to undermine efforts to increase commerce 
between Cuba and the United States. Early in 1933, Hull wrote that he viewed "with the gravest 
of concern the situation now existing in Cuba." A reciprocal trade agreement, Hull claimed, 
"cannot be undertaken so long as this situation of political unrest in Cuba continues."67 And 
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without a trade agreement and economic revival, it would be difficult to achieve the second 
prong of the liberal vision: a stable constitutional democracy. The liberals found themselves in a 
Catch-22. Without a trade treaty, prosperity seemed an impossible feat. Without peace and 
tranquility, a treaty to promote trade and prosperity appeared beyond reach. Without the ability 
to control political events in Cuba, the stability required to launch the liberal agenda remained 
elusive. 
     To resolve this quandary, FDR and Hull turned to Welles. The president had originally 
picked Welles as his chief Pan American strategist in the State Department because of the 
Castillean-speaking Brahmin’s experience in hemispheric diplomacy – including a stint serving 
as a mediator between dictator Rafael Trujillo and his opposition a few years before in the 
Dominican Republic. Welles accepted the challenge and was handed clear instructions from the 
president and secretary of state: Negotiate a commercial treaty and with Machado and the 
opposition to write a new electoral code and constitution providing for elections at the earliest 
possible date. 
     Welles harbored initial doubts about the strategy’s practicality, but his mission garnered 
endorsements from various quarters. "If you can arrange before Congress meets next January to 
restore civil rights and constitutional government, and elect a vice president to replace 
Machado, you will render a great service to the Cuban people and accomplish a diplomatic 
achievement for the present administration," wrote congressman Hamilton Fish of New York.68 
At least one U.S. manufacturer with business interests on the island welcomed the prospects of 
improved commerce. A.  
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Cornhall of the William L. Barrell Company complained that duties on cotton piece goods had 
risen by 60 percent since 1926. He said that attention to tariff reform and reciprocity might 
produce an improvement in business.69 Welles was unimpressed. The U.S. envoy was no fan of 
Machado, whom he believed was “detested” by many Cubans. "This policy is not sensational," 
he wrote. "It will satisfy neither one side nor the other down here."70 
     With his mission defined, the U.S. ambassador arrived at the port of Havana on a Sunday 
afternoon in May. He at once made an impression. A Cuban writer compared Welles – dressed 
in a dark suit in contrast to the more common tropical white linen attire – to a protagonist from 
a Lord Byron novel.71 In their first meeting, Welles and Machado exchanged public greetings 
and then, in a private chat, Welles handed the president a letter from FDR. Welles told 
Machado that he was there not to "involve himself in Cuban political matters” but to negotiate a 
commercial treaty “for the mutual benefit of both countries." He asked for Machado’s 
cooperation in turning the public's attention from "general agitation to economic interest." 
Welles suggested the Cuban leader "carry out a program of conciliation” as well as conducting 
“absolutely fair and uncontrolled national elections." Welles reported to Hull that Machado 
"was very obviously impressed with the declarations which I made to him."72 
     Welles and his superiors expected Machado to accept the offer. They reasoned that 
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Machado, a former manager in Cuba’s U.S.-run electric company, fully understood the benefits 
of U.S. investment and corporate patronage. They recognized Machado possessed a relatively 
solid record of cooperation with past U.S. administrators in Cuba. Before he assumed the 
presidency in 1925, Machado set the tone for his government during a luncheon sponsored by 
the Bankers' Club of New York. There he assured U.S. merchants "that they will have absolute 
guarantees for their business interests under the administration of Cuba." He pledged no 
tolerance for strikes, labor unrest and other actions disrupting "the tranquility of the 
Government and the peace of the country." The audience, which included representatives of the 
U.S. sugar industry and Wall Street financiers, nodded in approval.73 Throughout his eight years 
in power, Machado zealously repaid Cuba's external debts to U.S. banks and ardently kept the 
"communistic" and anti-Yankee elements under a tight grip. The question now, however, was 
whether Machado could hold his grasp on Cuba long enough to approve the treaty and spark a 
measure of economic recovery before his days in power came to a merciful end. 
Machado: From Liberalism to Nationalism 
     Machado later recalled that he greeted Welles and his mission on that May Sunday with 
initial skepticism. From the moment that the "ambassador came to shake my hand, we met face 
to face and I understood that the battle had begun.74 It is difficult to determine whether 
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Machado truly had been that perceptive, or whether bitterness over his subsequent ouster 
colored his later recollection. What is indisputable is that Machado came to resent Welles and 
to resist the liberal blueprint. This stance, ironically, placed the Cuban president more in accord 
with his most virulent, nationalist opponents than with Welles and the U.S. plan to bolster 
Machado’s own prospects, standing and future. 
     Stocky and stern, the white-haired Gerardo Machado y Morales fashioned himself as a 
classic authoritarian, paternal figure. A veteran of the war with Spain, where he lost his middle 
finger to injury and rose to field commander, Machado subsequently served in a series of post-
independence provincial government posts. Possessing a dominating personality, Machado held 
little but contempt for most of his rival political chieftains who he saw as weak-willed and 
corrupt. Machado blamed his presidential predecessors, Mario Menocal and Rogelio Zayas, for 
leaving him a country that was "disorganized and full of disintegrating currents . . . that was the 
product of twenty years of government in which all the errors and the evils of the colonial 
regime became accentuated."75 After his first four-year term in power expired, Machado 
declared that calm in Cuba existed only because "my government has zealously guarded order 
and assured social discipline."76 To guarantee its continuation, he changed the constitution to 
give himself a new six-year term, eliminate the position of vice-president to quell talk of 
successors and a keep a pliant congress.  
     His eight years in power increased Machado’s wealth and commercial holdings. A well-to-
do businessman, Machado learned to profit from the same protectionist policies that Welles 
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sought to roll back. The U.S. Smoot-Hawley Act, plus a parallel measure in Cuba, made it 
harder for Cubans to buy from U.S. merchants but easier for them to buy from the small but 
emerging Cuban manufacturing sector in which Machado possessed an array of investments 
and interests. By 1928, according to his personal financial statements, Machado owned a 
diversified investment portfolio that included shares in paint, metals and shoe factories as well 
as stock in International Telephone and Telegraph, a U.S. company that owned much of Cuba's 
phone industry. His proudest achievement – a public works law that initiated a series of projects 
including roads, sewers and ports – also benefited his real estate and agricultural holdings.77 
     Machado's emphasis on internal economic diversification worried U.S. diplomats in Cuba 
during the late 1920s and early 1930s. The embassy and consulates received various complaints 
from U.S. businessmen claiming they were muscled out of local contracts. A subsidiary of a 
large U.S. paint firm, for example, groused that a customer canceled an order because "such 
pressure was being brought upon him to buy from the Cuban factory."78 Machado's purchase of 
the Banco Comercial de Cuba, and his plans to issue government bonds, alarmed U.S. 
financiers. These types of transactions, the bankers insisted, were the unrivaled domain of the 
National City Bank of New York and the Chase Manhattan Bank.79 
     While trade with the United States declined, Cuba's contacts with Europe revived. Machado 
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boasted that during his tenure, exports and imports from Great Britain and Spain had 
increased.80 At his second inaugural, Machado played favorites with the Spaniards – allegedly 
even allowing the Spanish navy cruiser Almirante Cervera to moor above the spot where the 
U.S.S. Maine sank.81 He spoke with bluster and bravado as Cuba appeared to step away from 
the U.S. economic orbit. During a speech to a group of Spanish-American War veterans, 
Machado boasted that "morally, the Platt Amendment does not exist. It has been replaced by the 
patriotism and virtue of the Cubans."82 The United States, he was quoted as saying, was "not 
authorized to meddle in Cuban affairs. That was the business of the Cuban people. The Platt 
Amendment did not exist in Cuba anymore."83 
      Evidence suggests Machado was an opportunist, not a nationalist. To the ire of his domestic 
foes, for example, he zealously made sure that payments to U.S. bondholders and debtor banks 
arrived on time. He pushed a law through the Cuban congress reducing the tax burden on U.S.-
owned power and transportation companies while also allowing them to use land and property 
owned by the Cuban state or to private citizens. And to the delight of foreign investors, he 
played hardball with labor activists, as promised. Intellectuals, political adversaries, university 
professors, students, and the members of the nascent communist party all faced his wrath. 
     Eager to protect his wealth and his grip on power, Machado proved unenthusiastic about the 
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liberal trade agreement and government reforms that Welles was proposing in 1933. The first 
deadlock between Welles and Machado arrived during the first set of treaty talks. The U.S. 
envoy reported that Machado's representatives held steadfast to "a natural desire to afford 
protection to legitimate Cuban industries" and to not "impair the advantages now possessed in 
Cuba by Great Britain for her textiles and certain other categories of imports."84 In fact, 
Machado made clear that Cuba was disposed to grant favored status to U.S. products only over 
those of other countries. Machado said he was adamant against tariff reform that threatened to 
hurt the smaller farmer, the cattle rancher, and the small-scale industrialist. Not coincidentally, 
these were all activities in which Machado invested. And any tariff reductions, Machado 
insisted, were conditioned on parallel cuts in the U.S. sugar tariff, the setting of a fixed sugar 
quota, and favored treatment for tobacco and other winter agricultural produce that entered the 
U.S. market without duties. Machado did desire a treaty to increase commerce and revenues for 
his cash-poor government, but such a pact had to be crafted along his terms. "We demonstrated 
that we were not willing to sacrifice Cuba to serve the particular interests of Chicago [and its 
commodities markets]," Machado later boasted.85 
     Sporadic violence throughout the country and Cuban government disputes with creditor 
banks also complicated treaty negotiations. In May, Machado's Guardia Rural posse killed 
three employees of the U.S.-owned Cuban Company’s sugar mill. Welles warned Machado that 
the U.S. government would not "tolerate" the murders "any more than it had been willing to 
countenance on a similar situation in the years preceding the Spanish-American War."86 
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Machado also angered U.S. financiers in 1933 by retreating on his promise to pay back a 
portion of the island's debts to U.S. banks – a sharp break from a practice that for years earned 
him the benefit of the doubt. In late May, the Cuban government decided to issue $40 million in 
gold bonds to cover repayment of previous loans instead of using government cash collected 
from taxes.87 The bankers were displeased with the offer of bonds instead of cash, and they 
insisted the float should have been for twice as much. 
     The growing strength and unity exhibited by the anti-Machado dissidents further 
complicated the talks. A divided and defeated lot after a failed uprising in August 1931, the 
opposition groups reorganized under the auspices of an umbrella group, the New York-based 
Junta Revolucionaria Cubana, to offer a united front. This group included the Cuban political 
figures most familiar to U.S. officials in Washington and Havana, former president Mario 
Menocal and party captain Carlos Mendieta. Although they hailed from rival parties, both men 
represented the elite los hombres del '95," or the leaders of the wars of independence that later 
headed post-independence governments. Menocal served as Cuba's president from 1916 to 
1920 under the banner of the Conservative Party. Mendieta was a former Liberal Party chieftain 
who now headed the Nationalist Party. Another figure, Mariano Miguel Gómez, represented the 
Liberal party in the junta. Though hailing from different factions, these personalities and their 
respective parties sought to return Cuba to the pre-Machado system that allowed parties to take 
turns in office. But in the spring of 1933, neither group embraced Welles’ attempt to negotiate 
with Machado. "Over what exists nothing can be constructed, nothing just, stable or 
                                                                
 
87
 Memo by L. Casas of the National City Bank of New York, May 24, 1933, Welles Papers, 
box 26, FDRL. 
 
 48
permanent," wrote opposition figure Aurelio Hevia. "Everything that would be done would 
have its origin in vice."88 
     Other segments of the Cuban polity less familiar to Welles, Hull and other U.S. officials also 
gained strength and cohesion. Radical change was the goal of a wide array of non-elite actors, 
labor unions, university students, and the enlisted men in the military, whose influence finally 
coalesced in the summer of 1933. Organizations such as the labor union Confederación de 
Trabajadores Cubanos and the Cuban communist party positioned themselves as nascent 
power brokers. And a secretive group, known as ABC, took charge of the anti-Machado battle 
in the summer of 1933. The ABC's most recognized leader, Joaquín Martínez Saenz, claimed 
the group was formed because of the inaction and impotence of previous governing 
organizations, such as the Mendieta-led Nationalists.89 The ABC's chief goal was to run 
Machado and his government from office by force. Ideologically, the ABC's mildly reformist 
platform included measures to protect small farms, to reduce large landholdings through 
taxation policies, to put caps on corporate land holdings, and to nationalize public utilities that 
were monopolies.90 Discord also brewed in another quarter, the military. Non-commissioned 
soldiers in the Cuban army grew restless over pay, housing and potential reductions in their 
ranks.91 
     Yet it was the University of Havana’s Directorio Estudiantil, or student directorate, created 
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in the late 1920s, that ultimately emerged as the nationalist vanguard in Machado’s last year. 
The student group initially sought to eliminate government meddling in the university.92 But the 
expulsion, imprisonment, and subsequent murder of a popular student leader, Julio Mella, 
turned many student activists against the Machado regime. Mella’s death galvanized the 
university group into a formidable activist organization with a much broader and progressive 
public policy platform.93 By the end of 1932, the students assailed the government for making 
external debt payments while many Cubans suffered hunger. The student directorate pledged in 
late December of that year to replace Machado’s regime with a government that "will revise all 
Cuban values" along a more nationalist path.94 Within the year, the student group would get its 
chance to do so. 
     Welles’ hands were full just dealing with the Cuban political factions most familiar, and 
closest, to him. Machado would not budge and the mainstream opposition grew increasingly 
agitated and impatient. A provocative junta manifesto issued in the summer of 1933 called for a 
"renovating revolution . . . to totally liquidate the political system that has culminated in the 
bloody tyranny that we are fighting."95 If a breakthrough was not achieved by the end of June, 
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Welles and others feared, more bloodshed might necessitate U.S. military intervention. In 
Washington, Jefferson Caffery and Charles Taussig, two principal State Department and White 
House advisors on Latin America, urged a reconsideration of the attitude toward Machado. 
"The Opposition has become disturbed at the possibility that Machado will be further 
strengthened by the negotiation of any reciprocal trade agreement," Caffery wrote Welles. 
"Some gesture must be made towards the opposition. I don't know how much longer the Junta 
will wait without resorting to violence, unless some positive indication is given so that their 
grievances are to be taken under consideration."96 
Cease-fire, Garage Diplomacy, and Revolution 
     Barely a month into Welles’ Cuba mission, the United States turned a pivotal corner, quietly, 
with a strategy change that traded carrots for sticks. Instead of seeking political stability and 
reform following economic rejuvenation, they chose to restore public tranquility through a 
political settlement. The first step was to establish, and maintain a truce, however tenuous, 
between Machado and the junta. The next step would be setting a timetable for electing a new 
government more disposed to negotiating a commercial treaty. Welles’ efforts to negotiate a 
cease-fire – the so-called “mediation” – received an early boost. Cosme de la Torriente, a 
former president of the League of Nations Assembly and a Machado opponent, publicly 
supported a U.S.-negotiated truce in June. Welles then cheerfully reported to Hull and FDR that 
de la Torriente sent representatives from Cuba to New York and Miami to demand that exile 
opposition forces, particularly Menocal's group, drop their "revolutionary" program and agree to 
participate in the mediation process in Havana.97 
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     By the end of June other key members of the opposition agreed to participate in the truce 
talks with the Machado government. The sessions were irreverently dubbed "garage" diplomacy 
by critical Cuban observers because some of the discussions were held in the U.S. embassy's 
garage. Machado seemed willing to go along with garage diplomacy at first. He indicated his 
willingness to accept a slate of reforms including freeing prisoners, easing press censorship, and 
permitting the return of exiled rivals. Machado even consented to inviting Columbia University 
professor Lee McBain to come to Cuba to press for structural changes in government 
institutions along U.S. lines.98 
    Welles was soon convinced that "these negotiations will have a successful outcome."99 In a 
mid-July report to FDR, he gleefully reported that "I am happy to say that the various 
delegations are concentrating upon questions of principle, upon changing the system rather than 
the individuals." He predicted that "we can work out a fair and just solution of the political 
problem strictly within the line of a constitutional procedure." As truce talks progressed, Welles 
reported "the ground is very well cleared now for me to commence immediately the 
negotiations for the revision of the commercial treaty." If Cuba is permitted to sell two million 
tons of sugar in the U.S. at stable prices – plus a preferential advantage provided by the 
reciprocal treaty – Welles predicted that "there is no reason why social conditions in Cuba 
should not improve materially."100 
     There was a catch, however. While Welles was willing to settle for reform, the anti-
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Machado opposition in Cuba wanted immediate change. But Machado refused to accede to the 
one demand that his adversaries most sorely wanted – his resignation. Machado stated his 
position publicly in late July. Appearing before the Cuban congress, he broke with protocol, 
first, by publicly acknowledging the existence of the U.S.-inspired mediation and then linking 
the process to Welles personally. Machado claimed that his "cooperation" came from 
"spontaneous will and did not follow instructions or mandates” from Welles or the U.S. 
government. "I would have left the presidency rather than accept a foreign demand," he said.101 
     Machado may have relished his public scolding of Welles, but his congressional bravado 
doomed his own presidency. The disclosure left the mediation effort in shambles, with the U.S. 
envoy publicly rebuffed, and the new faces in the Cuban political drama seized the moment. 
First, a series of strikes called by the CTC and other unions swept Havana and many provincial 
towns. On August 7, police forces, called to stem labor union protests, opened fire on civilians, 
killing 17 protesters while wounding another 100 people. Three days after the shootings, the 
officer corps in the military revolted against Machado. Welles feared that "any incident might 
provoke a general explosion."102 When Machado proposed handing over the presidency to one 
of his associates, "some of the members of the opposition [were] bitterly opposed" and Welles 
warned Hull again that "the maintenance of public order in the next few days will be 
exceedingly difficult."103 On August 12, the army staged a palace coup that sent Machado 
fleeing into exile. Welles expressed relief. He told Hull and FDR that "I now have confidence 
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that the situation has been saved."104 
     The coup marked Machado’s political death knell, but it was a defeat for Welles and Cuban 
liberalism, too. The organizations and coalitions that prodded Machado’s ouster, labor unions, 
the communist party, and the university groups, were nationalist in thought and action, if not 
origin. Though Machado’s removal appeared to pave the way for constitutional and liberal 
commercial reforms, the coup actually opened avenues for nationalists – even if they still need 
to wait another turn before gaining power. The editors at the New Republic correctly prophesied 
that the times now called for "new men, new measures, a new Cuba" to replace the ousted 
Machado regime.105 And those men, their measures and the Cuba they longed for were 
decidedly nationalist in substance and style. 
     To be sure, Welles quickly recovered from the stunning events of August 12. With threats of 
U.S. intervention and more cajoling, he molded an interim government headed by Carlos 
Manuel de Cespedes. The provisional president, a former ambassador to the U.S. and France, 
possessed a familiar name, de Cespedes, to Cubans – he was a descendent of a historic figure in 
the mid-nineteenth century independence battles. After taking the oath, Machado's successor 
received a warm but somewhat distant embrace from the tall, lanky American ambassador. 
Tenuous, too, would be the level of support from the Cuban polity. Welles recognized the 
margin for error in Cuba was slim. "Poverty and destitution exist throughout the Republic," he 
wrote. "Under these conditions no government can stand." “Chaos” thus loomed. His solution: 
Cuba needed a freeze on debt repayment, U.S. loans so that the government could pay salaries, 
                     
104
 Welles to Hull, August 12, 1933, FRUS 1933, 5:359. 
 
105
 “The Week: Cuba,” The New Republic, 76 (August 23, 1933), p. 1. 
 
 54
a sale of U.S. Treasury bonds to Wall Street banks in Cuba (which would then use the bonds to 
circulate currency) and generous prices and generous quotas for its sugar.106 
     However, the U.S. Treasury rejected the proposed bond sale, and U.S. financial policy 
drifted. In a brief, if not terse response, Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson said that the U.S. 
Treasury would not aid in floating a money-raising bond issue in the United States. He also said 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation would not lend the island any money “until the whole 
matter of Cuban finances is put on a sounder basis.” The best the Treasury could do, Acheson 
said, was to extend credits to Cuba that were equal to what the island paid for purchases of U.S. 
exports. In August of 1933, Cuban remittances to the United States for export payments totaled 
about $2 million a month.107 
     To Welles’ dismay and chagrin, events again spun out of his control. The strikes in Cuba 
continued. Violence increased. Vigilante posses hunted and lynched former political and social 
rivals in cities and villages across the island. The anti-Machado coalition of old caudillos that 
Welles linked together in the mediation process suffered a key defection when Menocal's group 
broke ranks and, as Welles put it, joined with the "extreme radicals.” Welles complained his 
adversaries planned to transform the Cuban government into a revolutionary government. He 
warned that the coalition was plotting to abolish the Congress and the judiciary as well as “to 
remove all local provincial and municipal officials throughout the Republic in order to replace 
them with their own henchmen."108 Welles figured de Cespedes could not govern for another 
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two years, let alone two months, and he proposed elections for Cuba by the end of 1933 saying 
that an election was needed to avoid more unrest or a “further attempt at revolution.”109 
     Welles still insisted disorder could be quelled with a dose of economic revival. He told Hull 
that Cuba would need time to heal wounds inflicted by the violence and the repressive Machado 
government. In addition, deep structural issues within the island’s social and economic order 
required immediate attention. “The average laborer on the plantations has been paid less than 
the minimum amount required to feed himself and his family and the conditions of distress and 
actual destitution which exist cannot be exaggerated,” Welles concluded. The solution, he 
reiterated, was to get the sugar economy, the country’s biggest industry, to produce again and to 
distribute its gains more evenly. Of course, all this was "contingent" on how much sugar Cuba 
produced and sold, and that "depends on the agreement, which is to be reached in Washington 
as to the Cuban quota."110 
     However, time had run out on the de Cespedes government. On September 4, while the 
provisional president surveyed damage from a hurricane that ripped across the island's northern 
coast, a rebellion among rank-and-file soldiers erupted. Official U.S. sources blamed the revolt 
on a proposed pay cut for the 12,500 enlisted soldiers in the military.111 But an obscure sergeant 
named Fulgencio Batista furiously disputed the assertion, saying the rebellion sought to 
"cleanse the uniform" of its corrupt Machado stains by purging Machado officers from their 
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ranks.112 To back Batista’s words, the enlisted men marched five-hundred of their erstwhile 
commanding officers at gunpoint out of the Camp Columbia army headquarters in Havana. In a 
peculiar twist of fate, the ousted officers found refuge in the Hotel Nacional, where Welles was 
also living. Meanwhile, the military’s new leaders stripped their commander-in-chief, de 
Cespedes, of his duties as provisional president. The ousted president refused to challenge the 
conspirators. He preferred seclusion at home rather than to "lend myself to a farce where the 
only sound is the firing of machine guns."113 
     After the sergeant’s revolt, a new governing group, known as the Pentarquia, replaced the de 
Cespedes' provisional government. The Pentarquia government did not include military 
officers, but it ruled with the backing of the army. The university’s student directorate 
dominated the government and the students chose Ramon Grau San Martín, a University of 
Havana medical professor, as president. Grau's ascension concluded the directorate’s rise from 
obscure actor in the Cuban political scene to center stage in the September drama. Following its 
inception in 1927, the directorate gradually developed a broad and more radical program. At 
first narrowly focused on academic freedom, the directorate had, by July 1933, widened its 
concerns to include literacy campaigns in the countryside, a ban on child labor, establishment of 
minimum wages and advocated reorganization of health services and housing, particularly for 
the peasantry. 
     The directorate steadfastly opposed the proposed U.S. commercial treaty. Instead of 
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depending on export-oriented growth dependent on sales to the U.S. market, the directorate 
pledged to diversify Cuba’s trade by expanding its commercial ties to Canada and the other 
countries of the Americas.114 Directorate member Herminio Portela Vila, a historian, was an 
outspoken critic of the United States. He publicly castigated Washington for trying to "convert 
Cuba's Machado problem into one of give and take by offering concessions to Cuban sugar."115 
Antonio Guiteras, another directorate founder, promised that the new government would fight 
"fiercely against the root of our ills – economic imperialism."116 
     The directorate-guided government soon unleashed a series of nationalist decrees that 
angered Welles. The best-known measures included a rule that forced foreign-owned electric 
utilities to slash their kilowatt charges in half, a minimum wage law, and a decree requiring at 
least half of the workforce of all companies had to be native-born Cubans. Grau explained that 
the goal of his economic plan was the "nationalization of employment and wealth of the 
country, the development of small landowners by dividing [large land estates] and the erasure of 
national debts."117 He insisted the government would follow "a revolutionary program.”118 The 
Grau government disputed accusations that it adhered to Bolshevik principles and denied that 
its members were Communists.119 
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     Welles appraised the government and the military elements backing the government 
differently. He concluded two days after the coup that the new government was “an 
undisciplined group of individuals of divergent tendencies representing the most irresponsible 
elements in the city of Habana with practically no support whatsoever outside the capitol."120 
He charged that the government included "the most extreme radicals of the student organization 
and three university professors who are frankly communistic."121 Other U.S. citizens living in 
Cuba endorsed that view. "[T]he attitude of the soldiers and a substantial part of the population 
is swayed by the last agitator with whom they talk," wrote Maurice McGovern, president of the 
American Chamber of Commerce of Cuba. "[T]he communistic element is the best organized 
element in Cuba today."122 Welles initially was suspicious, too, of the army sergeants that 
ousted de Cespedes and kept the Pentarquia in power. Following the coup against de Cespedes, 
Welles wrote that "the disorganized and demoralized” force behind the new government “now 
realize their mistake" and may "resort to desperate measures if they become sufficiently 
drunk."123  
     After warning of a "communistic" takeover, Welles called for intervention. But beyond 
sending the U.S.S. Mississippi and a few smaller warships to sail along the island’s coast as a 
warning, Hull and FDR refused to consider landing Marines on the island. Both men were 
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adamant against reversing their previous pledges to not commit troops, even if the Platt 
Amendment still gave the United States the legal right to send troops to the island. "Such an act 
would further embitter our relations with all of Latin America," Hull wrote. "It would also undo 
all our protestations of non-intervention and non-interference."124 Besides "if we have to go in 
there again," Hull reasoned, "we will never be able to come out and we will have on our hands 
the troubles of thirty years ago."125  
     Without troops, Welles had to embark on another round of garage diplomacy and secret 
meetings to dislodge the “radical” Grau government. First, the ambassador reached out to the 
anti-Machado coalition that counted Mendieta, Martínez Saenz of the ABC, Menocal, and 
Gómez. The coalition now called for a "government of consensus" headed by Mendieta and 
others not viewed as radicals.126 Then Welles scolded the members of the student directorate, 
whom he said were "immature" and failed to "grasp even in a rudimentary sense the grave 
dangers" facing Cuba. He warned “the American companies – the public utilities, importers and 
sugar mills – cannot and will not do business under the present conditions.” Welles also 
calculated that Cuba’s treasury was low on funds and “will be empty within a period of two 
weeks.” He estimated “the food supplies in Habana and the other ports are barely sufficient."127 
Welles repeated a similar lecture to Grau. He pointed out that some U.S. financial, commercial 
and agricultural businesses refused to pay taxes. Others, Welles added, were closing down 
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operations or canceling orders to protest their opposition to “a continuation of the present 
regime.” Welles recalls telling Grau that all these actions “must certainly convince him . . . that 
the Government was not supported by exceedingly important elements in the country."128 
     Welles understood that to end the stalemate he needed to strike a deal between the Mendieta-
led coalition and the army. It was not possible to scrap the directorate without bringing both 
together. Thus, the focus of garage diplomacy turned to the sergeant in command, Fulgencio 
Batista. During their first meeting, Batista mouthed the very words that Welles wanted to hear. 
"We assured him that the [military] would give protection to property and life by maintaining 
public order,” Batista later recalled. He also promised to protect the rights of U.S. property 
owners by giving them the same protection that Cubans enjoyed “because we wanted to end the 
anarchy and the communist agitation."129 
    Welles was sold. He cabled Hull that Batista's attitude "was extremely reasonable . . . and he 
expressed rigorous opposition to all communist propaganda and activities."130 Welles set up 
meetings between Batista and coalition members such as Mendieta and Gómez. By early 
October, garage diplomacy had helped drive a wedge between the army and the directorate. A 
satisfied Welles reported to Hull on the "healthy reaction among the soldiers themselves against 
those elements in the government and especially those members of the [directorate] whom they 
consider identified with the Communist organization."131 He explained to Leslie Buell of the 
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Foreign Policy Association what his diplomacy had achieved – "the immediate fusion of the 
center and left groups with the participation of the present leaders of the army for the purpose of 
bringing about a change in the government."132 
     Pressure from U.S. citizens on the island mounted. William Whitman, an official at the U.S.-
owned electric company, complained bitterly that government decrees regulating the price of 
power would cost the company $3 million a year. The company, he warned, faced “bankruptcy, 
the partial if not complete suspension of its services within a very few months, and hence the 
enforced elimination of the best taxpayer and employer of labor in the republic of Cuba."133 The 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Cuba charged the Grau government with being "antagonistic to 
capital and business in general” and with having “completely destroyed confidence of the 
commercial, industrial and agricultural interests of the nation.” The end result, the business 
organization said, was “a state of chaos and disintegration of grave consequences to the future 
welfare of the island," wrote Maurice McGovern, the president the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
in Cuba.134 
     Unfortunately for Welles and U.S. businessmen opposing Grau, garage diplomacy was less 
fruitful the second time around. In late October, the ambassador offered the presidency to 
Mendieta. But the caudillo turned it down saying he lacked support he needed to hold a 
coalition together. An exasperated Welles reported to Hull that Mendieta "is unwilling to face 
the responsibility of the moment.”135 By late November, Welles was worn out by the travails of 
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dealing with the round robin of opposition figures and shifting alliances. 
     With his civilian allies noncommittal, Welles now turned to Batista again. He repeatedly 
noted that the "influence of Batista is very powerful" and that he appeared to have near 
command of all the troops.136 In early October, Welles flattered the erstwhile sergeant with 
assurances that he “was the only individual in Cuba today who represented authority." The 
support of his troops and his firm anti-Communist stance put Cuba’s salvation in his hands."137 
In the weeks that followed, Batista gathered army support for a change in government. Thus, the 
alliance between the U.S. ambassador and the former army stenographer took shape, and 
cemented Batista's grip on the Cuban political scene for the next generation. 
     The drama surrounding the directorate-led government ended in early January with Grau's 
resignation. The formerly reluctant Mendieta succeeded Grau. Washington quickly recognized 
the new president. The first order of business was to reestablish economic relations through a 
new commercial treaty. Negotiations, suspended during the summer, quickly resumed. To buy 
time for the Cuban economy, Washington suspended repayment of the $52 million the island 
owed U.S. financial institutions such as the House of Morgan and the Chase National Bank. 
The moratorium stipulated that the Cuban government continue making annual payments of $4 
million to cover interest charges on the debt. 
     On August 24, 1934, Welles got his treaty. The trade accord immediately gave the U.S. 
preferential treatment on over four-hundred items. The tariff on U.S.-made automobiles, for 
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example, was slashed from 24 percent of value to 12 percent. Cuba received a tariff cut on its 
sugar from 1.5 cents to less than a penny per pound – half the rate the United States charged on 
sugar imports from the rest of the world. U.S. officials insisted that the pact was a breakthrough. 
Hull beamed that "we have every hope that this agreement will rapidly restore to the American 
farmer, to the American wage earner, and to the American manufacturer, the benefits of the 
import market to Cuba."138 Charles Taussig, an FDR adviser and the president of the American 
Molasses Co. in New York, congratulated Welles. He told an audience that the United States 
played a leading role in ending the political turmoil that “overshadowed the fundamental 
economic errors that were responsible for Cuba's plight."139 
     The clash between liberals and nationalists in and out of Cuba over trade and development 
strategies continued. A bitter Grau charged that the bad blood between his government and 
Welles had developed because “I did not pay interest on the Cuban debt to the Chase National 
Bank."140 He lashed out at the new trade terms that he said placed Cuba in an economically 
subservient position. The treaty, he claimed, sacrificed "the most vital interests of Cuba's 
collective welfare” and reduced his country “to the status of colony." The result, he said, is that 
Cubans "have no alternative but to plead for a humble destiny, granted by foreign consciences 
and hands, or to fight for government jobs in Byzantine and vengeful political battles."141 
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Conclusion 
     The commercial treaty produced by the Welles-Batista pact marked another watershed in 
U.S.-Cuban economic diplomacy. The United States obtained its coveted trade treaty and, as 
Welles and others predicted, trade surged. By 1939, Cuba’s gross domestic product rose by 50 
percent largely because of the doubling of sugar sales to U.S. makers of sweets and other 
foodstuffs.142 But that pact also wedded Cuba’s economy to that of the United States in ways 
that produced macroeconomic achievements at the price of political destabilization and stark 
financial inequality. 
     The reciprocal treaty had an immediate impact on the amount of sugar Cuba produced and 
the dollars it earned. By 1938, sugar output increased by nearly two-thirds to 2.9 million tons, 
while the value more than doubled to 120.2 million pesos. Ten years later, the size of the crop 
rose to 5.8 million tons, and the sweet powder accounted for 90 percent of country’s exports. 
The profits generated by the massive increases in sugar sales were spent on a menu of U.S. 
imported consumer products. In the mid-1950s, Cuba ranked first among Latin American 
countries in the number of automobiles and telephones and rated third in the number of radios 
and televisions owned. In 1950, Cubans spent $515 million in imports, mostly from the United 
States.143 
     While the reciprocal treaty improved commerce, it also promoted uneven development. 
Those sectors of the economy linked to the sugar trade resumed the boom-and-bust cycle of 
                     
142
 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, “The Latin American economies, 1929-1939” in Leslie Bethell, 
ed., Latin America: Economy and Society Since 1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 90. 
 
143
 Pérez, “Cuba c. 1930-1959,” The Cambridge History of Latin America 7:438-45, 449-52. 
 
 65
previous decades. Cuba’s manufacturing center consistently faced strong competition from 
cheaper, low-duty U.S. goods. So, the country’s factories learned to produce little more than 
light consumer goods and food. The ramifications were felt over time: Post-World War II Cuba 
was not able to provide the 25,000 or so jobs a year that its growing work-age population 
demanded. Drops in sugar prices during the 1950s sparked a series of recessions that 
compounded the anemic job growth. The island also grew more and more vulnerable to 
destabilizing bouts of inflation. Between 1939 and 1950, Cuba’s money supply jumped five-
fold while the cost of living rose by 145 percent. 
     The economy’s instability placed added pressure on the flinty political arena. Grau’s ouster 
in early 1934 did not end the unrest on the island. The next six years were marked by political 
murders and the toppling of governments as nine different men attempted to govern Cuba. 
None were able to last in power for very long. Finally, in 1940, Batista himself stepped to the 
foreground as both the de facto and titular leader. By then, Batista’s deft use of repression and 
social reforms had helped cool passions on the island.144 But the political rivalry between the 
different factions continued. The economic treaty handed control of the island’s financial 
lifeline to foreign players, Cubans again sparred for the one institution they could dominate, the 
government. By the mid-1940s, the fight over the government spoils system was as heated and 
lucrative as ever. The number of people on the government’s payroll doubled between 1943 and 
1949. By 1950, one of out of every ten Cubans worked in a government job of some sort. 
Governments were notoriously corrupt and accusations of massive graft, if not outright theft, 
were routine. Grau, who eventually became president again in 1944, is said to have embezzled 
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$174 million by the time he left office in 1949. Ultimately, Batista ended the electoral charade 
with a 1952 coup that fixed him firmly in power. 
     Roosevelt and his liberal diplomats, in characteristic custom, still claimed victory even 
though some officials and other analysts harbored doubts about the island’s future. When 
Batista visited the White House in December 1942, FDR toasted the Cuban leader and 
justified U.S. diplomatic and economic efforts in Cuba. FDR pointed out that when one of 
the hemisphere’s countries “is unhappy and full of unrest, in a serious depression” then that 
“affects the happiness and the prosperity” of the hemisphere.145 But others conceded that the 
rise in trade and investment and accompanying economic improvement brought only a 
superficial sense of prosperity and progress. Welles worried in 1938 that peace and prosperity 
in Cuba were unattainable until “the average businessmen and bankers, within as well as 
outside Cuba, know what guarantees they may possess for the business enterprises in which 
they desire to participate."146 
    There lay the source of the problem. The 1933 revolt showed that Cuban dissatisfaction 
with U.S.-sponsored liberalism was deep enough to form a nationalist challenge. And the 
product of the clash, the 1934 treaty, provided a target: The dependency of the island on the 
United States. The economic umbilical chord – and the way that U.S. cultural and social 
institutions penetrated and molded the Cuban institutions and mores147 – rendered the 
island’s political structures, its financial wherewithal, and cultural development dependent on 
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the United States. Continued revolt against liberalism was, thus, predictable. The only 
question remaining after 1933 was whether it was possible to channel and harness that 
opposition energy to build a lasting political and economic order that was viable outside the 
liberal universe. Watching the spectacle in Cuba in 1933, U.S. newsman Tom Pettey 
predicted that "eventually an army of bearded Cubans will come out of the woods ready to 
begin a real revolution."148 Prophetic words indeed. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Liberal Reciprocity Blocked in Brazil 
     Even as Sumner Welles remained mired in Cuba, the Roosevelt Administration turned its 
attention toward Brazil in the summer of 1933. Though Brazilian-U.S. trade ties had expanded 
since the start of the century, Brazil remained a relatively untapped market for U.S.-made 
manufactured goods.149 In the mid-1930s, Hull and other U.S. officials sought to broaden 
commerce with Brazil’s thirty-five million people, a population larger than the total number of 
inhabitants in the continent’s other countries combined. At the same time, U.S. government 
officials grew uneasy with the inroads made into the Brazilian market by the European powers, 
most notably Nazi Germany. To even the score, the United States offered a commercial treaty to 
reduce tariffs and open markets for its exports to South America’s largest country.  
     Roosevelt’s open door advocates soon found that a reciprocal treaty was a hard sell in 
Brazil.150 The government of Getulio Vargas saw few advantages in the economic treaty at the 
outset. The country’s main export commodity, coffee, already possessed channels into U.S. 
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markets. Vargas also feared that importing more competitive U.S. goods might anger his 
political base, Brazilian industrialists, who stood to lose domestic market share, and their 
workers, who might lose jobs. In addition, Vargas worried that a reciprocal pact might stymie 
Brazilian efforts to increase commerce with other industrial nations, such as Germany. Brazilian 
Foreign Minister Osvaldo Aranha succinctly summed up the issue saying Brazil had “little to 
offer, little to gain” from a reciprocal treaty.151 
     Although the Roosevelt Administration ultimately succeeded in obtaining a treaty, it proved 
to be a flawed pact that did not resolve the most contentious financial debates in U.S.-Brazilian 
commercial relations. The liberal-nationalist clash over exchange rates and payment processes, 
as well as trade preferences, led to a brittle trade compromise that failed to measurably increase 
commerce between the two countries in the years to follow. The inability to satisfactorily 
resolve these disputes in the mid-1930s set the stage for a diplomatic break between the two 
countries after World War II – a rupture frequently blamed on Cold War pressures.152 Rather 
than setting expectations too high, as historiography suggests, 1930s U.S.-Brazilian diplomacy 
serves as a study of contrasting interests, frustration and stalemate that set the stage for future 
disappointment. 
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The Reciprocal Trade Treaty 
     While visiting Brazil in November 1936, Franklin Roosevelt rode with Brazilian president 
Getulio Vargas in a motorcade through the streets of Rio de Janeiro. At one juncture, the two 
presidents’ car faced a group of bystanders chanting anti-Vargas slogans. Possibly chagrined by 
the demonstration, Vargas reportedly turned to Roosevelt and whispered, “Perhaps you’ve 
heard that I am a dictator.” FDR, without missing a beat, put Vargas at ease replying; “Perhaps 
you’ve heard that I am one too.”153 At a banquet later that day, FDR raised his glass in a toast 
and proclaimed, "I shall remember . . . that it was two people who invented the New Deal – the 
President of Brazil and the President of the United States.”154 
     The reassuring one-liners and speech-making were simply private and public expressions of 
the way Franklin Roosevelt assiduously courted Brazil and its enigmatic leader, Getulio Vargas. 
Though Brazil was the largest country in South America, it was a market that U.S. interests had 
only recently begun to explore. Its nascent industrial sector beckoned U.S. investment capital. 
U.S. manufacturers, always on the lookout for sources of raw materials, craved Brazil’s vast 
natural resources – from its coffee plantations to its rubber trees. Brazil fit snugly into the 
Roosevelt Administration’s hegemonic free trade, free world ideology because of its size, its 
potential, and its early 1930s political instability. As in Cuba, Hull said commerce and 
prosperity offered hope for stability and peace in the continent’s largest country at a time when 
war and militancy flared in the nearby Chaco region of South America. 
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     To draw the giant nation deeper into its economic orbit, the Roosevelt Administration 
proposed a reciprocal pact. The proposal was not an original concept. Secretary of State Frank 
Kellogg had offered a similar deal six years before, but the measure died in the shadow of 
Smoot-Hawley protectionism. The treaty offered by the Roosevelt liberals had a basic goal: 
increase U.S. exports into Brazil. While Brazilian coffee and other agricultural and mining 
products entered the United States relatively unimpeded, U.S. diplomats complained that Brazil 
subjected U.S. products to increasing duties and tariffs. As a result, Welles and other U.S. 
officials claimed Brazil enjoyed a two-to-one advantage in trade. They were correct. In 1932, 
the United States consumed roughly $83 million in Brazilian goods while selling only $32 
million in products to the South American country. The $50 million trade deficit, according to 
U.S. calculations, accounted for two-thirds of Brazil’s surplus for that year.155 Welles pointed to 
Brazil as an example of a country that used a slew of economic, financial, and commercial 
policies to move “more and more toward a close regulation and control of foreign trade.” He 
insisted that under “these tendencies, the principle of equality is rapidly being superseded by 
preferential treatment and special advantages.”156 
     The Roosevelt Administration claimed a reciprocal treaty was necessary to balance the 
scales. William Phillips, assistant U.S. secretary of state for economic affairs, insisted that the 
pact was a fair offer. He said that it was unreasonable for “Brazilian products, which are subject 
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to heavy import duties in other countries,” to enter the United States without charges while 
“U.S. products are subject to heavy import duties in Brazil.”157 To make sure Brazil got the 
message, U.S. ambassador William Gibson readily updated Brazilian diplomats on the latest 
U.S. congressional attempts to slap Brazilian coffee with import duties, a role Gibson relished. 
Gibson wrote Hull that Brazilian government and industry officials and diplomats “had an 
unpleasant shock a few months ago when there was talk of an import tax on coffee.” Gibson 
then predicted “that they will not feel entirely easy until the situation is covered by treaty.”158 
     Nazi Germany’s seemingly successful commercial policies in Brazil added to the discontent 
of U.S. officials. Unlike the free exchange trade program touted by liberals in Washington, 
German cartels readily purchased goods from Brazil using a non-convertible Aski mark, an 
exclusive currency that could only be used to purchase German goods. The Aski mark let Adolf 
Hitler’s government finance its trade with Brazil through a quasi-bartering arrangement that 
promoted anti-liberal quotas, preferences, and payment schemes. Through these practices, 
Berlin cultivated a strong commercial nexus with Brazil in the early 1930s. In fact, barter trade 
permitted Germany to become Brazil's second-leading trade partner by the end of 1936.159 At 
the same time, Brazil’s clamps on free exchange trade had sharply decreased U.S. exports to 
Brazil. U.S. merchants saw their share of the Brazilian market drop from 30 percent in 1932 to 
22 percent in 1936.  
     Increases in German-Brazilian commerce alarmed advocates of free commerce in the United 
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States. Businesses and foreign policy think tanks, such as the Foreign Policy Association and 
the Council on Foreign Relations, advocated for unrestricted commerce. These groups insisted 
the Vargas government was not earning money needed to pay debts to U.S. bankers because 
Brazil received no cash payment for goods sold to Germany. The liberal Foreign Policy 
Association charged that Germany forced its trade on Brazil with its non-convertible Aski 
marks – a trade arrangement that constituted extortion. One Foreign Policy Association analyst 
claimed that “Brazil has broken off trade with the Nazis several times” but each time Berlin 
“force[d] Brazil to resume trade relations by threatening to close the German market to 
Brazilian products altogether.”160 Unless the United States countered this economic war with 
Hitler, liberals warned, Washington would lose important allies like Brazil to the Axis camp. 
FDR’s diplomats had already concluded as much, and their solution to Nazi encroachment on 
North American business turf in Brazil lay in a reciprocal trade treaty with Brazil. 
Vargas Protectionism: Exchange Controls and Barter Trade 
     A top priority facing the government headed by Getulio Vargas in 1933 was finding ways to 
prime a stagnant Brazilian economy. At the time he assumed the presidency in October 1930, 
Vargas inherited a drained treasury, declining prices for the country’s chief exports, and soft 
demand for its manufactured products. Though Brazil was less dependent on exports than 
countries like Cuba, its economy nonetheless felt the sting of the Depression. The price for 
Brazilian coffee beans, which accounted for about 72 percent of export earnings between 1924 
and 1929, fell by one-third in the fall of the latter year. In 1930, the Brazilian economy, which 
                     
160
 Thomas Brockway, Battle Without Bullets (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1939), 
p. 58. 
 
 
 74
experienced 6.5 percent growth in its gross domestic product during the early 1920s, shrank by 
2.1 percent.161 As production and sales fell, Brazil continued to purchase imports at a rate that 
sapped its gold reserves. A believer in a strong, central government, Vargas insisted the 
economy needed resolute state intervention. The question was whether Vargas could hold on to 
political power long enough to turn the economy around.  
     Vargas was a political yeoman of sorts. Crafty and resourceful, Vargas was a machine 
politician in the pre-1930 elite structure that ran the country’s political and commercial 
institutions. Vargas managed to land a varied number of civil service and political posts even 
though his political base in the Rio Grande do Sul region was not one of the country’s two rival, 
dominant regions. After serving on the financial committees in the country’s parliament, Vargas 
briefly served in the cabinet of Paulista president Washington Luis de Souza in 1927. He then 
went home to serve as governor of Rio Grande do Sul in 1928, where he pushed for programs 
to build schools, bridges, and roads. Vargas made a name for himself, and inroads to power, 
throughout the 1920s. But a so-called “gentleman’s agreement” alternated Brazil’s highest 
office, the presidency, between political rivals from the two most powerful states, Sao Paulo 
and Minas Gerais. This agreement effectively precluded Vargas from becoming president. 
     Still, the contentious 1930 presidential election opened a window for the ambitious and 
opportunistic Vargas to leapfrog his way to the nation’s top political post. President 
Washington Luis’s decision to handpick a political boss from Sao Paulo, his own state, to 
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succeed him angered presidential aspirants from the rival region Minas Gerais.162 The 
controversial decision came at a critical juncture in Brazilian political, social, and economic 
development. Brazil’s growing industrial base, plus its 1.5 million workers employed in 
factories, had grown impatient with the pre-1930 political order that emphasized export-
oriented growth based primarily on coffee exports at the expense of domestic manufacturing. 
Women demanded suffrage rights. The military worried about reductions in the officer corps 
and the enlisted ranks. Industrialists demanded government protection for the nascent factories. 
The end result is that opposition to the Paulistas surged from a broad popular base that included 
the middle class, blue-collar workers, soldiers, manufacturers, and nationalists. The October 
1930 coup that placed Vargas in power opened the door to a wide arrange of political and social 
groups and actors.163 The plurality gave the Vargas government a populist and egalitarian 
flavor, but it also forced Vargas to work ceaselessly to hold on to power throughout the next 
fifteen years in the face of challenges from the extreme right and the extreme left. 
     Once in power, Vargas inherited not just a political system in shambles but a broken 
economic order as well. Throughout the four-hundred years since the arrival of Portuguese 
colonialists, the Brazilian economy was dependent on export earnings generated by the sale of 
specific commodities. First it was brazilwood, from which the country derived its name, 
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followed by sugar cane, and then coffee. While the 1920s saw a boom in coffee prices, Brazil in 
the 1930s was again trapped in another cyclical downturn in the commodities markets.164 
     At the same time, the Depression further aggravated Brazil’s already tight balance of 
payments position. Because the value of coffee and other commodities that Brazil sold to other 
countries failed to match the money spent buying manufactured imports from industrialized 
nations, Brazil covered the gap in its balance of payments with loans and, later, by selling off its 
meager gold reserves. Between 1930 and 1931, Brazil “exported” the $160 million worth of 
gold in the country’s treasury to cover foreign obligations.165 The consequence of all this was 
that foreign traders in Brazil would only received payment for their goods when they converted 
their milreis holdings into U.S. dollars, British pounds, or German Aski marks. This practice 
seriously eroded the Brazilian treasury by depleting its foreign currency stockpiles. In 1932, for 
example, the Brazilian treasury possessed barely enough exchange to cover its purchases abroad 
even though imports into Brazil fell 62 percent compared against the 1929 totals.166 
     Like FDR to the north, Vargas planned to reinvigorate trade and commerce between Brazil 
and the industrialized world – but not through the open commercial and free exchange network 
that the U.S. liberals demanded. Instead, Vargas maneuvered to build trade ties based on more 
affordable bartered exchanges that did not drain the country’s treasury. This program began 
with a 1931 decree that placed all foreign exchange transactions under the control of the 
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country’s treasury. The rule forced enterprises buying and selling in Brazil to use the milreis as 
payment. The depletion of the Brazilian treasury’s gold and U.S. dollar reserves already 
severely restricted commerce with Brazil. The currency exchange rules simply made it more 
difficult for merchants to convert the milreis into dollars. So, in practice, the rule favored 
subsidized barter trade where goods were ultimately exchanged for other goods. In this arena, 
Berlin enjoyed success because the Aski mark did not require conversion to the milreis. A 
Brazilian holding Aski marks simply used them to buy German goods. 
     The type of reciprocity that U.S. liberals demanded in the mid-1930s placed Vargas in a 
difficult position. Vargas’s goal was to restructure the role of government to wean the Brazilian 
economy off its dependency on exports by building the country’s industrial base. To be sure, 
Brazil’s turn toward early import substitution programs preceded the Vargas regime.167 But 
Vargas sped this shift toward industrialization and away from commodity exports to curb 
Brazil’s appetite for imports and, thus, further shore up its weak financial position.168 To do so, 
however, the Brazilian government needed resources to fund industrial expansion. However, 
Vargas knew that reducing tariffs and duties as U.S. liberals demanded meant losing out on 
needed revenues. In addition, Vargas feared that he risked provoking resentment and opposition 
from Brazilian industry if he opened the door to foreign manufactured goods.169  
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      Vargas had good reason to resist U.S. trade overtures. Brazilian industry flourished in the 
first decades of the twentieth century. In 1930, Brazil listed 30,000 industrial enterprises versus 
just 13,300 in 1920. Roughly 1.4 million workers earned their paychecks in transportation, 
textiles, and steel.170 Vargas not only expected that the nation’s manufacturers would become 
economically powerful, but that their support would be crucial to keeping him in power. In 
addition, Vargas had a personal-political stake in cultivating trade with Germany even if it 
annoyed U.S. diplomats. Specifically, Berlin purchased rice, beef and other products produced 
by Vargas’ political home field, Rio Grande do Sul. Those were foodstuffs and other products 
that U.S. commercial interests did not purchase.171 
     Liberal reciprocity also got a mixed review from U.S. allies in Brazil. Osvaldo Aranha, the 
Brazilian foreign minister who favored offering the United States preferential treatment over the 
Europeans, said he failed to see much of a bargain in the reciprocal pact offered by the 
Roosevelt liberals. Aranha calculated that 97.5 percent of Brazil’s imports already entered the 
United States freely. Even with reduced duties on U.S. goods, the products U.S. companies 
wanted to sell in Brazil were still more expensive than comparable goods available in other 
countries.172 Of course, neither Vargas nor Aranha wanted to risk losing access to the United 
States, which they viewed as Brazil’s most lucrative market. Rather than offend U.S. diplomats, 
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Vargas instructed his chief negotiator, Aranha, to double-talk his way out of the quandary. 
Aranha was to suggest that negotiations seek a “higher philosophical plane that transcends 
commercial interests to focus on collaboration and cooperation.”173 Nonsense, to be sure, but 
vague pledges bought time and ultimately provided both Brazil and the United States a way to 
save face. 
Unfavorable Exchanges: Stalemate in Reciprocal Negotiations 
     Thus, U.S. economic liberalism was trapped between opposing forces and interests in and 
out of Brazil. The Brazilian government was mired in a complex monetary and currency web. 
U.S. merchants wanted better access to markets and an effective currency exchange system. 
Bondholders called for prompt payment on their debts. Industry and agriculture in both 
countries desired open foreign markets but demanded safeguards against cheap imports at 
home. “Two important questions are now before us,” wrote one U.S. economist in relation to 
Brazilian eco-diplomacy. “How to collect debts owed to us and how to continue the huge export 
trade on which our farms and factory production is now based?”174 The fate of the reciprocity 
treaty and Good Neighbor liberalism in Brazil rested on answers to that question. But the 
solutions offered only elicited a barrage of debate, counterproposals and, most important, 
deadlock in U.S.-Brazilian treaty talks.  
     The bottom line, liberals insisted, was that a treaty to reduce tariffs without addressing 
payment systems accomplished little. For the reciprocal treaty to succeed in practice, U.S. and 
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Brazilian officials needed to agree on a payment system that promptly swapped money. U.S. 
merchants in Brazil charged that Brazilian currency exchange policies – which regulated and 
limited monetary trading – discriminated against them. Because goods were sold in Brazil using 
the national currency, the milreis, a U.S. trader only profited from a sale after he exchanged the 
Brazilian currency for U.S. dollars. However, Brazilian government-imposed currency 
exchange restrictions blocked that process with an array of rules, including narrow hard 
currency limits for each nationality. These measures limited the stockpile of dollars available 
for exchange with the milreis. 
     Unable to freely swap large sums of the Brazilian paper money for dollars, U.S. enterprises 
in Brazil found themselves holding large stockpiles of the Brazilian currency that, for their 
purposes, possessed little value. The American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil complained to 
President Roosevelt that “American companies and exporters are being compelled to 
discontinue shipments which will soon result in closing American branch houses and practically 
annihilate already diminished American exports.”175 One firm, the Empire Plow Company in 
Cleveland, Ohio, complained that its Brazilian subsidiary possessed approximately $30,000 in 
blocked funds and “we do not know when [dollars for exchange] will be granted."176 Another 
exporter groused that “it ought to be clear even to our professional politicians that an increase in 
our exports is dependent entirely upon our getting paid for them.”177 Firms that lent capital to 
Brazil found themselves in a similar bind after the Brazilian government placed a moratorium 
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on payments to foreign-held debts by municipal, state and national governments. The American 
Council of Foreign Bondholders criticized Brazilian authorities for failing to make payments on 
its $754 million in international debts.178 
     Global financial decision-making further deepened the stalemate. Brazil had eliminated the 
gold standard in 1932, and the United States followed suit in 1933 in hopes of simplifying the 
process of paying for cross-border sales of goods and services. The end to the gold-based 
currency created a currency free-float monetary system susceptible to volatile swings in 
exchange rates and dollar drains. But in doing so, U.S. policy-makers cornered themselves in 
Brazil. Unless they demanded that the Vargas government earmark more dollars for swaps with 
milreis, Hull, Phillips and Gibson could not reassure U.S. companies and merchants that they 
stood to win from open trade with Brazil. But forcing Brazil, or any other country, to set aside 
currency reserves for swaps contradicted the liberals’ own calls for unimpeded international 
flows of commerce and goods. And requiring Brazil to allot special currency reserves for U.S. 
merchants risked eliciting criticism from other countries that the United States demanded 
special treatment from Rio at the same time it was calling for equitable arrangements elsewhere. 
     Moreover, the U.S. trade and exchange proposals arrived in Brazil barely a month after the 
Roosevelt government had come under intense criticism for backing out of a currency 
stabilization plan at the London economic conference. The purpose of the London meeting had 
been to find ways to shore up the sagging value of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis European currencies 
still fixed to gold values. But in June, FDR rejected a European proposal to temporarily fix the 
dollar at $4 to the British pound. FDR also backed away from promising not to use unilateral 
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powers to strengthen the dollar. Unable to resolve the currency stabilization dilemma, the 
conference fizzled in July.179 
     The inability of the industrialized countries to resolve the currency question bolstered the 
position of anti-liberal proponents in Brazil and the United States who argued the two countries 
should drop the free exchange system and play the barter game, as Germany did successfully. 
They pointed out that though global trade grew best during the days of the gold standard, when 
currency valuations and payments were fixed to a country’s gold reserves to facilitate payment, 
the gold standard days were gone – and unlikely to be restored in the wake of the London 
fiasco. Given the payment imbalances and stockpiles of milreis in the hands of U.S. businesses 
in Brazil, efforts to lift currency restrictions were off to a bad start. “Merchants will not sell and 
bankers will not lend abroad unless they are sure that the return for their goods or their capital 
will not be diminished by constant changes in the rates of money exchange,” wrote one U.S. 
economist. “We must reverse our tariff policies and accept goods and services in exchange for 
our debts and exports or . . . submit to cancellation of debts, loss of investments, sacrifice trade 
and lowering of the standard of living.”180 
     The reciprocal treaty elicited criticism within the United States from labor unions, 
isolationists in the Republican Party, and agricultural groups opposed to opening U.S. markets 
to cheaper foreign manufactured goods and produce. W.L. Munro of the American Tariff 
League charged that higher production costs associated with National Recovery Administration-
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mandated shorter hours and other New Deal measures to reduce industrial output already 
burdened U.S. industry. Munro complained about New Deal proposals requiring companies to 
provide unemployment and health insurance for workers. He said business could not "take hold 
of these programs with increased costs” while “another arm of government is engaged in taking 
away almost irrevocably the protection that is afforded the industries that are asked to increase 
costs." He and other businessmen, Munro claimed, were being wedged "between the upper and 
nether millstones."181 Powerful isolationists in the Republican Party complained that reciprocity 
failed to open foreign markets to U.S. agricultural products. Wheat millers in Kansas, for 
example, feared that the “export flour trade will be completely lost unless our government takes 
very definite steps at an early date to aid millers in regaining the business that has gone to their 
competitors” whether in South America or elsewhere.182 
     A fair amount of dissent existed within the Roosevelt Administration itself. White House 
Trade Advisor George Peek seized on the exchange issue to sidetrack the Brazil treaty. 
Specifically, Peek wanted Brazil to immediately provide $23 million to cover exchange 
shortages. Peek insisted "the question of blocked exchanges with Brazil . . . should be covered 
either in the trade agreement or concurrently therewith.”183 Peek’s views gained some support 
from analysts alleging that the exchange restrictions served to “discriminate against U.S. 
interests.” The opposition from Peek led Commerce Secretary Henry Wallace to admit, 
privately, in May 1935 that the prospects for reciprocity and freer markets abroad appear 
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encouraging.184 The debate over economic and trade policies got louder and louder. The 
impatient editors at The New York Times blamed Peek for the “slow” progress of hemispheric 
trade talks, initiatives and global economic revival. “Such recovery as has been is only in very 
small degree due to the policy of reciprocity so hopeful espoused a year ago,” the paper’s 
editors lamented.185 Another foreign correspondent wrote that in South America “the rise in 
world prices for raw materials has largely overcome conditions which originally led to the 
imposition of controls over foreign trade, but these have been continued as a means of 
permitting discriminations among various foreign suppliers.”186 The chances the U.S. could 
open its markets to Brazilian agricultural output – a possible concession to win over a reluctant 
Vargas – were a longshot. 
     The complaints from U.S. businesses in Brazil, however, soon overrode other 
considerations. The State Department used the treaty talks to press Brazil for exchange 
concessions – a demand that further complicated reciprocal treaty negotiations. In a memo to 
Brazilian diplomats, U.S. officials proposed safeguards to protect “the interests of the nationals 
and commerce of the two countries” against “any exchange control system.”187 According to 
the memo, this new requirement resulted from the long delays experienced by exporters as they 
waited to swap currencies – delays that ultimately threatened to thwart commerce between the 
two countries. The State Department memo, however, put a brake on the reciprocity talks. The 
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Brazilian ambassador, Oswaldo Aranha, claimed his government needed to study the proposal 
since it was also negotiating a barter treaty with Germany.188 Those negotiations, under the so-
called German Schacht Plan, discussed expanding barter-based swaps of goods and 
commodities. “The adoption of an inflexible liberal policy as outlined in the treaty project will 
amount . . . to suspension of our commerce with countries that, like Germany, Italy and many 
others [that] . . . buy from Brazil only in order to sell,” said Aranha to Welles.189 Rio counter 
offered the United States a similar barter strategy, but Washington rejected the measure.  
     Brazil also resisted removing exchange restrictions because the government stood to lose 
control of import regulation. Although he wanted to increase commerce, Aranha feared that a 
flood of imported U.S. manufactured autos and consumer goods into Brazil would provoke 
serious opposition from the country's emerging industrialists. And Vargas also worried it could 
dry up an important source of its tax revenue.190 “We should keep in mind how much this [pact] 
could submit us to that country,” Aranha said, referring to concerns that Brazil might become 
even more dependent on U.S. trade, in a letter to Vargas.191 Besides, if the United States 
embraced protectionism through New Deal policies then why should not Brazil, too? Still, 
Vargas and Brazil went along with the negotiations to buy time. “Either we follow the liberal 
line or [the U.S.] will apply an anti-liberal policy,” Aranha warned Vargas, perhaps alluding to 
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the coffee tax the U.S. Congress was mulling. So Vargas and Aranha continued attempts to 
soothe U.S. liberals. Brazil’s central bank, U.S. officials quoted Brazilian diplomats as saying, 
would set aside available exchange funds to “pay all American commercial transactions 
promptly and in full” as long as the United States granted preferential treatment to Brazilian 
products “against those of other countries.”192 Hull rejected the stipulation, arguing that such a 
provision would raise problems in U.S.-European reciprocal talks. So Hull and the liberals were 
stuck again in a box, this time one drawn by the Brazilians. 
     To change minds in Rio, U.S. liberals employed a series of strategies that ranged from 
evangelizing to pleading to arm-twisting. Cuba immediately became the liberal’s poster child. 
The State Department heralded the growth in trade with the island – from $7 million in the last 
three months of 1933 to $17 million in the last three months of 1934 – as a result of a 
reciprocity treaty with Havana.193 In addition to reciprocity, dollar devaluation and renewal of 
purchasing power was fueling a trade renaissance in the hemisphere, said Henry Grady, the 
chief of the Department of State's tariff office. He noted that Latin Americans were purchasing 
$200 million more in U.S. goods in 1934 than they did in 1933.194 On the other hand, countries 
that had not formalized a trade relationship with the United States saw a precipitous drop in 
commerce. Grady said sales to these countries fell from $2 billion in 1929 to $500 million in 
1933. The pitch was clear: Reciprocity bolstered profitable trading relationships – and leaving 
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the issue in limbo could prove costly.  
     U.S. officials also contemplated a new series of less controversial financial initiatives. 
Welles and Adolph Berle suggested that FDR or Hull propose the creation of “a joint 
commission” to “bring us closer together economically.” The committee, they said, could find 
ways to implement U.S. initiatives such as a minimum wage and a forty-hour workweek 
throughout Latin America. It also could work to remodel Pan American “financial systems and 
monetary policies so that they may fit more closely into ours.”195 In addition, the U.S. offered 
incentives aimed at building the Inter-American highway from New York to Argentina. Other 
initiatives included funding an FDR pet project, upgrading transportation facilities, and 
modernizing communications systems within the hemisphere. 
     The stalemate on the reciprocity treaty broke when U.S. officials backed down and 
unilaterally de-coupled the thorny question of easing Brazilian exchange restrictions from the 
tariff and quota talks. Despite drawing the anger of U.S. commercial interests,196 the maneuver 
proved practical. It ended the deadlock on tariff reform and, in February 1935, Brazil and the 
U.S. signed a reciprocity treaty. Some newspapers hailed it as a victory for Cordell Hull. One 
correspondent wrote that Hull "held his peace during all the New Deal experiments, even bided 
his time while Raymond Moley and George Peek had their hour in the sun. Peace and trade are 
his sole philosophy and at Buenos Aires his single track, so far as man can see, goes on to that 
horizon."197 
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     But the signing of the treaty was not broadly celebrated. Because it did not address exchange 
rules, some U.S. officials worried that commerce stood to suffer if Brazil gave preference in 
payments to other countries. State Department economic advisor Herbert Feis feared that Brazil 
might negotiate more favorable accords to repay debts to countries or insist that other trading 
partners buy Brazilian cotton in exchange for exports. “I remain impressed by the danger that 
the Brazilian mission while in Europe will sign special agreements,” Feis wrote.198 Within 
months, the controversy over reciprocity with Brazil again erupted when the Brazilian congress 
delayed ratifying the pact. Then, U.S. officials protested a Brazilian-British commercial accord 
that presumably gave British merchants favorable treatment in exchanging pounds for the 
milreis. Sumner Welles insisted U.S. merchants must receive payment for their outstanding 
balances immediately from either the 35 percent currency reserve allotted to Americans or 
through other means Rio might devise. “I said it was clear that our American interests must at 
once and without further delay receive at least the same treatment which British holders of 
deferred balances would now enjoy,” Welles told Ambassador Aranha.199 
    Opposition to the treaty grew in Rio as well and the resistance caught U.S. officials by 
surprise. A high-ranking Brazilian lawmaker, Euvaldo Lodi, told Welles that Brazilian industry 
opposed the treaty because many manufacturers “would be seriously crippled if the treaty went 
into force in its present shape.” Lodi also said the two governments negotiated the treaty in 
secret, without input from lawmakers, and now the congress had to carefully review the 
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document.200 U.S. officials did not expect additional opposition to brew within Brazil and they 
stressed their impatience. Hull reiterated that the “advantages of the trade agreement “far 
outweigh” the “few criticisms” made by what he called special interests. He insisted the treaty 
“represents a real step forward in these days of economic confusion” and delays “might further 
encourage hostile tendencies with unpredictable results.” 201 
     As the months passed, FDR and Hull became more and more exasperated with the inability 
of the Vargas government to place the treaty in effect. The two liberals feared the delay might 
prompt the U.S. Congress to reconsider the measure as well. At the very least, the delay in 
Brazilian approval kept the debate over free trade versus protectionism alive. In addition, Hull 
and Phillips remained under pressure from U.S. merchants and exporters in Brazil. Phillips 
wrote that the stalling gave reciprocity foes in the U.S. time to place additional pressure on U.S. 
policy-makers and potentially jeopardized treaty talks with other nations.202 Hull issued veiled 
threats, warning that failure to ratify the treaty, or at least continued delay, might force the U.S. 
government to take “such measures as might be necessary to secure special concessions from 
Brazil.”203 The secretary threatened that without “aggressive action” by U.S. and Brazilian 
lawmakers the reciprocal treaty would suffer death by inertia. He said the treaty’s failure would 
amount to nothing less than a "great setback” to free trade.204 The threats may have had an 
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impact. In late November 1935, the Brazilian lawmakers ratified the treaty. So the accord 
ultimately went into effect, but without an effective way to balance payments for commerce 
between the two countries. 
Conclusion 
     The Brazilian reciprocal treaty, like the one signed with Cuba, was hailed as another success 
for Roosevelt free trade regime. In November 1936, Roosevelt arrived in Rio to meet Vargas. 
FDR was cheered by throngs of well-wishers and he lost no opportunity to herald the 
increasingly close relations between the Pan American countries and the United States. FDR 
spoke of possibilities for improving radio, air travel, collective bargaining, old age security, 
and improved sanitation. “Among nations, the principle of interdependence is paramount,” 
Roosevelt said of the Brazilian economic pact. Vargas agreed saying that “we are linked by a 
community of economic and political interests and, still further, by sentiments of inter-
American solidarity.” 205  
     Despite the speech-making, the reciprocal treaty did not remove the fundamental obstacles in 
U.S.-Brazilian economic relations. The exchange issue remained a contentious obstacle even 
after Brazilian lawmakers approved the treaty. An offer by the Brazilian treasury to allocate 
dollars for exchange with milreis held by U.S. merchants appeared to set a framework to end 
the currency exchange dispute. But disagreements over the amount the Brazilian finance 
ministry should pay U.S. enterprises led to further discord and protests.206 The Brazilian 
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congress then passed a 2 percent Social Welfare Tax on the imported value of all goods 
entering Brazil. Hull denounced the tax as “contrary to the general policy of expanding trade 
through reduction of barriers” in the 1935 commercial treaty.207 Later, another barter agreement 
with Germany, that included a swap of Brazilian cotton for German autos, gasoline, typewriters 
and sewing machines, again raised warnings from Gibson about the potential “dangers of 
destroying American import trade and good will.”208  
     Throughout the balance of the 1930s, Aranha and Rio continued to stiff-arm U.S. pressure 
for exchange liberalization. Aranha called for a “transitional period” to permit Brazil to 
“aggressively” sell goods to European countries with bartered payment issued not by the 
government but through banks and internal credit operations. He conceded the idea might 
“appear anti-liberal.” But he reminded his North American counterparts that while the United 
States economy was strong enough to survive in an open market his country’s financial state 
was not so secure. “Brazil could not endure, as the latter has no reserves and is a debtor 
country,” Aranha added. He concluded his note by lecturing that “liberal practices” do not 
depend “upon a treaty by two peoples” but are “achieved by patient effort and labor, using old 
or new materials, according to convenience or necessity.”209 Welles and Feis were dismayed by 
the offer, which they believed did not contain anything of “a practical nature.”210  
     The Second World War subsequently masked the fissure over currencies and exchange rates 
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as Brazil offered the U.S. military bases on its soil in return for U.S.-aid in building a much-
coveted steel plant and promises of postwar investment and development initiatives. In 1941, 
the Roosevelt Administration funded the Export-Import Bank with $500 million that was used 
to ease exchange crunches and export manufactured goods from the U.S to Brazil and 
elsewhere in Latin America.211 Vargas cooperated with the U.S. military by allowing the War 
Department to use its northeastern territory for air bases. The U.S. military sold the Brazilian 
navy the blueprints and materials for several 1,500-ton destroyers that Rio built in its shipyards. 
As part of the military cooperation program, the U.S. Navy also leased to Brazil a handful of 
destroyers for training purposes. 
     Prospects for a liberal commercial arrangement between the United States and Brazil 
appeared to surge after the war, only to collapse again. Brazilian protectionism ended in 
October 1945 when a coup ousted Vargas and a liberal, Eurico Dutra, was elected president two 
months later. Dutra condemned state intervention in the economy and began to dismantle the 
protectionist wall created by Vargas. Dutra calculated that Brazilian industry needed capital 
goods to modernize its factories and bolster manufacturing production. The Brazilian treasury’s 
replenished stockpile of foreign currency, particularly U.S. dollars during the war, made Dutra’s 
liberal buy-and-sell program with the United States affordable. In the following year, a flood of 
imports swamped Brazil and, faster than expected, wiped out Brazil’s currency reserves. In 
response, the Dutra government created a system of import licensing that restricted foreign 
purchases to equipment, machinery, and fuel at the expense of consumer goods imports. The 
new system bolstered Brazilian industry. Between 1948 and 1950, the country’s gross domestic 
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product grew an average of 8 percent a year. But the restrictions again curtailed commerce with 
U.S. interests. 
     Thus, the faces and the times changed but the core financial and economic obstacles to 
balancing U.S.-Brazilian trade remained much the same. The two countries continued in their 
cycle of dollar gaps, created by the outflow of dollars as a country buys more from a country 
than it sells to it,212 and free riding, when a country maintains protectionist barriers while 
capitalizing on another nation’s openness.213 U.S. economic policy toward the Brazil continued 
to insist on private business initiatives,214 concessions on exchange rates, lower tariffs, and 
protections for investments.215 But Brazil’s weak currency and gold reserves continually limited 
the country’s ability to commit to a liberal commercial pattern. Assessing prospects for U.S.-
Brazilian commerce in the 1950s, Stanley Hollis, president of the American Foreign Credit 
Underwriters Corporation, simply stated: “Brazil will continue to buy from us, but in lower 
volume until they can accumulate more funds.”216 So, almost two decades after the reciprocal 
treaty, virtually the same impediments blocked the flow of goods and dollars. 
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     It is tempting to say that in the 1930s, the United States and Brazil missed an opportunity to 
resolve the outstanding issues in economic diplomacy. Tempting, yes, but incorrect. The truth is 
that there existed significant hurdles that could not be overcome in the 1930s, the 1940s, or the 
1950s. George Peek, FDR’s advisor on trade, pointed out that open trade was simply not 
possible as long as countries did not trade by the same rules.217 “If the whole world had the 
same level of living standards, free trade might be possible and even desirable, but in that event 
it still would be limited by the obvious advantages derived from the growing and making of 
most things near the point of consumption,” Peek later wrote.218 Ultimately, the structural trade 
imbalances generated a persistent currency crisis. In Brazil, it seems Good Neighbor liberalism 
was simply doomed to stalemate. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Expropriation Stuns U.S. Liberalism in Mexico 
     Multinational corporations from the United States figured prominently in the Roosevelt 
Administration’s liberal program for economic and political renewal across the hemisphere. 
U.S. policy-makers cast transnational companies as engines for development across the 
Americas. They said corporate investment in factories, refineries, and farms brought jobs, 
technology, and innovation to the “backward” world. U.S. government officials insisted this 
investment propagated the business and commercial “know-how” that was necessary to raise 
living standards and foster civic responsibility. From the standpoint of Roosevelt liberals, 
protecting foreign investment and safeguarding industrial and commercial possessions were as 
important as tariff reductions and free exchange rules. 
     Mexico’s expropriation of the oil refineries near Tampico in March 1938 shook U.S. policy-
makers’ sense of security and tested their ability to defend U.S. investments abroad. The 
expropriation of the refineries followed two decades of wrangling over ownership of the 
properties between Mexican authorities and U.S. diplomats, an off-and-on series of 
confrontations that began after promulgation of Mexico’s constitution in 1917. The seizure of 
the valuable petroleum was a significant defeat for liberal U.S. policy-makers who promoted 
cross-border investment as a catalyst for hemispheric economic growth. Mexico’s expropriation 
without compensation, government officials and industry executives argued vociferously, tread 
over regulations and laws that secured private property rights in theory and practice. Worse, 
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Mexican charges that foreign-control of the country’s oil industry not only failed to help the 
country prosper but actually stunted its development amounted to an all-out attack on liberalism 
itself. 
     Whether Mexico gained much from the expropriation is debatable,219 but the seizure handed 
U.S. liberals an unsettling setback. The Mexican labor organizations and the government 
officials prodding President Lazaro Cardenas into seizing the refineries and oil wells equated 
liberalism with foreign domination of Mexico’s oil fields. They charged that foreign ownership 
of productive property relegated Mexico to a second-class, dependent state. The Cardenistas 
and their allies among labor syndicates accused the U.S. and British oil companies of profiting 
at the expense of impoverished Mexican workers. So, they demanded that the government 
expropriate the oil properties, effectively rejecting liberalism, and distribute profits directly to 
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the Mexican citizenry. Witnesses to this drama quickly surmised that there was more at stake 
than petroleum beneath the surface of the standoff. "This is something more than an oil war 
now," wrote Frank Kluckhorn, a reporter for The New York Times.220 
Patient Liberalism in Mexico 
     While the Great Depression did not produce widespread poverty and desperation in Mexico, 
Hull, Welles, and other policy-makers believed that a liberal resurgence might still help Mexico 
prosper financially and develop politically, two goals that were high on the U.S. diplomatic 
wish list. Mexico shared a long border with the United States and both sides knew that 
instability and volatility to the south of the Rio Grande always risked drawing troops from the 
north. North American industry and businesses also possessed sizeable investment holdings in 
this nearest of neighbors whose 17 million people made it the second most populous country in 
Latin America. 
     The Roosevelt government believed that Mexico, like other Latin American republics, 
lacked the capital necessary to continue developing industry and expand its commercial 
operations. Sumner Welles noted that the United States possessed abundant sources of the 
much-needed investment money for machinery and other capital goods. He insisted that U.S. 
investment “added to the wealth of Mexico by tilling the soil, by installing irrigation works, by 
erecting processing plants, and by giving new employment to the agriculturists in the regions 
where their lands were situated."221 Besides economic benefits, U.S. liberals predicted that U.S. 
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dollars and know-how would bolster Mexican political maturity, a desired outcome given the 
country’s internecine political infighting in the 1920s and the 1928 assassination of political 
boss Miguel Obregon.  
     In the mid-1930s, U.S. officials could already forecast trouble ahead in commercial relations 
between the two countries. Two areas in particular drew concern. One was the increasingly 
heated and contentious negotiation between managers at U.S.-owned oil refineries in Mexico 
and the labor unions that represented the oil field workers. The other area was a Mexican 
government agrarian reform program that displaced U.S. farmers in the Yucatan peninsula. The 
confrontations were more than minor irritants. A basic corollary of the free trade program was 
that foreign investment capital needed protection and safeguarding. Now, in Mexico, U.S. 
citizens who owned farmlands complained that they lost those properties without immediate 
compensation. And the oil industry barons were in jeopardy of losing managerial control of 
their petroleum businesses. 
    The multinational companies that dominated the petroleum industry in Mexico were unhappy 
with the tone and direction the Cardenas government took in the mid-1930s. U.S. oil industry 
executives accused the Cardenistas of encouraging labor unions to increase wage demands. 
They also charged the government was inciting oil workers to strike. One group of oil company 
chieftains predicted the government’s plan was to “eliminate the right of owners to manage” 
their enterprises. "It has been increasingly apparent that the objective of the Mexican 
Government is to take over the oil industry from the foreign companies," said a group of oil 
industry executives.222 
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     The pressure building in Mexico divided FDR’s diplomatic team. The top U.S. diplomat in 
Mexico, Ambassador Josephus Daniels, advised his superiors to keep their distance from the 
simmering disputes. Yes, oil company-labor relations were contentious, but Daniels, FDR’s 
former boss at the U.S. Navy Department, insisted that both sides would ultimately settle their 
differences. Other key diplomatic figures harbored doubts. Hull, Welles, Berle and other Brains 
Trust advisors argued that, in the case of the land reform actions, expropriation without 
immediate compensation threatened to erode confidence in property ownership and investment 
and to undermine the liberal economic program in the hemisphere. 
     Daniels’ approach took precedence at the outset. The ambassador, a North Carolina Baptist 
and a committed New Dealer, called for patience in economic diplomacy and he did not shy 
from making known his sympathy with Cardenas’ reform program. Daniels called Cardenas’ 
programs “a new and square deal” and consistently compared them to FDR's New Deal.223 “At 
the bottom of the Mexican, as well as most other revolutions, is hunger," he wrote to FDR. "The 
only hope of Mexico is dividing the lands so that those who live on them will be safe in their 
cultivation of the soil.”224 In fact, the Mexican land program, Daniels advised FDR, “in some 
things, as for example, giving land to men who work the haciendas, Mexico is looking to do 
more for the forgotten man than you have been able to do.”225 Daniels also effusively praised 
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the Mexican leadership. In toasting the country's policies, he gushed “that the social order now 
in the making in both countries will guarantee to all men equality, justice, liberty, and the full 
enjoyment of the fruits of their labor.”226 In private, he cheered Cardenista reforms as well. He 
told the Mexican president that his policies were well-received in the United States because 
they “had many concurrent points with those followed by President Roosevelt and which tend 
to better conditions for workers.”227 
     By the same token, Daniels bore little sympathy for the oil industry, which he saw as 
arrogant and inflexible. “When industries seek a twilight zone of state control [where] such 
regulations mean no regulation,” he wrote, “advocacy of such [regulation] is as antiquated as 
the old contention of the right to carry slaves” into free territory.228 “The truth is that the whole 
oil history here has not been one to cause Mexico to feel that the oil producers have treated the 
country justly,” he said. Daniels criticized the oil firms for taking advantage of the government's 
weak bargaining position and said he did not blame the government and labor for wanting to 
“get what they think is a fair share of the income from oil for their workers and for the Treasury, 
while production continues.”229 
     Hull initially followed Daniels’ lead and counseled patience. The consensus within the 
Administration’s foreign policy held that as long as the tension in Mexico was limited to 
farmer-labor-industry jostling over land and profits, they were more than happy to stay out of 
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harm’s way. “We had no sympathy with people from other countries going into Mexico and 
fleecing the Mexican people by any sort of method,” Hull said emphatically.230 FDR adviser 
Raymond Moley also defended the Mexican reforms against charges that they were 
communistic. Moley insisted that Cardenas’ government is “a regulating force rather than a 
paternalistic owner, directing and partially controlling capitalistic enterprise.”231 Those views 
would soon change. 
Mexico’s Reforms Take Aim at U.S. Investors 
     U.S. policy-makers did not grasp the deep level of Mexican disenchantment with its foreign-
dominated agricultural sector and oil industry. A quarter century after the unprecedented 1910 
revolution, Mexico was still mired in economic stagnation. The nationalist revolution that 
ousted Porfirio Díaz pledged land reform for peasants and promised to improve living standards 
for the average Mexican worker. A generation later, neither vow yielded born much fruit. A 
1930 survey revealed that only a fraction more than 6 percent of the land in Mexico was owned 
and cultivated by peasants.232 Patience with the status quo grew thin in the Mexican press. A 
Mexican newspaper editor wrote in 1933 that “so long as the Capitalistic State persists and 
endures as a system” it will “continue to be a secular and fundamental barrier” to social, 
political and economic progress. The editor concluded that “without a socialized economy of 
general methods excluding monopolistic minorities the last battle will not have been fought.”233 
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     The tools to place these words in action existed in the form of Mexico’s 1917 constitution 
– if the government could completely implement that document. Article 27 of the constitution 
provided for extensive land redistribution and granted the state rights to subsoil oil and 
mining reserves. Article 27 also gave the government power to impose limitations on 
property rights when those restrictions were in the public interest. Another provision, Article 
123, limited the workday to eight hours, guaranteed workers the right to form trade unions, 
and to strike. But the constitution held more promise than reality. The federal government 
born out of the Mexican revolution and the constitution was a weak state with just enough 
power to govern domestically but certainly not to enforce its will on foreign commercial 
interests. 
     A succession of presidents, from Venustiano Caranza to Alvaro Obregon to Plutarco Elias 
Calles in the 1920s and early 1930s, enacted decrees to increase taxes on petroleum revenues 
with minor results. Most importantly, though, the Mexican government failed to achieve 
highest public policy goal – to apply the provisions of Article 27 retroactively to the oil 
properties. Essentially, the Mexican state wished to declare that Article 27 gave it ownership 
of reserves granted to the companies prior to the 1917 constitution. But Mexican officials 
lacked the will to do so and consistently retreated from aggressive stances under pressure 
from U.S. diplomats and industry executives. After nearly two decades of successfully 
staving off the Mexican government and its constitution, U.S. industry and government 
officials believed their fortunes would not change when Lazaro Cardenas was sworn in as 
Mexico’s president in 1934.  
     Yet, soon after taking office, Cardenas unveiled a comprehensive six-year program, called el 
plan sexenal. The program promised to grant Mexicans greater control of the country's 
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agricultural and industrial production. In agriculture, the Cardenista program targeted the large 
landholdings – owned by Mexicans and foreigners alike – for expropriation by the government. 
The government would then divide the land among landless peasants through collective ejidos. 
The six-year program also pledged to expand public works projects, improve irrigation to turn 
fallow lands into productive ones, and boost production in arable territory.234 By the time of 
Cardenas's exit from power in 1940, over $10 million worth of land had been expropriated 
dating back to 1927. More significantly, the Cardenista program almost quadrupled the 
percentage of parcels owned by ejidos from 6 percent to 22 percent.235 All well and good, but 
the biggest prize of all lay in the country’s oil fields. 
     Cardenas insisted the dispute over productive means was more than a struggle to reclaim 
land and property ownership – and more than a business deal that was negotiated with dollars. 
"The distribution of land," Cardenas wrote, "is indispensable for the development of the 
country's economy and, in addition, it is made necessary by the violent situation that exists in 
the countryside between peasants and landowners."236 The Cardenistas not only rejected U.S. 
landowner proposals, they also reduced the amount of land that the law allowed U.S. citizens to 
keep by decreasing the maximum limit by two-thirds to 100 hectares. That move placed a total 
of 18,000-hectares of fertile land in the hands of ejidos and, as Cardenas saw it, improved the 
prospects for peace and prosperity. 
      The principal territorial focus of the sexenal’s agricultural reforms was the Yacqui Valley, a 
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fertile zone in the Yucatan Peninsula that was the domain of hundreds of U.S. farmers who 
cultivated wheat, corn and other crops. The Cardenas team announced plans in early 1936 to 
apply the agrarian code, which guided the expropriation policy on farmlands, in the valley. To 
quell internal domestic opposition to land reform from large Mexican landowners, the Cardenas 
agrarian code set limits on land ownership at 300 hectares, 100 more hectares than allowed by 
the "radical" Constitution of 1917. But the code's guidelines placed U.S.-owned properties 
owned by individuals and companies such as the Colorado River Land Company in danger of 
losing significant chunks of land. To spare themselves a financial disaster, U.S. citizens in the 
Yacqui Valley offered a counterproposal. The owners suggested that they would pool a 
selection of their properties and then turn these over to the peasants as an ejido district where 
locals could grow their crops under U.S. tutelage. An amendment to that proposal offered to 
establish a fund for compensation over several years. The fund could then be tapped by the 
ejidos to pay for cultivation of government-owned lands already at their disposal. 
     Daniels sympathized with – and defended – U.S. landowners in the Yacqui Valley dispute. 
After the Cardenistas reduced the number of hectares that U.S. citizens would be able to keep – 
down to 100 hectares – Daniels insisted that the existing Yacqui Valley landowners needed to 
be grandfathered in at a higher amount. The ambassador also demanded that U.S. farmers 
needed reimbursement for the improvements, such as canals and other irrigation facilities, they 
built on the properties. And he called for a delay in the seizures until the farmers had been able 
to plant the entire wheat crop so that they and the ejidos would be able to reap some profits 
from the next harvest. But as long as the government offered some recompense, or promise to 
pay for the lands, Daniels still believed the expropriation dispute might still go away. 
     Further frustrating Mexican aspirations were the meager results of the two principal 
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developmental engines, oil drilling and precious metals mining, despite the know-how, 
technological wizardry, and dollars that foreign ownership pledged to generate for Mexico’s 
treasury. Production of gold fell from 23,500 kilograms to 19,800 kilograms between 1917 and 
1933. The output of silver and lead plummeted, too, between 1930 and 1935.237 Petroleum 
production fared better. From 1932 to 1937, the number of 159-liter barrels produced rose by 6 
million to almost 47 million.238 To be sure, it was a lucrative 47 million barrels for all – except 
for the Mexican state. Mexican treasury economist Jesus Silva Herzog claimed that the oil 
companies' profits "borders on the fantastic." But as "fantastic" as they were, Herzog Silva 
noted, they had little impact on the country or the living standard of workers in Tampico, and 
the other petroleum drilling centers, because Mexicans received little benefit from the profits of 
their oil. 
     Herzog Silva and other officials accused the oil firms of using a series of financial schemes 
to evade income taxes and to avoid paying Mexican oil workers higher wages. A favorite oil 
industry ploy, Silva Herzog said, worked by having the Mexican subsidiary sell oil at a 
"notoriously low price" to a sister subsidiary in the same conglomerate. The sister firm was 
usually located in Canada or the United States, the senior Mexican treasury official claimed, 
and when the subsidiary resold the oil at a higher price it allowed the Mexican company to avert 
taxes by devaluing the price of the oil sold through "a transfer of profits." At the same time, the 
maneuver offered the foreign oil companies a second advantage: The trick permitted the 
Mexican subsidiaries to report lower operating profits, which would help them argue against 
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demands for wage increases by the petroleum oil worker unions.239 Cardenas apparently agreed 
with Herzog Silva’s assessment. “There are countries that have been able to recapture their 
natural resources for their own development,” he wrote in his diary prior to expropriation. “But 
[in other countries] the indecision of their leaders and the compromises that weaken them, 
maintain their nations in a backward state in their economies and in their political 
independence.”240 
     The Cardenista strategy toward the oil industry first relied on allowing labor organizations to 
muscle Mexican workers into managerial positions. In February 1936, Cardenas, who was 
being pressured by union leaders to adopt stronger stances toward foreign firms, brazenly told a 
group of industrialists in Monterrey that they had to acquiesce to labor’s demands. The 
president scolded the industrialists by saying the “sale of your products are not the result of your 
having established factories, but that your installations obey the market's demand for products 
that you already knew existed in the country and internationally.” Locking out workers and 
shutting down the industry, Cardenas reasoned, was more costly than higher operating costs. 
“So it behooves you to abandon your attitude,” he concluded. And then he issued a thinly veiled 
threat: “Those businessmen that feel fatigued by the social struggle may turn their industries 
over to the workers or to the government.”241 
     Whether Cardenas could do more than cajole industrialists was unclear – so he let the unions 
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lead the battle. While Article 27 of Mexico’s 1917 constitution gave the Mexican state control 
over subsoil rights, a 1927 agreement between Plutarco Calles and U.S. Ambassador Dwight 
Morrow guaranteed unlimited foreign ownership of all subsoil concessions that existed prior to 
the constitution. This agreement effectively gave the foreign oil and mining concerns perpetual 
rights over the fields and mines acquired before the 1910 revolution. So Cardenas focused his 
efforts on labor and management roughhousing. While his predecessors had pressured Mexican 
labor to accede to industry demands, Cardenas took a more neutral stance. Capitalizing on the 
government's tacit pro-labor stance, the oil unions in the petroleum industry merged into one 
all-encompassing umbrella organization, the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la 
Republica de Mexico, or STPRM. The stronger union coalition immediately fired off a list of 
demands including wage increases and benefits that totaled 65 million pesos per year. The 
companies countered by offering a much more modest package totaling about 14 million pesos, 
which the STPRM rejected. The standoff resulted in a May 1937 strike.242 
     Rather than intervene in the strike, Cardenas instructed his labor ministry to organize a 
committee of experts to probe the corporate financial statements to calculate a fair contract for 
the union. In August 1937, the committee issued a series of findings that backed up the union’s 
position. The committee charged that the foreign petroleum companies had reduced the average 
wages of workers by 16 percent against the cost of living – below that of miners and railway 
laborers – even as the companies increased prices charged for oil products in Mexico to 
exorbitant levels in comparison to other countries. The low operating costs and the high retail 
prices in Mexico, the experts claimed, allowed the companies in Mexico to reap windfall profits 
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of 79 million pesos from 1934 to 1937, a 34 percent return on capital investment. The 
committee concluded the oil firms were “so extraordinarily prosperous” they could afford to 
raise worker wages by 26 million pesos in 1938. In addition, the board said the companies 
should be required to provide housing for workers, immediate employment of Mexican trainees 
for every foreigner working on site, medical facilities, life insurance, and pensions. And, most 
importantly, the commission suggested that the entire industry should be placed under the 
control of a governing board composed of representatives from the industry, labor union, and 
government. 
     Predictably, the petroleum companies rejected the report’s conclusions. An executive at the 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, F.C. Pannill, immediately charged that the committee's 
conclusions were "not true findings but are clearly arbitrary and distorted without regard to 
facts." Then, in a measure of foreboding, Pannill predicted that if the Cardenas government 
granted STPRM the slate of concessions offered by the committee there would be no way that 
the "oil industry in Mexico, as today constituted, could continue to exist."243 Worrisome for the 
oil industry, too, was that in early 1937 Cardenas joined Herzog Silva in blaming the country’s 
stagnant economic woes on flight capital. Mexico charged oil industry officials and other 
anxious foreign investors were moving funds out of the country and storing it in foreign havens. 
That was one charge that the oil companies, curiously, did not deny.244 By September 1937, the 
Comptroller of the Treasury revealed that the ministry was "hard pressed to meet extraordinary 
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expenditures which have been pledged by [Cardenas's] social program," costs that forced the 
government to borrow 8 million pesos from the central bank.245 
     With the growing financial crisis, and the role of foreign capital in fueling it, Cardenas 
became even more skeptical of the elusive promise of economic liberalism. Among a series of 
initiatives considered to reinvigorate the sexenal, Cardenas privately proposed to his cabinet in 
May 1937, was “the exact application of Article 27 as it refers to subsoil rights, lands and 
waters, particularly those in the hands of foreigners.”246 
Expropriation, Confrontation, Negotiation 
    On the morning of March 19, 1938, Ambassador Daniels awoke to bad news. Just after 
midnight the following evening, he was informed, Cardenas had inked a decree that effectively 
expropriated some $400 million worth of U.S. oil industry properties, including lands, subsoil 
rights, drilling equipment, and refineries. Up to then, the expropriation was the largest and 
costliest ever for U.S. industry – and immediately became the obstacle to the Pan American 
goal of a hemisphere peacefully united by commerce. "The seizure of properties belonging to 
the nationals of the good neighbor," wrote the Christian Science Monitor, "is hardly the sort of 
treatment that could be described as reciprocal."247 In one stroke of the pen, the promotion of 
economic liberalism in Mexico was redefined as a battle to preserve private property rights. 
Expropriation without compensation, thus, had the same chilling effect on global commerce 
and production as trade barriers, exchange controls and other economic nationalist programs. 
Warned the editors at the Wall Street Journal: “Capital, particularly foreign capital, must 
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henceforth be extremely [wary] about further and deeper investment, which involves 
exploitation of natural resources.”248 
     Conversely, the decree sparked jubilation in Mexico City. On March 23, less than a week 
after the seizure of the oil properties, a million workers were said to have marched throughout 
the country carrying slogans such as “Huerta freed us politically, Cardenas freed us 
economically!” and “Cardenas against Capital.” In Mexico City, Cardenas told an estimated 
200,000 marchers that “we are acting on a high legal and moral ground in order to make our 
country great and respected.”249 The hype and furor continued with a national drive to collect 
funds to “to pay for the expropriation.” Wealthy women, ready to turn in jewelry, stood in line 
along with peasant women willing to donate chickens. Picking up donations was no less a 
figure than the country’s first lady, Amalia Cardenas.250  
     The State Department initially attempted to persuade Cardenas to rescind the expropriation 
decree. Hull and Welles pointed to international law obligations requiring prompt repayment for 
the expropriated refineries and farmlands. The taking of property was legal only if Mexico 
made “adequate and effective compensation to these companies for their properties 
expropriated.”251 Hull noted that the United States, like Mexico, was pursuing a program of 
social betterment to improve the housing, prospects for farmers, security against old age and the 
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wider use of electricity. To accomplish this, the United States, too, had "expropriated from 
foreigners as well as its citizens properties of various kinds" to retire farmlands, build public 
works projects such as dams, and to clear slums.252 But, the difference was that the U.S. 
government had paid for the lands at the time of seizure, Washington couseled. 
     Hull continued the lecture by warning that Mexico’s actions could potentially undermine the 
confidence in the world economic system. The expropriation, the secretary said, was “alien to 
the history, the spirit and the ideals of democracy.” The rules of a civilized society and of 
common justice, he added, required that properties seized be paid for. Only by meeting the law 
could Mexico satisfy business requirements and bolster confidence in the country as an 
investment safe haven. If expropriation is permitted without compensation, Hull charged, 
"safeguards” and the “fundamental laws of most countries and established international law” 
that protect private property “would be utterly worthless." Hull ended his speechmaking 
concluding that the free world could ill afford to see financial rights eroded “at a time when the 
world is on fire, when lawlessness is steadily expanding in so many regions . . . and when this 
Government is pushing its call for law and order.” 253  
     The taking of such lucrative investments, Welles continued, would surely cause other 
foreign capitalists to reconsider Mexico as a place to do business. The Good Neighbor program, 
Welles added, was based on a Pan American “community” of investment and trade founded “on 
a common plane of mutual confidence and fair dealing.” In this regard, Welles said the 
expropriation was “bound to have the most serious repercussions [on Mexico’s] commercial 
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and financial relations.” The expropriation degree, Welles concluded, was a “suicidal” 
mistake.254 Without compensation, Welles sharply told Mexcian ambassador Francisco Castillo 
Najera, “I could not conceive how one penny of additional foreign capital could be invested in 
Mexico except by persons residing in a lunatic asylum.”255 The only solution, Welles advised, 
was for the properties to be returned so that a compromise could be worked out between the 
Cardenas Administration and the oil companies. 
     Cardenas believed the issue was just as critical for Mexico – and if his predecessors had 
been docile and accommodating in the past it was not to be like that this time. Though he 
cloaked the expropriation in the language of nationalism and self-respect, the president from the 
rural state of Michoacan also based his refusal to offer immediate cash payment on monetary 
reasons. The Cardenistas knew full well that Mexico’s federal treasury was running a deficit. If 
Mexico waited until it had enough cash or precious metal in reserve to buy out the oil 
companies or the U.S. farmers, the day of "economic emancipation" would never arrive. 
     Besides, the Mexican government did not regard the expropriation as simply a business deal 
or a buyout. Cardenas implored his countrymen to support the measure. He said the 
expropriation recaptured “the dignity of Mexico that foreigners have scoffed while reaping 
riches from the abuse of our natural resources and while ignoring the problems in the 
country.”256 He repeatedly insisted he was committed to “developing the country with our own 
modest resources, and free from the dangers to the Nation represented by the imperialist 
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capitalism and its presence in our national economy.”257 The president countered U.S. protests 
by offering a few programs offering restitution over a period of ten years. But beyond that, the 
Cardenistas were not prepared to offer much in the way of accommodation. 
     The Cardenistas also rebuffed U.S. threats of sanctions and allegations that they had violated 
international law. Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay insisted that, with all apologies to liberal 
economic dogma, the “political, social and economic stability, and the peace of Mexico, 
depended on the land being placed anew in the hands” of Mexicans. “A transformation of the 
country,” Hay said, “could not be halted by the impossibility of paying immediately the value of 
the properties.” First, he pointed out that only a small number of foreigners were affected. The 
foreign minister added that it was “unjust” for a foreign investor to “aspire to a privileged 
position safe from any risk, but availing himself of the effort of the nationals which must be to 
the benefit of the collectivity.”258 
     This point was the fulcrum of Hay’s defense – the country had decided to place the rights of 
a “collective” society over the safeguards afforded to individuals. The foreign ministry insisted 
that the “rights of society are in this case beyond doubt, and the social necessity is so urgent that 
its satisfaction cannot be subordinated” to the U.S. interpretations of international law and 
demands for compensation. “In view of the fact that the aspirations of the collectivity must 
prevail over individual interests,” Hay continued, “Mexico cannot refrain from carrying out" the 
agricultural and industrial expropriation policies.” Then Hay concluded the note, and the 
argument, by saying that the “continuation of this discussion would benefit only the interested 
                     
257
 Cárdenas, Obras, 1:392. 
 
258
 Hay to Daniels, August 3, 1938, in FRUS 1938, 5:678-79. 
 114
and traditional enemies” of Mexico and terminated the exchange of notes.259  
     Although the State Department and the oil industry were facing a fait accompli, they did 
have leverage. The Mexican government did not own tankers to transport oil. And the 
petroleum companies possessed the contracts for the sale of Mexican oil outside the country. 
Thus, Mexico was deprived of transportation for its oil as well as a distribution network in 
foreign markets. Without oil revenues, the emerging economic crisis in the country was about to 
get worse. Cardenas knew the State Department was pressuring U.S. Treasury officials to stop 
purchasing Mexican silver, a move that would exacerbate the country's financial woes. And 
Cardenas feared, too, that "vigorous" anti-Mexican press coverage in the United States, fueled 
by the companies, might push the Roosevelt government to take more forceful measures 
especially as its concern over Nazism increased. 
     Cardenas also worried about a challenge from within Mexico. Even with the nationalist and 
xenophobic rhetoric and program, the sexenal initially received opposition from domestic 
political rivals. Though Cardenas had won the presidency, Plutarco Calles, the party boss, 
remained a powerful force in the country. Throughout his first years in power, he feared that 
Calles, a much more conservative figure, was working to undermine the sexenal and his 
authority as president. In fact, Calles was dissatisfied with his anointed successor. After all, it 
was the former president who had ironed out the accord with Dwight Morrow in the 1920s that 
provided guarantees for the same foreign interests that Cardenas targeted and criticized. When 
Cardenas initially considered a proposal to reopen the subsoil dispute that Calles settled in 
1927, it led to a bitter break between the two. Meanwhile, Cardenas also worried that the 
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industrial interests, especially the oil concerns, were bankrolling the opposition.260 The 
confrontation with Washington, Cardenas ultimately feared, might embolden Calles and other 
opposition figures to challenge his hold on power. Still, Cardenas believed Mexico had to act 
now. “Mexico has to take advantage of these favorable moments when so-called ‘democratic’ 
governments are declaring before international public opinion their intention to respect the 
sovereignty of nations,” Cardenas wrote.261 The solution, he claimed, lay in negotiating a 
compromise that would satisfy the State Department’s compensation requirement before the 
1940 U.S. presidential elections. 
     Daniels, Hull and Welles also stood in a policy tar pit that limited their options. After all, the 
petroleum companies were not exactly viewed as white knights on either side of the Rio 
Grande. "Having made big money on absurdly low wages . . . all oil producers oppose any 
change in tax and wages, and resent it if their Governments do not take their point of view," 
Daniels complained.262 And as the threat of war loomed in Europe, the United States could not 
press Mexico too hard. A break with Mexico, with which the U.S. shared a 2,000-mile border, 
could damage hemispheric harmony that FDR and Hull felt they needed as a strategic bulwark. 
For these reasons, Welles said, the spring of 1938 held the "promise of being the most critical 
moment in the relations of between the people" situated on either side of the Rio Grande.263  
     The stalemate led to a series of negotiations, the first ones conducted by Donald Richberg, a 
New York lawyer who represented the oil companies. The ensuing talks produced the so-called 
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Richberg Plan, which would allow the Mexican government to keep the refineries and 
equipment without immediate repayment. However, under the compromise, the oil companies' 
management teams would run the facilities "free from restrictions, claims or obligations" not 
written into the contract. In addition, the proposed management contract contained provisions 
for "fixed taxes and similar payments" for the duration of the deal as well as for "appropriate 
measures and means of reimbursement" for the original nationalization of the properties. The 
oil companies argued that the success of the plan lay in the retention of company management 
because in Mexico "the only possibility of an efficient management was company management 
and not Mexican management or joint management."264 The Cardenistas, however, would not 
agree to any resolution that did not place operations in the control of Mexicans. "There can be 
no resolution if the companies insist on wanting renewed control of operations," Cardenas 
wrote. "For Mexico, the only solution is for [the U.S.] to recognize the expropriation and to 
focus on working out a payment arrangement." Cardenas suggested that the companies 
reconsider marketing Mexican oil abroad and take a cut of the profits as compensation.265  
     A second attempt to resolve the impasse took place in the fall of 1939. In October, the oil 
firms sent Nelson Rockefeller, the youthful son of John D. Rockefeller, to negotiate a 
resolution. Possessing an appreciation for Mexican arts, Rockefeller at one time commissioned 
a painting by the famed Mexican artist Diego Rivera. However, in an embarrassing turn-about, 
Rockefeller ordered the mural at the family’s Manhattan headquarters covered because its 
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theme was too anti-capitalist.266 Rockefeller arrived in Mexico with high hopes. He started by 
arguing the official line – that without foreign technology and experienced hands, the industry 
faced a "complete breakdown." Cardenas remained unconvinced. Then Rockefeller made a new 
offer: The Mexican government and the oil companies would form one large conglomerate in 
Mexico and share the earnings fifty-fifty. Cardenas was interested – but only if the government 
owned a 51 percent stake in the new company. He reiterated his conviction that as long as 
ownership was in the hands of foreigners "the whole thing would have no meaning and was 
impossible from the point of view of the Mexican people." The only way to make it happen, the 
general said, would be to give the government 51 percent. Rockefeller balked, arguing that then 
"you have the responsibility for management in the hands of the Government and even if they 
started out by saying the foreign companies would have the management, sooner or later 
Government control would creep into the operation because of their majority holding of the 
stock."267 Thus, the stalemate continued and the Rockefeller mission, like the Richberg Plan, 
ended up in the diplomatic scrap heap. 
     The stalemate would drag on for two more years before it was "resolved." A turning point 
was the departure of Cardenas from office and his replacement by Manuel Avila Camacho. The 
new president was more conservative than Cardenas – and a little more disposed to settle the 
dispute. The war in Europe made clear to him that Mexico's fate was better tied to the United 
States than to a European continent at war with itself. Soon after his election, Avila Camacho 
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made overtures to the United States. He told the newspaper La Prensa that he was not a 
"socialist" and that he felt it "necessary to create confidence for the investor, first for the 
Mexican investor and then for the foreign investor."268 Sensing a chance to end the deadlock, 
Daniels endorsed the new president. He told FDR that Avila Camacho did not elicit the rancor 
and bitterness from oil company officials that "call him everything from a Communist 
down."269 
     The White House, too, was eager to end the standoff. FDR’s aides advised the U.S. president 
that Avila Camacho’s election offered an opportunity to improve economic diplomacy and 
settle the oil dispute.270 FDR’s personal representative at Avila Camacho's inaugural predicted 
"a swing to the right" by the incoming Mexican president. The shift would not be enough to 
restore the pre-expropriation status quo, but it bolstered hope for an end the U.S. boycott of 
Mexican oil and paved the way for new investment in other areas such as railroads and steel 
production.271 The assessment was on target. Though Avila Camacho did not rescind the 
expropriation, he was eager to accommodate the United States and strike a face-saving 
resolution. In November 1941, the two countries agreed to form a commission, known as the 
Cooke-Zevada committee, with two representatives from each side. The committee’s task was 
to agree on a figure for compensating the oil firms and establishing a payment schedule. 
     The oil firms were not satisfied. Their demand was nothing short than a return to active and 
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full management of the industry. "Mexican management of the oil industry would not restore 
that confidence in Mexico which foreign investors and domestic investors require," Farish 
insisted. "There is said to be at present a large amount of idle capital which awaits merely a 
return to business of confidence in foreign investment in Mexican industries."272 
     But Avila Camacho would not relent – and the Roosevelt government desperately wanted 
the issue resolved. In the fall of 1941, the Cooke-Zevada commission proposed a price and 
payment schedule sounded like the right deal to a U.S. officials now worried more about war in 
Europe than the oil industry in Mexico. The face-saving measure permitted cordial, if not 
superficial, cooperation through military exchanges between the Mexican and U.S. armed 
forces. When U.S. military personnel arrived in Mexico to discuss hemispheric defense plans in 
September 1942, Avila Camacho pledged that the talks would be characterized by "a sense of 
reciprocity, appreciation and real cooperation that would be extremely useful in coordinating 
military efforts between Mexico and the United States."273 Avila Camacho allowed the U.S. 
armed forces to use Mexican airfields for military purposes and he did not object to the drafting 
of Mexicans in the living in the U.S. Some 250,000 Mexicans in U.S. military uniforms died in 
World War II combat.274 
     Commercial relations improved during World War II as well. In 1943, Avila Camacho's 
government seized control of a series of alleged German chemical and pharmaceutical 
investments in Mexico. The taking of the properties coincided with the finalization of a contract 
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to hand over operations of the German facilities to a U.S. firm, the American Cyanamid 
Company. The contract allowed American Cyanide to manage the seized properties, which 
totaled thirty-three companies controlling about half the Mexican market, for six years, with an 
automatic option to renew the contract for three-year installments thereafter. A senior U.S. 
official lauded the contract, which he said removed a key industry that was "the basis of the 
German commercial power in Latin America" and replaced its supervision with American 
ownership.275 Soon after the expropriation, U.S. officials gleefully reported that the Mexican 
government agreed to permit U.S. corporations to invest and help manage all the chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies that Mexico seized from Germans in their country.276 
     FDR was certainly pleased. In a letter to Avila Camacho, Roosevelt hailed the seizure and 
endorsed the American Cyanide contract, saying the nationalization provided a "splendid 
opportunity" to "apply the principles of friendly cooperation which we discussed during our 
meeting at Monterrey." To mark the cooperation between the two nations, Avila Camacho sent 
FDR a shipment of Mexican wines. FDR took samples with him to the Casablanca conference 
with Churchill, and then ordered the remaining bottles be served in the White House.277 
Conclusion 
      Though the Cooke-Zevada arrangement quieted the dispute over the Tampico refineries, it 
failed to reestablish the liberal agenda or restate the primacy of property rights and investment 
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safe harbor in Mexico. For the next fifteen years, U.S. officials gritted their teeth over Mexican 
protective tariffs and limitations on foreign investment in the country. To the disappointment of 
U.S. officials, Mexico chose not to renew a weak, seven-year-old reciprocal treaty in 1950. 
“Inordinate nationalism appears to be innate in the Mexican national character,” claimed one 
State Department analysis in 1955. “It is evident in Mexico’s attitude toward foreign 
investments and in its trade policies.”278 
     Still angry about the 1938 expropriation, U.S. oil companies continued to oppose the 
normalization of economic relations with Mexico. A good example was a late 1940s proposal 
by a U.S. firm that wanted to conduct oil exploration in Mexico. Though it seemed like an 
innocuous offer, U.S. diplomats and oil industry executives ganged up to defeat the plan. Harry 
Truman’s Point IV program promised to make U.S. scientific and technical know-how and 
machinery available to Latin American countries and one company hoped to strike a deal with 
Mexico. The virtually unknown Wheland Company in Texas figured Point IV offered a chance 
to boost sales by selling drilling equipment to Petroleros Mexicanos, S.A., the nationalized firm 
that succeeded the foreign oil conglomerates after the expropriation. To pay for the equipment, 
the government of Miguel Aleman, which succeeded Avila Camacho, resurrected a five-year 
old request for an Export-Import Bank loan. 
     The State Department immediately opposed the measure. Willard Thorp, the economic 
advisor, argued for rejection of the loan because U.S. policy was clear: "Exploration, 
development, and production activities in the oil industry are best conducted on a competitive, 
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non-nationalized basis." The loan, Thorp said, constituted nothing short of violating a sacred 
precept of U.S. foreign economic policy by financing government meddling in an area best left 
to free enterprise. As such, Thorp concluded, U.S. government "assistance" was out of the 
question until U.S. companies could again invest in “the exploration, and production of 
Mexican oil.”279 Implicit in the U.S. rejection of the loan was an attempt to teach Pemex a 
lesson. "We know that Mexican oil development will not reach substantial proportions until 
Mexico will allow private enterprise to tackle the job," said E.B. Swanson of Interior's Oil and 
Gas Division. "We know this, but Mexico has yet to learn it. Mexico will only learn this from 
experience."280 
     The U.S. government position was clear: The project would be approved only if U.S. 
companies conducted the drilling. Gordon Duke of Southeastern de Mexico, the company that 
partnered with Wheland to sell the equipment, old Pemex director general Antonio Bermudez 
that his only option was to “pursue negotiations” with U.S. oil firms willing to “undertake 
drilling operations” in Mexico. Otherwise, Mexico could expect a line-of-credit of no more than 
$100 million that could not be used for the drilling equipment that it wanted.281 Mexico balked, 
withdrew the oil loan and settled for a $150 million Export Import Bank credit for irrigation and 
road-building materials. The withdrawal satisfied U.S. officials. Assistant Secretary Edward 
Miller called the compromise "a great relief to all of us since we had bogged down into a 
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complete impasse over the oil loan."282 
     This episode demonstrated that fully a decade after the expropriation clash, the liberal-
nationalist dialectic still figured prominently. The Cooke-Zevada pact may have ended the oil 
expropriation dispute, but it did nothing to cover the unbridgeable gap between liberalism and 
nationalism. Wartime diplomatic conveniences had prompted Cooke-Zevada. Once World War 
II ended, old resentments returned. Try as they might, U.S. and Mexican negotiators were 
unable to resolve issues over ownership and control and for this reason the expropriation, the 
Cooke-Zevada agreement and the stalemate that lingered were long-lasting setbacks for the 
policy of economic liberalism. The agreement’s U.S. author, attorney Morris Cooke, 
acknowledged the deep disagreements between U.S. liberals and Mexican nationalism. "There 
is involved in the matter at issue the major problem of harnessing two great social forces,” he 
said about the settlement in 1942. “One is the force represented by Mexico, the other force 
represented by Anglo-Saxon traditions, institutions and laws. Settlement of the problem of 
indemnification for expropriated oil properties is a joint experience on the part of two peoples 
in harmonizing these historic forces.”283 
     Perhaps, a more telling pair of appraisals of the liberal-nationalist standoff came from 
Cardenas and Nelson Rockefeller, and the lessons each said they learned in their negotiations. 
Rockefeller said he learned in his talks with Cardenas that, for Mexico, the issue of property 
control was paramount. “Little by little I came to understand the true significance [of the 
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expropriation],” he wrote in his journal. “It had been the turning point for the basis of relations 
for the petroleum industry in the foreign field.”284 Cardenas arrived at different conclusion. 
Upon leaving the presidency, he jotted down a note for his predecessor: “As long as there is not 
a declaration from the U.S. government to recognize the [sovereignty] of other countries, there 
should not be acceptance of new investments here.”285  
     These realizations were evidently clear to others in the United States and Mexico. After 
the expropriation, U.S. transnational companies understood that economic nationalists in the 
Americas could do more than temporarily fracture commerce. It could actually seize 
commerce by capturing the means of production. And the treaties, agreements and contracts 
that once protected business were no longer sure-fire safeguards. The founding of Pemex set a 
precedent for subsequent nationalization of industry in other countries, from Cuba to Peru to 
Venezuela, using similar arguments.286 U.S. policy-makers in government and industry knew 
that they would now have to resort to heavy-handed means if they were to safeguard property 
and interests. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Truman’s Liberals Confront the Peronist Corporate State 
     Geographically speaking, the United States and Argentina are nearly polar opposites in the 
Western Hemisphere. In the spring of 1945, the ideological divide between the governments of 
the two countries was a wide one as well. As the Axis empire crumbled in Europe and the 
Pacific, the Truman Administration, backed by the executives of the country’s top transnational 
companies, laid plans for a resumption of post-war liberal commerce in the Pan American 
backyard. Out of war and depression, U.S. policy-makers renewed their call for open markets 
and unimpeded foreign investment. Yet the Argentine junta, led in name by Edelmiro Farrell 
and in practice by Juan Peron, rejected the Truman Administration’s liberal lead. Instead, the 
Peronist junta planned to reorganize Argentina’s political, economic, and social structure. This 
model incorporated strict state regulation that gave the government broad powers to act as an 
arbitrator in the country’s economic life.287 The Peronistas dubbed their model the “corporate 
state.” This approach to economic policy-making lay at the heart of the post-war Argentine-U.S. 
standoff. 
     Though U.S. ambassador to Argentina Spruille Braden held a grudge against Peron,288 the 
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issue was deeper than personality. Braden feared that the Peron-led junta advocated an anti-
liberal corporate state. U.S. policy-makers argued that a post-war surge of U.S.-style democracy 
and free enterprise could not take root in the Pan American hemisphere as long as rival 
ideologies and agendas offered competition, much as occurred previously in Cuba, Brazil, and 
Mexico. They charged the junta’s policies, which called for an intrusive state in a broad 
spectrum of economic affairs, were antithetical to the Four Freedoms that so many U.S. soldiers 
fought to defend in the war against totalitarianism. Ultimately, the Truman Administration’s 
concern in the Southern Cone had less to do with supposed sympathy between the Peronists in 
Buenos Aires and Nazi Germany during World War II.289 The principal irritant was the 
Argentine junta’s desire to pursue its own blueprint for political, social, and economic 
organization after the war. A dispute that started off with substantive economic issues did turn 
into a personal feud. But personalities aside, profound economic issues lay at the heart of the 
confrontation. 
Post-War Economic Liberalism 
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     The new U.S. president, Harry Truman, interpreted the Allied victory in Europe as 
convincing proof that the best way to deter conflict was to bind the world's nation-states in an 
interdependent liberal network led by the United States. Truman, who was given to boasting 
that "We are the economic giant of the world," believed even stronger in the virtues of 
economic liberalism than FDR. Anything other than liberalism, Truman said, was "not the 
American way," and "not the way to peace."290 Privately, Truman was just as leery of the 
Argentine junta as his ambassador in the River Plate. "I’ve no faith in any totalitarian state be it 
Russian, German, Spanish, Argentinean," Truman confided in his diary the very day Braden 
arrived at his post. "They all start with the wrong premise [that] the end justifies the means.”291 
Truman’s diplomatic team followed his lead. They championed pre-World War II policies 
favoring liberal trade and investment initiatives. They embraced a 1942 inter-American pact 
that promised a “new order of peace . . . supported by economic principles that insure equitable 
and lasting international trade.”292 After all, one U.S. official crowed in early 1945, the United 
States was "the greatest production machine the world has ever seen."293 Pan American 
diplomacy, from the standpoint of U.S. diplomats, rested on one constant, central assumption: 
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The belief that Latin Americans were a people locked in a cycle of poverty and political 
instability that only U.S. corporations and trade could break. 
     Truman’s liberals argued U.S. capital offered the true option to building much-needed 
infrastructure such as roads and sewer systems as well as incubating industry with technological 
advances. U.S. direct investment, they said, provided factory jobs and paychecks for the large 
numbers of unemployed and unskilled laborers. Unfettered hemispheric trade and investment 
could not fail, declared one top State Department economist, because it was the brainchild of 
none other than Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and "the founders of this Nation."294 If it was 
good enough for the founding fathers, it was good enough for the needy republics of Pan 
America. 
     The diplomats decried the intervention of the state in economic affairs as, ultimately, an 
assault on freedom. Perhaps, they said, such government management was necessary during the 
Great Depression. But, in the post-war era, those policies only substituted “the will of the state 
for the freedom of choice of individuals,” said Rockefeller. “Economic dictation – and this is 
the very essence of central planning – involves political dictation. If government is to tell men 
what they may not produce it soon comes to tell them what they may produce. This means the 
end of personal freedom."295 The free market model that Uncle Sam was restoring at home, 
Rockefeller and others reasoned, was the only viable alternative for the Americas, too. 
     U.S. industrialists who hoped to dominate the Latin American marketplace re-enforced these 
                     
294
 Speech by Winthorp G. Brown, Director of the Office of International Trade Policy, titled 
"Economic Factors in U.S. Foreign Policy," in DSB, 19 (August 14, 1948), p. 8. 
 
295
 Rockefeller memo, July 19, 1940, in Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, Washington DC files, 
box 1, Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, N.Y. 
 
 129
views. Harvey Firestone, president of the tire company bearing his name, claimed "most foreign 
ideologies were conceived by theorists who sought to better the lot of what they refer to as the 
common man [but] they have merely succeeded in reducing the standard of living" in practice. 
“It does not occur to them,” he added, “that the blueprints and formulas for their own salvation 
and prosperity are all clearly recorded in the pages of American history.”296 Other corporate 
groups sounded similar themes. “In America, we have adhered to the principles of free 
enterprise and individual opportunity under capitalism,” wrote the Committee for Economic 
Development, an influential post-war economic advisory group in the United States. “It has 
given us the highest living standards in the world.”297 
     Few people in or out of government articulated the case for post-war economic liberalism 
better than Spruille Braden, Sumner Welles replacement as Pan American strategist. In part, 
Braden’s ability to explain the nexus between liberalism, prosperity, and peace drew from his 
family's roots within Latin America's export economy. Braden's father, William, was a founder 
of the Braden Copper Company. Spruille Braden's pre-diplomatic experiences centered, largely, 
on negotiating business deals in Chile and other Latin republics.298 An outspoken, blunt, and 
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uninhibited believer in civil democracy and free enterprise, Braden saw himself as a lightning 
rod for the post-war, U.S.-led government and economic development in the region. 
     A devout believer in Wilsonian internationalism, Braden recalled the mistaken retrenchment 
toward isolation that followed the Versailles peace treaty. He believed that it was his mission to 
prevent a repeat of the post-World War I mistakes. The opportunity to establish U.S.-style 
democracy and economy across the globe, Braden said, was at hand in the closing months of 
World War II. The victory in Europe and the impending triumph in the Pacific, he insisted, 
offered a second chance to get it right. The post-war era, Braden argued, would be dominated 
by a “collision of philosophies . . . more fundamental than the collision of armies.”299 So 
Braden and others seized an opportunity in the waning months of World War II to spread the 
U.S. political and economic model. 
     U.S. intelligence reports on the Argentine junta’s economic maneuvers troubled Braden and 
other U.S. intelligence officers. The State Department’s Office of Strategic Services alleged that 
Farrell planned to develop "a self-sufficient industrial economy equipped to support aggressive 
war."300 The regime’s plans to incorporate the Union Industrial Argentina, a manufacturing 
federation, into the "state-controlled corporate assembly" smacked of National Socialism.301 
The Farrell-Peron government, U.S. intelligence officials would later charge, manifested its 
"Nazi-Fascist character" in numerous acts including suppressing "individual liberties" and 
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establishing "a 'corporate' labor organization subservient to the government.”302 
     Braden watched anxiously as the Argentine government tapped the remnants of Germany’s 
investment interest in the country. The ambassador claimed German businesses in Argentina 
included "powerful, commercial and financial institutions.”303 The economic link between 
Argentine and German industry was a key irritant for both U.S. policy-makers and corporate 
chieftains. The junta's relationship with a series of German multinational companies and their 
subsidiaries angered U.S. multinationals. "Bayer of Argentina did more business last year than 
it ever did before in its history," groused Victor Folsom head of the Chilean-based operations of 
the U.S. pharmaceutical firm Winthorp. "The efforts of U.S. drug houses to replace German 
interests in Argentina have been anything but successful. It is a fact that as long as Bayer is 
allowed to live Winthorp's task is going to remain extremely difficult."304 
     Competing in Argentina, stated other U.S. executives, would be especially difficult given the 
financial subsidies offered to Argentine enterprises by their government. Between 1943 and 
July 1944, U.S. officials claimed, the Argentine junta permitted some 42 million pesos worth of 
contracts to fall into the hands of German companies such as Siemens Bauunion and Wayss & 
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Freytag – even as Allied armies were still waging war against their Nazi parent companies and 
Hitler’s armies. After the war, U.S. officials charged Argentines did little to curtail the influence 
of these powerful firms. "In Argentina, the Germans have constructed a complete duplicate of 
the economic structure for war which they had in Germany," U.S. officials charged. "They 
possess today in Argentina the economic organization – industrial, commercial and agricultural 
– which they need to provide a base for the reconstitution of German aggressive power during 
the period when the homeland is still occupied."305 Building a liberal economic order led by 
U.S. industry was impossible as long as that was the case. The only solution, U.S. policy-
makers concluded, was to remove Colonel Peron. 
The Peronista Corporate State 
     Argentina’s financial backbone snapped with the outbreak of World War II, and that break 
set the country on a path to a post-war confrontation with the United States. In the late 1930s, 
Argentina, a nation of 14 million people, was a rising power in the global marketplace. But 
Argentina was in a precarious position. Its commercial lifeline ran through Western Europe, a 
volatile region marching toward the most destructive war in human history. Buenos Aires 
attempted to wean Argentine commerce off its European dependency by widening its economic 
nexus with the United States, its one hope to avoid a wartime collapse. But those trade and 
commercial negotiations repeatedly failed to produce meaningful results. Following a June 
1943 coup, the country’s leadership turned to more inward strategies that, after the war, ran 
counter to U.S. hemispheric and global visions.   
     Before Germany’s invasion of Poland, few analysts, certainly not many in Argentina, 
predicted the sudden demise of the South American country. Argentina’s recovery from the 
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Depression had been impressively quick. By 1937, the rich soils of its pampa prairies permitted 
the country to become the second-largest exporter of grain in the world. Its expanding 
manufacturing sector saw payrolls swell from about 80,000 workers to nearly one million in 
1940. Argentine factories produced enough textile products to reduce imports of these materials 
by the early 1940s. Migration into Buenos Aires, the country’s capital and largest city, sparked a 
construction boom as the population doubled between the world wars. Argentina even lured 
more corporate investment.306 
     The outbreak of the European war halted this progress and triggered a downward slide that 
cut deeper than the Depression. Argentina, which sold roughly 40 percent of its exports to 
Western Europe in 1938, saw that share shrink to 6 percent after 1941. Argentina’s total exports 
were cut by 20 percent in 1940, and further declines followed in the next two years. Argentine 
grain sales fell from 17 million tons exported in 1937 to just 6 million tons in 1942. 
International sales of Argentine maize plummeted from 6 million tons in 1941 to 400,000 tons 
in later years. Argentine industry lost access to access to imported coal and oil reserves needed 
to fuel railroads, factories and utilities.307 
     Having lost its major trading partners, Argentina again turned to the United States. For more 
than a decade, the two countries had attempted to negotiate a series of trade agreements to no 
success. First the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in the early 1930s shut the door on most Argentine 
products. Then New Deal agricultural subsidies blocked imports of Argentine produce that 
undersold U.S. farm production. Then, late 1930s U.S. health and safety rules to safeguard 
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against cattle foot-and-mouth disease kept Argentine meat products from U.S. markets. In 1941, 
Argentine Finance Minister Federico Pinedo attempted to knock on U.S. commercial doors one 
last time. After a round of frustrating talks, the Argentines came away with little to show for his 
efforts. Under the new accord, the only new Argentine products admitted into the U.S. included 
some minerals and dairy products. The trade pact barely lowered tariffs on Argentine linseed 
and tallow, and did little to open doors for meat or grain.308 
     The economic malaise resulting from the war, and the failure of previous U.S.-Argentine 
commercial efforts, impacted Argentina’s political and diplomatic landscape. The financial 
woes led to political destabilization and a succession of military juntas in Buenos Aires for the 
balance of the war. In addition, the perceived snub by the powerful neighbor to the north raised 
anti-U.S. sentiment in the country, and emboldened an emerging political force in Argentina, 
the nationalists. Nationalist sentiment insisted that Argentina had received a raw deal from its 
global partners and now needed to look inward for solutions. Argentine nationalism called for 
domestic industrialization and expropriation of foreign-owned utilities. In the international 
field, nationalism eschewed formal alignments with any of the European belligerents. Instead, 
nationalist thinkers and proponents insisted Argentina should seek alliances that benefited their 
country first.         
     A career soldier from a lower middle-class background, Colonel Juan Peron readily rebuffed 
the U.S. liberal call for various reasons. First, he harbored a well-honed distrust of the United 
States. His dissatisfaction with Argentina’s corrupt, democratic experiment – which lasted from 
1916 to 1930 - also cooled Peron to Washington’s post-World War II calls for electoral and 
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democratic governance. His military training patterned after the German officer corps, distanced 
Peron from the Allies during World War II. So did the considerable concessions of money and 
national dignity, extracted under some coercion, to British buyers of Argentine meat and grain. 
Peron resented the coziness of Argentina’s upper classes and their foreign business partners. 
Liberalism allowed foreign businessmen and the oligarchies to grow richer, Peron surmised, but 
the slums and urban poor in Buenos Aires simply grew. After the Farrell government took 
power in a June 1943 coup, Peron envisioned a different route where the state heavily regulated 
commerce and labor relations. His political machine-building skills, including force and co-
opting, complemented Peron’s hopeful promises of a “New Argentina” founded on vague 
notions of economic self-sufficiency, social justice and political reform. 
     Peron's goal was to fashion a financially independent Argentine state. "The fruits of our soil 
should be cultivated by our industry," he proposed. The idea was a simple precursor of 1950s 
import substitution utopia: raw materials produced on Argentine soil should be processed by 
Argentine industry to manufacture goods that Argentines could use. Ironically, the stated goal 
was to achieve U.S.-like self-sufficiency, where Peron claimed "70 to 90 percent of its 
production is consumed" with a minimal surplus for export.309 Moreover, Peron envisioned 
ambitious goals for his industrialization program, particularly investment in high-technology 
capital goods such as high-speed aircraft. The country's "great expanse, covering thousands of 
kilometers of frontier" necessitated the modernization of transportation and communication, he 
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said.310 
     Economic autonomy paved the way for social justice, a vaguely defined but desirable goal of 
the Peronist program. Social justice meant, in broad terms, equality of opportunity and 
improved distribution of per capita income. Among the great failures of previous governments, 
Peron often charged, was "their distance from the ranks of the workers." Those governments’ 
concern for the working class materialized only when "fear of disorder in the streets obligated it 
to come descend from its ivory tower." As Labor Secretary, Peron embarked on land division 
programs, construction of affordable housing, savings incentives, wage increases, worker 
holidays, and a labor code that he said provided workers with respect. 
     To accomplish this task, Peron promised to dismember "the Creole economic oligarchy." 
Nebulously defined, the enemy constituted various factions that owned industry, large land 
estates and the major export houses. But Peronista foes also included the bourgeois professional 
classes, such as attorneys, merchants, university professors and accountants. Peron charged that 
these middle class stalwarts fed off the export-oriented oligarchy and tacitly embraced 
Argentina's subservient role in the global economic and political hierarchy. The new economic 
order, he stated, "should change the worship of money with the concept that money in itself is 
not wealth, but an instrument" for development.311 To push his agenda, Peron alternated 
between paternal lectures and heavy-handed repression and bullying. In his relations with social 
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groups in Argentina, and the press, Peron first attempted persuasion, saying that his approach 
ultimately led to social peace by forestalling communist penetration. When rebuffed, Peron 
made clear he "was not a man of half-measures" and threatened to confront his "social enemies 
with frankness and valor given to us by our convictions."312 Peron also turned to chauvinistic 
bravado and bluster. "I have no fear of civil war," he reportedly told Cuban publisher Pedro 
Cue. "I have an army of 100,000 [soldiers] … and 4,000,000 workers armed with clubs."313 
     Peron's plans went beyond redistribution of land, wage, and price controls. Indeed, the 
colonel accepted that government needed to assume the role of the tough talking and, 
sometimes, the arm-twisting mediator in labor-capital disputes. If the state deemed labor to act 
irrationally, or against "the healthy rules of human coexistence," government would side with 
capital. Workers, on the other hand, were guaranteed that decrees and codes in their favor 
would "be enforced with the highest amount of zeal." This balancing act, at least in theory, was 
the essence of the corporate state – the use of power and force by the state to govern Argentine 
society based on a subjective Peronista balancing act of values, interests, and priorities. "Social 
progress," he felt, "allows civilized nations to soften the clash of interests and to convert in 
permanent codes of justice relations, which often altered with different circumstances, 
provoking conflict between capital and labor."314 Only government could guarantee this result, 
he said. "The state should assure a just recompense and an equitable redistribution of the profits 
to each of the elements that participate, without jeopardizing the consumer," Peron told one 
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audience. "This is possible by creating equilibrium and coordination of the factors that interplay 
in the problem, adjusting the costs and salaries."315 
     The third stage of Peronista national reconstruction was the realignment of the political party 
system. Like many of his nationalist supporters, Peron felt disdain toward the old style of 
partisan politics in the country. "What have the [traditional, old-league] parties done since the 
third of June?" he asked rhetorically in one broadcast speech, "to purify themselves of the 
factions that implemented fraud and violence . . . or did they benefit in silence from their 
residue?" But Peron did not entirely reject electoral politics, stating only that Argentine citizens 
must place national interests ahead of personal pursuits. He said that was the problem with 
previous experiments with democracy: Electoral banter became little more than a rush to claim 
patronage jobs by civil servants who “understood little or nothing of the function they were to 
execute.”316 
     The Peronista ideological platform found soul mates within Argentina’s nationalist quarters. 
“German political ideas may not interest us,” wrote one writer. “But German commercial 
interests do interest us and half the nations of the Americas.”317 Argentine writers viewed 
Washington's insistence on state deregulation, foreign investment, and agro-export as pillars of 
post-war commerce with more than a modicum of suspicion and contempt. "Since commerce is 
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to an immense degree in the hands of foreigners, so are its profits," wrote Rodolfo Irazusta, a 
contemporary nationalist author. "The foreigner dominates us with our own means. The 
inhuman structure consists of freedom for the foreigner and submission of the Creole."318 
Washington's trumpeting of representative government did not convince everyone, either. 
Another nationalist theorist warned that Argentina needed to rearrange its “society along the 
basis of equity” without advice or intrusion from the United States. “This task of organization 
and fortification is a task that cannot be delegated to another country,” said the writer.319 Others 
reminded the Argentine citizenry that pre-1930 experiment in representative government – led 
by Peronist rivals like the Radical Party – was rife with fraud, patronage and corruption. "The 
echoes of one unprecedented scandal had barely grown faint when another, and then another, 
would surge," wrote Otero. Rather than emphasizing individual choice and personal property 
rights, Argentine dissenters claimed they sought a "genuine democracy . . . guided by the larger 
interests of the community."320 Latin America, the nationalists insisted, should form its own 
block, its own sphere with Argentina in the lead role. “Argentina, because of its untainted 
history, has the right to morally guide South America.”321  
     In the international arena, Peron articulated a vague but clearly self-centered "Third 
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Position." In essence, Peronist foreign policy sought to guarantee Argentine neutrality in non-
South American conflicts. Buenos Aires desired trade and amicable political, cultural, and 
social exchanges with the former World War II belligerents. In part, the country's geographical 
positioning fostered feelings of distance. But Argentina’s demographics also made Buenos 
Aires’ aloofness toward the Allies a matter of practicality. Argentina, like the United States 
during World War I, harbored large Italian and German immigrant communities whose 
sentiments had to be balanced against the country's extensive commercial relationship with 
Great Britain. Furthermore, Buenos Aires felt its political, economic and social potential made 
it a pivot in South America. “In Hispanic-America, Argentina should be the one that marks 
paths,” Peronist platform claimed.322 
Face-Off in Buenos Aires 
     Convinced of the need to break the burgeoning Buenos Aires-Axis commercial fiefdom, 
Braden went on the attack. On his third day in the embassy, the ambassador convened a press 
conference. When asked if the U.S. cuddled Farrell and Peron because it found it easier to work 
with dictators, Braden fumed. "We are fighting throughout the world for the cause of 
democracy," he retorted, "and when we say democracy we mean just that." The statement shot 
through Buenos Aires like a rush of adrenaline. The influential opposition party-affiliated daily 
newspaper La Prensa, a Conservative Party ally and a Peronista foe, quoted the ambassador’s 
comments, a brazen move for a paper previously muzzled by censors.323 Days later, the 
newspaper's editors chastised the regime and exhorted its silent countrymen to speak up. They 
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wrote:  "It is not possible to defend the fatherland with the patriotism of some, instead it 
requires that of all . . . and when the exercise of citizenship is abandoned, the liberties, rights 
and guarantees that seemed garnered can be withdrawn from nations."324 Business and 
industrialists published a manifesto criticizing government economic policies saying that 
artificial price controls would "lead to bankruptcy."325 
     Believing Peron was unpopular – and thus vulnerable – the ambassador's strategy was to 
wrest enough civil freedoms for the Argentine populace hoping they, in turn, might rise against 
Peron. If newspapers, political parties, and mass assembly were permitted to run their course, 
the overwhelming sentiment against Peron would run the colonel and his wife, Eva, out of the 
Casa Rosada – or so Braden strategized. In a series of public speeches and writings the 
ambassador continued his caustic, hyperbolic attacks. He accused the Farrell government of 
giving "any swaggering officer license to beat citizens who refuse to hail the 'leader'" and 
"licenses mounted policemen armed with sabers to ride down men, women and children as in 
the bloody days of the Czar."326 
      Influential organizations and citizens in the United States publicly supported Braden's 
crusade in Buenos Aires. The Congress of Industrial Organizations' Committee on Inter-
American Affairs alleged the Peron "imprisoned and tortured the flower of Argentina's labor 
movement and has used Nazi files, advice and methods to break up bona-fide trade 
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unionism."327 The National Committee to Combat Anti-Semitism applauded Braden's actions 
and urged him to break relations with the Farrell government and impose sanctions.328 These 
groups and other influential observers found the presence of the Peronists galling, if not 
dangerous. "After the enemies of democracy have utterly [been] defeated and are on trial for 
their lives in Nuremberg or Tokyo," wrote Samuel Guy Inman, "they openly flaunt themselves 
in Buenos Aires."329 
    Within weeks of assuming his role as Argentine opposition organizer, Braden had become a 
lightning rod. When he arrived to speak at the University of the Littoral, thousands of 
Argentines reportedly packed the railway station to greet him. Once on campus, his exclamatory 
attacks on the Peron government drew ovations. His appearances at other gatherings, such as 
those given at the "swank, Goya-lined" Jockey Club330 and the trendy Plaza Hotel, also drew 
rave reviews as did his talks at black-tie social events, official luncheons, operas and a ball.331 
At the gatherings, the ambassador delivered passionate speeches defending democracy and 
castigating the junta. "Your words at the banquet," wrote an Argentine attorney after listening to 
a Braden speech, "have served to stimulate the battle against the Nazi barbarity that threatens 
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our hearth."332 An opposition lawmaker implored Braden to continue pressuring the regime, 
predicting that the "imposition of Peron would lead to war in South America."333 An American 
living in Argentina gushed it was "absolutely wonderful the way you handled the situation 
here."334 The Peronists fired back with a series of leaflets calling Braden a "cowboy" 
ambassador and the "Al Capone" of diplomats.335 When an accident left dozens of Chilean 
miners dead, flyers accused Braden of owning the mining company and placed responsibility 
for the casualties on him. These tactics offended Braden – and he responded. Until Argentine 
fascists were deposed, Braden warned, "none of us can sleep soundly at night."336 
     By July, Braden appeared to have reinvigorated the Argentine opposition to Peron, and 
events seemed to vindicate his interventionist tactics. Protesting students shut down 
universities. Lawyers in Buenos Aires demanded the release of political prisoners. The 
surrender of the Japanese in early September set off jubilant celebrations and sparked anti-Peron 
rallies. Resignations by key Argentine government figures fueled rumors that pro-democratic 
officers in the army stood ready to oust the junta. Under the intense pressure, the Farrell 
government appeared to cave. The junta lifted press restrictions and set a timetable for 
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presidential elections the next year. The news bolstered the once demoralized opposition 
political parties. Dissident factions within the centrist, middle-class Radical Party, ended 
flirtations with Peron's machine and returned to the opposition fold. The Conservative Party, 
which had bickered with the Radicals for thirty years, pledged to support their erstwhile foes. In 
early September, Braden was handed a ringing endorsement from Washington. Secretary James 
F. Byrnes, who succeeded Stettinius, promoted Braden to Assistant Secretary in charge of Latin 
America, replacing Rockefeller, whose earlier, softer approach now stood discredited.337 "My 
policies here," Braden wrote, "have so gained the confidence of the Argentine people that I am 
regarded as a symbol of hope by them for their liberation from Peron fascist military regime 
which have so long protected our enemies."338 
     The tension in Argentina reached its climax in mid-October 1945 with the fall and rise of 
Juan Peron. Under pressure from military commanders Peron resigned his government post as 
labor minister and then was sequestered at a naval prison camp. For a moment, the October 
revolt in Buenos Aires appeared to justify Braden's tactics. However, Peron’s defeat was no 
more than a brief setback for the colonel. Pro-Peron demonstrations, largely marshaled by Evita 
Peron and union leaders, erupted and the pressure they brought forced the coup leaders to back 
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down. They freed Peron and he emerged as the most dominant political figure in the country. 
The stunning turnaround occurred partly because Peron’s rivals failed to fill the leadership void, 
underestimated his appeal within the Argentine army and misjudged the surprising ability of the 
Peronistas in the labor unions to organize behind Peron.339 On October 17, Peron reappeared at 
the Casa Rosada, and soaked the adulation that made him the most celebrated political figure in 
the country.340  
     In Washington, Braden’s frustration over the stunning and humiliating turn of events was 
evident. He blamed U.S. senators, specifically Thomas Connally and Arthur S. Vandenburg, 
who first delayed his confirmation hearing and then ardently questioned his methods. Their 
hindrance, he surmised, emboldened the tyrant. He wondered whether the best opportunity to 
rid the Americas of its last vestige of fascism had been lost. Braden wrote a discouraged note to 
his British colleague in Buenos Aires, British ambassador Sir David Kelly blaming "opposition 
elements" for not acting "decisively when the opportunity presented itself."341 U.S. voices 
began to doubt Braden as well. "So far the Braden doctrine and the Braden way," wrote Time in 
a cover story on the new Latin American policy chief, "have failed in their most conspicuous, 
most important test – in Argentina."342 
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     Some of Braden's foot soldiers also lost faith in the heavy-handed policy to push liberalism 
in Argentina in the aftermath of the October 17 debacle. The most significant defection was 
Charge d'Affaires John Moors Cabot, the Boston Brahmin who served as de facto ambassador 
after Braden's departure. Cabot had loyally continued the zealous hounding of Peron. On the 
eve of Peron's resignation and arrest, he eagerly reported that "the bonfire under Peron is 
blazing merrily" and "our role is to feed the flames with maximum efficiency."343 Throughout 
the next few days, Cabot watched the spectacle unfold from his window in the embassy. Peron's 
startling comeback, the Harvard-educated U.S. envoy came to realize, was a signal that it was 
time to rethink approaches and assumptions about Peron and Argentina. Cabot was impressed 
by the way the colonel rallied his legions of urban poor and organized labor. "Argentina," Cabot 
concluded, "is badly in need of social reforms . . . Naturally I don't care for [Peron's] methods 
and I doubt the wisdom of his measures, but at least he is doing something about it." Cabot 
worried that "our crackdown policy [may be carried] to such extremes that it becomes 
contraproducente."344 Privately, Cabot voiced sharper differences. "It seems to me that our 
Argentina policy may collapse in a grand smash," he wrote, "burying its principal authors [and] 
also the Good Neighbor Policy may be torn to ribbons."345 
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     Soon after the tumultuous events of October, the Farrell government set an election date: 
February 24, 1946. General Farrell withdrew his name from the list of candidates. Peron, 
however, accepted the challenge and declared his candidacy. Braden figured the election offered 
another shot at dislodging the strongman. An electoral defeat for the colonel would 
convincingly prove his unpopularity, fascism's death knell, and the long-coveted opportunity to 
push economic liberalism. All this would be possible if the fractious Argentine opposition 
parties could unite, and if the government would actually allow for a fair and unfettered 
election, or so Braden believed. Figuring the vote was too important to U.S. interests and the 
cause of Argentine and hemispheric democracy, Braden and his subordinates debated ways to 
bolster the opposition's chances. The capture of German government war documents presented 
an opportunity. By culling the Berlin-Buenos Aires paper trail, Braden hoped to produce a 
convincing record of Axis-Peronist complicity and duplicity during the war. Once made public, 
Braden and others concluded, Argentina, the Pan American republics and, the world, would feel 
such disgust that the disgraced colonel would surely face overwhelming rejection at the polls. 
     Braden’s plan found opposition within the U.S. diplomatic corps. Cabot warned that unless 
Peron "stole" the election, the opposition had a clear shot at victory. Unleashing the "bomb," as 
the Argentine-Nazi report was dubbed, however, might create such a sensation that its impact 
would be difficult to predict. In essence, Cabot felt better about the opposition's odds without 
the publication of such a report. Still, Braden insisted that Peron would cheat his way into the 
presidency without publication of damaging evidence.346 On February 12, the U.S. released the 
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Blue Book to the international public. For the most part, the booklet provided details, from 
German government documents, purportedly substantiating U.S. charges of Argentine 
complicity during the war.347  
     Peron immediately seized on the U.S. intrusion, charging that it joined a litany of alleged 
abuse by Braden of his ambassadorial post. According to Peron, Braden had "inspired, created, 
organized and served as the true chief of the Union Democratica." The purpose of Braden's 
"aggressions against the revolutionary government," Peron repeated in speeches following the 
Blue Book release, was to "implant in our country his own government, a puppet government." 
His counterattack rested in the Libro Azul y Blanco,348 a thirty-page refutation of the original 
U.S. pamphlet. The cursory rebuttal sought not to engage "in detail the ambassador's violent 
campaign" but to reestablish that "the [opposition] party created by Mr. Braden . . . has resulted 
in a heterogeneous conglomerate at the service of the forces of privilege, which in our country 
are the traditional anti-democrats."349 
     In late February, Peron posted a convincing electoral victory that left U.S. policy-makers 
chagrined and humiliated. Time reported that the "swash-buckling, 50-year-old glamour boy 
had more to him than the demagogical charm that caused a group of swooning women to cry, 
"We want sons by Peron!"350 U.S. diplomats, such as Cabot, and their links with losing 
                     
347
 Arthur Whittaker, "Blue Book Blues,” Current History 10 (April 1946), pp. 294-96. 
Whittaker and contemporary analysts claimed the publication added little new revelations but 
merely provided some hard documentation to support general suspicions. 
348
 The Argentine response was titled the Blue and White Book, a title that alludes to the 
colors of the Argentine flag. 
 
349
 Peron, Libro Azul y Blanco (Buenos Aires: Editorial Freeland, 1973), p. 12. 
 
350
 “Argentina: A Damp Firecracker,” Time, 47 (March 4, 1946), p. 34. 
 149
Argentine candidate Jose Tamborini, became fodder for barbs circulating the Plaza de Mayo in 
Buenos Aires. One example: 
"Here's to old Argentina/ 
 the land of beef and good sod/ 
 Where Tamborini speaks only to Cabot/ 
 and Cabot speaks only to God.351 
 
Conclusion 
     The aftermath of defeat in Argentina left White House officials, State Department diplomats, 
and think-tank experts bickering over who was to blame for the diplomatic disaster. Truman 
pointed a finger at Braden, saying the ambassador was "crazy" for having meddled in the 
election. "He mixed in politics which he shouldn't have done," the retired president recalled. 
"Spruille Braden was fundamentally the cause of the election of Peron and he contributed to the 
ill feeling of the Argentine[s] toward us," the president later said.352 The Council on Foreign 
Relations succinctly summed up the failure of Braden's mission noting that "the democratic 
people of Argentina, on whom we have relied, seemed to have disproved an axiom of our 
political thinking, that a people will choose democracy over fascism if given a free choice."353 
     To start repairing the damage, the third U.S. secretary of state in two years, George Marshall, 
sent George Messerschmidt to Buenos Aires in 1946. Messerschmidt, a career diplomat, 
refrained from public jousting with Peron in deference to more discreet negotiation. "We must 
endeavor to get the Argentine to turn her eyes away from Europe, to which they have always 
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been directed in practically every field, and to turn them to this hemisphere," the new 
ambassador wrote.354 Though the public verbiage changed, the mission Messerschmidt was 
handed was much the same. His first challenge was to dissuade Peron from pursuing the ardent 
economic nationalist strategy contained in the 1946 five-year plan proposal.355 But 
Messerschmidt encountered little success in promoting the liberal cause in Buenos Aires. 
     Soul-searching fired debate within Argentine society as well. Was there a path to political, 
economic and social development different from Washington's model? Could a country seek a 
different route in the very face of the norteamericanos? The answer in Argentina was mixed. 
Yes, Peron thwarted Braden and domestic rivals in the election, and thereby reasserted 
Argentine political autonomy. But establishing the economic autonomy the Peronists sought – 
and the “New Argentina” corporate state they envisioned – proved to be a much more difficult 
task. The dispute with Washington led to Argentina’s continued ostracism from the world 
economy. The U.S. government’s Marshall Plan virtually locked Argentina out of its European 
markets. Without its export revenues, the country’s financial health weakened precipitously in 
the next decade. This outcome was accepted. Buenos Aires had already decided to mortgage its 
future on inward-looking import substitution and industrialization strategies that, in the long 
run, also failed to result in sustainable prosperity and economic development. 
     At the core of the diplomatic and political chasm between Braden and Peron lay larger, more 
profound questions about the post-war U.S. role in the hemisphere. The issues related to 
alternative modes of economic and political evolution in the hemisphere were present in earlier 
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confrontations, and arose again in later U.S.-Latin American showdowns. These contentious 
points dominated the 1945-1946 debacle in Argentina, and again sabotaged the liberal dream of 
a fully integrated, economically secure hemisphere. One prominent Blue Book author said the 
defeat of U.S. liberalism in Argentina was due to hubris. "We were really at the pinnacle of 
power and . . . the idea prevalent among liberals was that we [had] a responsibility to use this 
great power in a way that would benefit mankind," recalled Thomas Mann, a State Department 
Latin American specialist.356 Cabot, one of the few officials actually in Argentina during the 
crisis, also admitted that his colleagues and superiors pursued an impractical objective. U.S. 
officials, he said, continue to believe that “the peace of the world can be maintained only by the 
practice of democracy throughout the world” was a flawed one. However, he concluded, “we 
have tried the same ideas before and they have worked out in the exact reverse of the way” they 
were supposed to work.357 
     This frustrating outcome was hardly the one Roosevelt liberals envisioned in the early 
1930s. The United States deeply desired to lure Argentina into the liberal neighborhood. At 
the 1933 Montevideo Conference, Hull ardently wooed Argentine foreign minister Carlos 
Saavedra Lamas – and even pushed his candidacy for the Nobel Prize after the Chaco peace 
treaty. In 1936, FDR traveled to Buenos Aires – and the two nations considered widening a 
reciprocal trade treaty to get beyond a late 1930s controversy over hoof-and-mouth disease 
damaging Argentine beef. Washington believed this southernmost – and most distant – 
neighbor stood on the brink of first-nation status. It sought to bond with Argentina’s 
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economic potential and worried about its military potential. But after twenty years of carrots 
and sticks, U.S. diplomats and business leaders were no closer to forging an alliance with 
Buenos Aires than they were at the very start. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 From the Ashes of Liberalism: Post-Bogotazo Containment 
     As the last chapter in the Argentine electoral debacle played out, U.S. policy-makers shifted 
their focus in Latin American diplomacy from economic treaty negotiations to security pacts. In 
January 1947, President Truman appointed General George C. Marshall as secretary of state.358 
Marshall immediately fired Spruille Braden after castigating the feisty diplomat and his 
Argentine policy for delaying an inter-American conference on defense issues. When that 
meeting took place in Rio de Janeiro the following August, Marshall presided over the signing 
of an inter-hemispheric pact that permitted the U.S. military to again intervene in national and 
regional squabbles. The Rio Treaty, as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance it is 
often referred to, became a model for other regional alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.359 
     The military pact, however, left Latin American diplomats virtually empty-handed at Rio. 
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The aftermath of World War II found many of the region’s economies struggling to adjust 
economically.360 As U.S. industry cutback on its purchases of Latin American tin, rubber, and 
other raw materials, revenues fell precipitously for exporting countries. War-torn Western 
Europe, a principal antebellum buyer of Latin American primary materials, lacked the financial 
wherewithal to resume commerce with the Americas. As a result, many of the commercial 
dysfunctions that cyclically plagued inter-American commerce before the war – drops in 
demand for export products and falling currency reserves – again dogged the region during the 
early postwar years. 
     At various postwar planning conferences and diplomatic meetings, diplomats from Mexico, 
Cuba, and Brazil pressed for financial assistance. At the Rio gathering, the Latin American 
diplomats prodded U.S. policy-makers for a comprehensive credits and currency assistance to 
shore up their balance of payments, and their industries. Their calls for a Latin American 
“Marshall Plan” briefly threatened to sidetrack the defense treaty negotiations.361 But U.S. 
diplomats still mustered together enough support for the Rio security pledge by offering vague 
promises to address economic concerns at the next hemispheric conference set for Bogota. 
     That meeting, the Ninth International Conference of American States, convened in April 
1948 in a climate of high expectations and high tensions. Latin American delegates anxiously 
sought a long-awaited, comprehensive hemispheric commercial initiative. U.S. policy-makers, 
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distracted by a Cold War stand-off in Berlin, plus civil wars in Greece and China, prepared to 
talk hemispheric security, allegiance and unity – again. And, in Colombia, where civil strife 
mounted almost on a daily basis, officials and the citizenry simply prayed that the hemispheric 
gathering would adjourn without incident. The tinderbox in Bogota, however, ignited on April 9 
when a popular Colombian politician, Jorge Elicier Gaitan, was murdered on a city sidewalk. 
The shooting sparked days of rioting362 and demands for resolute action from all sides. In 
response, Marshall and the U.S. delegation pressed for an anticommunist resolution and gained 
even more security agreements. The Latin delegates, again disappointed by seemingly U.S. 
inattentiveness to their economic plight, walked away discouraged, and convinced their 
countries were on their own. Ultimately, the Bogota Conference witnessed the last gasp of 
Good Neighbor liberalism, a policy overwhelmed by yet another European-based conflict that 
shoved inter-American aspirations onto the priority boondocks. The Bogota conference proved 
not to redirect policy from security to economics, but instead to codify the era of Cold War 
containment in the Americas.363 However, as this chapter will posit, containment in Latin 
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America was more an effort to replace the Good Neighbor Policy, which proved ineffective 
against nationalist, internal hemispheric challenges, than to inoculate the Americas from 
external threats. 
Gaitan, Nationalism and the Bogotazo 
     In the spring of 1948, Colombia rated as a success when measured by Good Neighbor 
benchmarks, but as a failure when assessing the country’s political friction and faltering 
economic indicators. Despite a reciprocal trade treaty signed in 1935, and significant investment 
by companies like the Standard Oil Company and the United Fruit Company in previous 
decades, the country found itself mired in a low-intensity civil war.364 One scholar described the 
strife spreading through rural Colombia as a conflict that “touched every institution from the 
family to the Church” and was “so widespread and pervasive that the most appropriate term 
Colombians found for it was generic: the Violence.”365 All told, the estimates of deaths from 
the civil strife are said to have reached 200,000 between 1946 and 1962.366 Alluding to repeated 
calls for the army to step in to stop the bloodshed, a contemporary Colombian poet wrote: "In 
Colombia . . . the soldiers bring peace and the civilians make war."367 
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     The return to liberal economic policies in Colombia during the mid-1940s accentuated the 
anger and frustration that fostered this violence. On one hand, the volatile nature of the 
commercial and trade patterns between Colombia and the United States fueled alternating 
economic cycles of growth and contraction. The twists and turns fueled periods plenty and 
scarcity, and contributed to significant increases in the cost of living, that left the Colombian 
citizenry dazed by abrupt reversals of fortune. Conversely, efforts by wartime and postwar 
Colombian governments to phase out state intervention in the economy, and government 
backing for labor groups, sparked widespread resentment. The rollback of state-funded welfare 
protections left Colombians even more vulnerable to whims of the liberal economy, deepening 
popular disenchantment and discontent. 
     Initially, the rise in wartime trade and economic growth in Colombia suggested the 
Bolivarian nation had found a path to financial stability and prosperity. At the outbreak of 
World War II in Europe, Colombian exports to the United States, including precious metals and 
oil, but excluding coffee, grew nearly 50 percent to a value of 131.4 million Colombian pesos in 
1941. Coffee sales to the United States also rose by more than 40 percent to 154 million pesos 
in 1942. Bolstered by the commercial boom, the U.S. Export-Import Bank extended $33.4 
million in loans to Colombia for construction of highways, agricultural projects and a 
hydroelectric power plant.368 All told, the Colombian economy posted stellar economic growth. 
Between 1945 and 1949, the nation’s gross domestic product grew by an annual average of 6.2 
percent.369 In the process, Colombia amassed more than a five-fold increase in its foreign 
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exchange reserve.370 
     The seemingly impressive results hid significant financial fault lines. Though profits 
materialized from the sale of coffee and other raw materials to U.S. industry, Colombians had 
limited access to goods and other products to buy from the United States. With too few pesos 
chasing too few goods, prices rose precipitously. From 1939 to 1950, the cost of living rose by 
almost 93 percent. Wages and buying power failed to keep pace with inflation. Per capita GDP 
appreciated just 1.8 percent per year from 1945 to 1950.371 Unemployment remained high, as 
did marginal employment. The end of the war also brought a severe readjustment to the 
Colombian economy, as it did for other Latin American countries, as hyper demand for raw 
materials in the United States eased. With the exception of demand for Venezuelan oil and 
Cuban sugar, which propped up those nations, Colombian exports, like those from other 
regional trade sectors, saw a shortfall of capital inflows and trade after the war. 
     The economic ups and downs coincided with another important development, the 
dismantling of the Colombian interventionist state built during the Depression. The mid-1930s 
presidential administration of Alfonso Lopez opened doors to more a aggressive regulatory 
state. A pragmatic leader educated in England and the United States, Lopez pursued a more 
even distribution of the nation’s wealth. His administration authorized the creation of a 
government-owned oil refinery, which competed with the foreign-owned facilities, in an effort 
to lower gasoline prices in the country. The Lopez government also negotiated wage increases 
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on behalf of Colombians working for the foreign banana plantations.372 The Lopez government 
promoted rewrites of the national constitution to give the state a role in economic development, 
a move that broadened avenues for the government to protect domestic industry and consumers. 
Lopez also pursued a graduated income tax and an excess profits tax, also to distribute 
wealth.373 However, beginning in 1945, a predecessor government led by Alberto Lleras 
Camargo worked diligently to reduce the public sector’s role in the economy and to back off 
state efforts on behalf of organized labor. Strikes were outlawed, workers’ protests were 
repressed and the government promoted the growth of rival and less militant labor groups in an 
effort to weaken the more powerful unions.374 
     Labor, political and social organizations protested the new government strategies. Between 
1945 and 1948, Colombia witnessed no fewer than 20 strikes per year. Those work stoppages 
and demonstrations often ended in tragedy. In 1947, scholars estimate that 13,968 Colombians 
died as a result of repressive actions by the government.375 The economic volatility and the 
bloodshed bolstered political groups and leaders that embraced alternatives to the liberal export-
oriented development and investment model, including strict labor and taxation codes as well as 
import-substitution strategies. 
     Gaitan, an attorney and former mayor of Bogota, figured prominently in anti-establishment 
                     
372
 Randall, Colombia and the United States, pp. 149-59. 
 
373
 Dix, Colombia, p. 87. 
 
374
 Medofilo Medina, “Violence and Economic Development: 1945-1950 and 1985-1988,” in 
Sanchez, ed., Violence in Colombia, 156-58. 
 
375
 Medina, “Violence and Economic Development,” p. 159. 
 
 
 160
and anti-liberal circles, not to mention ultimately in the spark that unleashed the Bogota 
bloodshed. Gaitan, who grew up in Bogota as the son of bourgeois parents, tied his political 
fortunes to the country’s urban middling classes and working poor. Part of the affiliation drew 
from personal identity: His darker skin invited the derogatory nickname El negro (the dark one) 
and occasional derision and discrimination that molded his own class and identity politics.376 In 
the 1946 election, Gaitan ran for president as a Liberal Party candidate on what he termed a 
progressive platform but that was deemed radical in comparison to Liberal government and 
political standards. The Gaitanista platform not only criticized the rival Conservative Party 
candidate, but also the Liberal’s standard bearer, Gabriel Turbay. Gaitan’s candidacy split the 
Liberal vote – Colombian leftists and the Communist Party endorsed Turbay. The Liberal split 
permitted the Conservative candidate to win. The outcome of the election unleashed a wave of 
violence as Conservatives punished their Liberal adversaries, who then retaliated in kind.  
     In the midst of the post-election strife, Gaitan reorganized his political machine. The 
Gaitanista movement reached out to a coalition of middle class groups worried about post-war 
inflation and deteriorating living standards. Gaitan's rhetoric also played to the so-called 
“victims” of urbanization – the rural migrants who migrated to cities and settled in 
impoverished slums. From 1925 to 1945, the distribution of city dwellers grew from 23 percent 
of the population to over one-third.377 "Today's concern, we want to shout to those impostors 
[in power] is the life of our hearth, our dwelling, our food, our bread, our milk, our meat, our 
children," he called out to marchers in a 1947 protest demonstration. "Pueblo, for the defense of 
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threatened unions, march! Pueblo, for the economic transformation of the republic, march! 
Pueblo, for the recapture of power, march!"378 In doing so, Gaitan continued to broaden his 
bloc, his views, and to challenge his own party’s leadership. 
     As he did, Gaitan vociferously attacked the same commercial accords and export-fueled 
growth strategies that U.S. free traders and private investors sought, such as the 1935 reciprocal 
trade pact. Instead, Gaitan advocated a different development model for Colombia that 
resembled previous protectionist reforms in Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina – all which 
brought those government’s into diplomatic conflict with Washington. Gaitan’s program relied 
on nationalizing industry, increasing taxes on foreign companies and using government to wrest 
better wages from transnational companies. These formed views that he had long espoused, to 
varying degrees and in different forums. For example, he articulated some of these proposals in 
his 1926 law school thesis, Socialist Ideas in Colombia. In the thesis, Gaitan argued that the 
state needed to assume a direct role in resolving conflict between capital and labor to “ensure 
just distribution of materials and means to the individual.”379 
     Neither was Gaitan a newcomer to populist, rural labor or working class causes. In the late 
1920s and early 1930s, Gaitan aided laborers who bitterly, and violently, struck against the 
U.S.-owned United Fruit Company's operations in the country's banana growing district. Gaitan, 
then a member of the Colombian congress, used the banana zone strikes and their repression by 
the country’s military as a catapult to national political prominence. During a ten-day tour of the 
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region, Gaitan led “mass interrogations,” interviews with those involved in the attack, and 
spoke to large crowds. After returning to the capital, Gaitan starred in a sensational 
parliamentary debate that scrutinized the use of armed force by the government in the labor 
standoff.380 Later on, Gaitan continued his overtures to labor, which continued to mushroom as 
a political force in Colombia, bolstered in part by immigration and urban migration. After 
World War II, immigrants, displaced peasants accounted for the bulk of the population growth 
in Bogota and other Colombians cities.381 The increasingly larger, powerful, and militant trade 
unions recruited these new urban workers into their fold in larger and larger numbers. From 
1935 to 1947, the number of unionized workers in Colombia nearly quadrupled from 42,678 to 
165,595.382 Bolstered by the swelling ranks, key unions such as the Confederation of 
Colombian Workers and the National Federation of Petroleum Workers struck against their 
employers in 1947 and early 1948, particularly foreign corporations such as the Standard Oil 
Company of New Jersey, in an effort to force better wages. 
     Party leaders and masses alike speculated Gaitan, described as the “leader of the left-wing of 
the Liberal party,”383 was the early odds-on candidate to win the country's next presidential 
election in 1950. Gaitan did little to dissuade those expectations. He positioned himself for the 
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campaign by refining and reiterating his previous stances. The enemy, again, was the domestic 
oligarchy as represented by both Liberal and Conservative Party caudillos and their benefactors 
in foreign transnational companies, from United Fruit to Standard Oil. Like other economic 
nationalists surveyed in this dissertation, Gaitan believed Colombia's underdevelopment was 
rooted in the country's disadvantageous trade, investment, and commercial relations with the 
United States – as well as the other industrial powers. As long as Colombia depended on chief 
development engines in coffee plantations, banana fields, and other low profit margin export 
commodities, the country would remain at the mercy of the global agricultural markets and their 
unpredictable price fluctuations. And as long as Colombia’s sources of manufactured and 
capital goods lay in foreign markets, Gaitan insisted the nation's balance of payments deficit – 
and the crippling dual cycles of inflation and scarcity – would never be ameliorated. 
     Gaitan argued that the only solution to Colombia’s cyclical disruptions rested in replacing 
the Liberal Party government, and liberal policies, with one that promulgated protectionist and 
other inward-looking policies. Gaitan preferred public policy measures such as earmarking 
foreign corporate profits toward an industrialization program to create jobs and empower the 
land-less citizenry. This was the substance of Gaitan's "revolution," he said. "Revolution . . . is 
nothing less than a new order replacing the (existing) stiff one . . . with different concepts and 
different men, but over all with distinct notions about the rights and duties of human labor," he 
told audiences.384 
     In Bogota, and across the country, Colombians faced a much less utopian reality in the 
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spring of 1948. Political friction between Colombian Conservative and Liberal caudillos only 
intensified in the early months of that year. On April 5, days ahead of the hemispheric 
conference in Bogota, Minister of Government Eduardo Zuleta Angel spoke on radio, pleading 
with his countrymen to cease the hostilities. “Neither the maintenance of power nor the 
recapture [of power] can justify or excuse the death of a single Colombian,” he said.385 Four 
days later, Gaitan lay murdered on a sidewalk while Bogota burned. 
From Civil War to Cold War 
     Mayhem engulfed Bogota, and members of the U.S. delegation at the Bogota Conference 
aimed blame for the bogotazo and its massive destruction and killing on communists doing the 
work of the Kremlin. Talking to journalists, Secretary Marshall declared that “revolutionary 
movements [in Bogota] were not confined to Colombia but had world-wide implications.” 
Marshall and other U.S. diplomats claimed rioters sought nothing less than to "sabotage the 
conference, affect the European Reconstruction Plan and disrupt the Italian election."386 
According to Assistant Secretary of State Norman Armour, "the reality of international 
communism's opposition to all the American states stand for was thrust forcibly upon the 
consciousness of the delegates at Bogota.”387 Thus, the U.S. diplomatic line interpreted the 
explosion of unrest within Colombia, quickly and opportunistically, within the confines of the 
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international struggle between democracy and communism. 
     Speedy, definite conclusions were drawn in part because the U.S. delegation arrived in 
Bogota predisposed to press its case against Colombian “communism.” Prior to the bogotazo, 
U.S. Foreign Service officers closely watched Gaitan’s overtures to Colombia’s leftist political 
quarters. They warned of Gaitan's alliance with the national communist party, the Partido 
Comunista Colombiano, and his empathy for their agenda. The Office of Strategic Services, a 
Central Intelligence Agency predecessor, said Gaitan's overtures to radicals in the NFPW, his 
talk of “revolution” and a “new order” threatened U.S. interests. U.S. analysts warned that his 
calls for expropriation of properties and an end to commercial agreements such as the 
reciprocity treaty meant more trouble ahead.388 Gaitan's political machine further unnerved 
policy-makers as well because of its inclusion of communist elements and his alleged ties to 
Colombia’s communist party. 
     Other intelligence gathering agencies collected similar testimonials. Intelligence reports sent 
from Colombia to the State Department’s Office of American Republic Affairs warned in 
January 1948 that Marxists and labor groups planned to disrupt the Bogota Conference. One 
alert landed at the desk of Roy Rubottom, a delegation member. It advised that a recent 
"Communist-controlled labor congress [had] approved manifestations against and disturbances 
of the Conference." These protests sought to discredit "'Yankee Imperialism' and its servant, the 
[Colombian] Conservative Government." During the demonstration, the report predicted, 
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communists and their labor allies would attempt to loot food stores to show their anger at the 
expenditure of "public funds on luxurious accommodations and displays for the visiting 
delegates from other American nations" instead of on Bogota's poor.389 The source of the quotes 
was an unidentified speaker at the gathering. Other cryptic reports were sent to CIA director 
R.K. Hillinkoetter. They claimed that a series of Colombian communist party officials – 
identified only as "Mr. X," "Mr. G," and "Mr. S" – conspired to disrupt the conference. The gist 
of the effort by "Communist inspired agitators [was] to humiliate the Secretary of State and 
other members of the U.S. delegation to Pan American conference, arriving in Bogota, by 
manifestation and possibly personal molestation."390 
     Once the rioting began, the bloody street clashes and vitriolic radio broadcasts gave U.S. 
policy-makers all the evidence they needed to prove their charges of "communist-directed" 
upheaval. Following encounters with rioters on Bogota's boulevards, foreign service officer 
Cecil B. Lyons concluded the "drunken hoodlums" and others toting machetes and chanting 
“Down with the Americans” and “Down with imperialism" were communists and "that, all in 
all, this was no ordinary South American revolution."391 Meanwhile, Ambassador Willard 
Beaulac recalled tuning to one station and listening in shock as "communists" gave "lessons on 
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how to prepare Molotov cocktails."392 For his part, Marshall rode out the uprising barricaded in 
the U.S. official residence, the Puyana House, and monitored local radio broadcasts for 
developments. Among the personalities that appeared on radio was Gilberto Vieira White, 
secretary general of the Colombian Communist Party. A number of these broadcasts appeared 
to confirm fears of a pact between Gaitanista nationalists and communist organizations. U.S. 
analysts quoted communist leaders such as White who urged "Communists to support the 
Liberal revolution."393 The communists' presence, and their support for the rioting, helped 
Marshall and his translators argue that communists provided leadership and rank-and-file for 
this atypical South American "revolution."394  
     The violence in Bogota initially caught the Truman Administration off guard. A defensive 
Truman admitted there had been warnings of communist agitation in America’s back yard "but 
nobody had any idea somebody was going to get shot and cause a riot such as the one in 
Bogota."395 The tone of public comment reflected impatience with an Administration perceived 
as disconnected with world events. Newsweek declared "the revolt has had a damaging blow to 
the prestige of the inter-American system and Washington is braced for Cominform attempts to 
exploit it as a popular protest against United States 'Imperialism.'"396 One of Truman's GOP 
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rivals in the 1948 presidential election, Gov. Thomas Dewey, charged that because of the 
"dreadful incompetence of our present government we had apparently no idea what was going 
on in a country just two hours bomber time from the Panama Canal."397 The Council on Foreign 
Relations noted "the violence in Bogota was no isolated phenomenon but . . . part of an 
international pattern of Communist action directed from Moscow."398 
     The criticism generated calls for Marshall's return to Washington, but Marshall was one step 
ahead of the critics. Lovett advised him that talk of communism in Central and South America 
in Congress and the press led to "queries" in the Administration as to "whether delegates should 
not be home 'doing something about it.'"399 But Marshall was already at work on a response. 
During a conference planning session, secretary suggested a discussion on communism but few 
delegations showed interest.400 The bogotazo's red hues brought communism back to the 
forefront of the conference agenda and the U.S. delegates found little trouble rounding up 
unanimous agreement on an anti-communism resolution titled "The Preservation and Defense 
of Democracy in America." The two-page document, sponsored by the United States, Chile, 
Brazil and Peru, garnered the immediate endorsement of eleven other countries including 
Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay. The signatory countries promised to prevent 
"agents at the service of international communism" from subjugating the hemisphere. Each 
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country pledged to "eradicate and prevent" the activities of any organization construed to be a 
subversive influence. To do so, the member republics promised to share intelligence with the 
other inter-American countries.401 A confident Marshall departed for Washington following the 
resolution's approval.  
     The passage of the anticommunist resolution demonstrated, to the satisfaction of some U.S. 
officials, business leaders and public commentators, that the Truman government remained 
capable of quickly responding to international crises in its home hemisphere. Despite the chaos, 
the U.S. delegation claimed that it not only took a lead role in the resumption of the conference, 
but also regrouped and rallied its regional friends behind the anticommunist banner. By late 
spring, the U.S. press reassured readers with reports of crackdowns against communists across 
the hemisphere. In May, Time reported that "Washington [has] shaken off the Red Jitters born 
of the Columbian [sic] uprising" and "many a Latin American government now has the Reds on 
the run."402 More measures would be forthcoming. 
The Containment Line in Colombia and Venezuela 
     The violence that engulfed Colombia after Gaitan's murder gave U.S. diplomats an 
opportunity to redefine the mayhem and to tailor their response to economic nationalism along 
the southern end of the Caribbean Sea. The members of the U.S. delegation at the Bogota 
Conference claimed the rioting on the streets of Bogota was proof positive that the Cold War 
needed to be fought in the American backyard. To be sure, they admitted that the violence at 
Bogota was more anarchy than organized revolution. Still, they insisted militant labor 
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organizations, leftist politicians and communists fused together in opposition to the United 
States and its allies in the Americas. In Colombia, U.S. diplomats said, the murder of Gaitan 
opened the door to a communist-style revolt and raised worries that economic nationalists posed 
a much more serious challenge U.S. interests. The political front against nationalism, as 
assembled in Bogota, was also applied to the oil industry in neighboring Venezuela. 
     In the spring of 1948, the energy needs of European reconstruction, skyrocketing demand for 
oil by U.S. civilians and the military threatened to sap reserves. By the end of 1947, one U.S. oil 
industry official claimed spiraling demand was placing the industry in a "range where supply 
and demand almost exactly equal."403 As increased demand erased the comfort zone provided 
by excess capacity, the United States became more dependent on reliable imported oil. 
"Venezuela's petroleum production," U.S. Army planners concluded, "[amounts] to one-fifth of 
the daily production in the U.S., [and] is of special importance to this country."404 Through 
1950, 99 percent of the oil consumed in the United States – but produced elsewhere – came 
from Latin America, specifically Venezuela’s reserves.405 “Today we import more oil than we 
export and virtually all our imports must come from oil fields in Latin America,” said 
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commerce secretary Averill Harriman in March 1948.406 
     Venezuelans also viewed their domestic “oil factory”407 as a vital resource, but for different 
reasons. Beginning in the early 1940s, a succession of regimes attempted to harness the 
profitability of the crude that lay, in such abundant stockpiles, below their very feet. In 1942, the 
government of President Isaias Medina Angarita promulgated an income tax to tap the wealth 
generated by petroleum, the first of its kind in the nation’s history. The tax affected only very 
large earners, ostensibly just the oil companies, and raised $6 million in revenue for the 
government. The amount was a relatively minor sum, but it opened the doors for the 
Venezuelan government to further tap the business of extracting and selling its most significant 
resource. Medina then sought an increase in the royalties foreign-owned oil conglomerates paid 
the government, roughly a dime a barrel. When the companies balked, Medina threatened to not 
renew their concessions, and suggested the government might demand payment for back taxes 
on understated market prices. The companies relented, and a 1943 oil profits law doubled the 
royalties owed the government to 16.66 percent of the value per barrel. Buoyed by the royalty 
hike, and for the increased demand for his country’s crude during the war, Medina granted the 
companies concessions to more than 12 million hectares of drilling territory, two times the 
amount of land available prior to 1943. The Venezuelan state profited from the ensuing increase 
in production. By 1945, the government’s take from oil revenues grew eight-fold to 614 million 
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bolivars.408 
     Medina’s successor, Romulo Betancourt and his Accion Democratica Party, eagerly pressed 
for an even greater share of oil profits. Whereas the Medina regime simply sought a larger share 
of oil revenues, Betancourt and the reform-minded Accion Democratica planned to roll out an 
expensive program of social reforms. Accion Democratica immediately pressed the oil 
conglomerates. In a series of decrees between 1945 and 1947, the government instituted a 
number of taxes that, when totaled, added to a 50 percent share of oil revenues. These taxes 
were later replaced by an early 1948 law ordering a fifty-fifty profit split between the 
government and the companies.409 The oil companies protested that one, too, but as in previous 
disputes, they  ultimately relented to the government’s demand for more money in exchange for 
permission to expand exploration, refining, and sales of the lucrative crude. 
     The aggressive stance by the Accion Democratica government, and the post-Bogota 
demands by Colombian labor groups, did not sit well with U.S. officials in Bolivarian republics. 
Diplomats such as Walter Donnelly in Caracas and Willard Beaulac in Bogota criticized the 
hikes in oil taxes, additional regulations on drilling of new wells, and tougher rules affecting 
labor relations in 1947 and 1948. They chafed when Venezuelan leaders floated the idea of 
expropriating refineries and drilling stations, as Mexico had in 1938. In Colombia, two lengthy, 
violent strikes ended with the imposition of compulsory arbitration programs subordinating the 
oil company executives to decisions by local judges and labor-management committees. Labor 
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leaders, charged one industry executive, only sought "a way to make the union the true 
administrator of company business."410 The ambassadors said such aggressive actions served as 
evidence that the unions and their leaders were "communistic." They worried that these 
industries would ultimately face nationalization in Venezuela.411 Ambassador Donnelly often 
noted in messages to Washington, Gallegos' party, Accion Democratica, owed political capital 
to "communistic" unions. "The pattern of Accion Democratica rule," ARA concluded, "does not 
warrant in assuming that it had abandoned its socialistic aims; on the contrary, it furnishes good 
ground for concluding that it wished to socialize the Venezuelan economy as fast as it could be 
done efficiently."412 
     The communist mayhem that followed Gaitan's shooting gave U.S. officials and business 
interests a pretext for redefining the nature of the struggle for Venezuelan oil profits. In Bogota, 
the CIA confided in a May 1948 report to Truman that communists "may have discovered a 
                     
410
 Lionel Weidey, manager of Standard Oil Company's Colombian affiliate, Tropical Oil 
Co., to Colombian congressman Argemiro Martínez Vega, August 14, 1948, in DSR/RG 59, 
box 5265, NARA. 
 
411
 "Memorandum on the Possibilities of Eliminating Private Oil Companies in Venezuela by 
Nationalization or other Effective Means," Department of State, American Republic Affairs 
Files, box 7, NARA. The report pointed out that the oil companies contributed about 63 percent 
of the total Venezuelan Government revenue and about 95 percent of the country's foreign 
exchange. This dependency, the authors said, “injures Venezuelan pride." They also added that: 
"The prevalent Latin American Theory that the 'industrial' nations hold others in a kind of 
economic servitude (the catch-words are 'economic freedom,' 'colonialism,' and 'imperialism') 
has a particularly strong appeal in Venezuela.” The reason was obvious: Venezuela’s national 
economy is “so dependent on that of the United States and where the two major industries, oil 
and iron ore, are owned and managed by foreigners. 
 
412
 “The Possibilities of Eliminating Private Oil Companies in Venezuela by Nationalization 
or Other effective Means,” 1951, Department of State Records, RG 59, American Republic 
Files, box 7, NARA. 
 
 174
technique which might be employed deliberately and with greater effect on other occasions."413 
U.S. officials insisted communists quickly mobilized strikes, protests and general anarchy at 
Bogota, because they efficiently penetrated Colombian labor groups.414 At Bogota, they said, 
communists utilized "their position in organized labor . . . to execute plans which had been 
formulated to sabotage the conference."415 An even more distressing allegation concerned 
communist attempts to "sabotage the Colombian oil industry." Near one facility, seventeen 
suspected party members were arrested and quantities of explosives were confiscated.416 
Meanwhile, the National Federation of Petroleum Workers, run by an "independent 
communist" named Diego Montana Cuellar, called a strike to halt production of oil. 
     Within days of the Gaitan murder and ensuing violence, the Pentagon acted to safeguard 
refineries and other important installations in Venezuela. Defense Secretary James Forrestal 
worried that in light of the "world situation [and] recent developments in Colombia" it is 
"prudent" to minimize the danger to installations in Venezuela. With the coordination of the 
State Department, the military implemented a joint U.S.-Venezuelan security arrangement to 
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protect Venezuelan oil fields against communist sabotage. The squad sent to study security 
precautions mapped out logistics and a defensive system for the refineries deemed "extremely 
vulnerable to sabotage." 
     The team also suggested the "oil companies temporarily employ United States experts in 
counter-sabotage," with the participation of the Venezuelan government.417 In August 1948, the 
State Department, the Pentagon and the NSC agreed to "take the initiative" and called on the 
CIA to "keep under surveillance the threat to especially important industrial operations" in 
South and Central America. In essence, these decisions empowered the CIA to spy on labor 
groups and take any measures necessary to thwart attempts to disrupt the oil flow whether 
through sabotage or strikes.418 In early 1949, National Security Council analysts again warned 
that "international communism" will attempt to "interfere with the production and movement of 
[oil and other strategic materials] as required by the United States" through "public disorder, 
work stoppage, slowdowns or sabotage" as a fundamental component of U.S. hemispheric 
military planning.419 
     The pressure to establish security zones around installations and quell militancy among labor 
syndicates culminated in more U.S. government support for military and authoritarian 
governments at the expense of championing civilian-led, popularly elected governments. After 
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a November coup displaced Venezuelan Betancourt’s successor, President Romulo Gallegos, 
U.S. diplomats said they faced a clear-cut choice: Support the anticommunist officers led by his 
successor, Lt. Col. Marcos Perez Jimenez, or back the return of exiled populist Gallegos. U.S. 
officials initially considered rejecting the junta's request for diplomatic recognition fearing that 
acknowledging them as the legitimate rulers in Caracas might send the wrong message, 
meaning that coup and instability were acceptable ways to pursue political change.420 Yet, in the 
early stages of Cold War containment, the emerging consensus agreed that stopping 
communism was the top priority. At the Bogota conference, the United States had championed 
the anticommunist resolution. Now, just seven months later, the Venezuelan officers that 
toppled Gallegos claimed they acted to squelch communist influence, as had been agreed to in 
Bogota. After issuing a mild rebuke of military overthrows,421 the State Department quietly 
extended recognition to the new Venezuelan government in early January 1949. 
     The decision to recognize Perez Jimenez and his government proved successful, at least in 
the short-term. In return for U.S. acknowledgement, Perez Jimenez rewarded U.S. oil 
companies by lowering taxes on corporate profits and easing regulations on drilling new wells. 
Petroleum production, on the decrease during Gallegos’ short presidency, more than doubled 
during Perez Jimenez's tenure. In January 1952, the State Department boasted that its 
cooperative arrangement with the military junta paid dividends. Some $2.5 billion worth of new 
capital found its way into the country and, partly as a result, Venezuela "pushed its oil 
production up steadily upward until it ranks second in the world, and has proved reserves 
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representing more than 10 percent of the Free World total." The study concluded that 
"Venezuela and the investing corporations have worked together to develop a climate that 
assures mutual benefits, a sound working basis for operations, and a resulting incentive for 
additional foreign capital to make its contribution to the development of the country."422 Exiled 
in Havana, Gallegos criticized the Truman Administration. He said his erstwhile friends in 
Washington turned back on a “free government that had been the object of admiration of 
democratic America."423 Years later, Truman reflected on the coup. He recalled that Gallegos 
"was a grand fellow and it's too bad they didn't allow him to finish out his term. But he was too 
[nationalistic] and the oil companies didn't like him."424 
Conclusion 
     During the Good Neighbor era, the United States preached a “non-intervention” policy 
backed by peace and prosperity through open trade and unrestricted foreign investment. But in 
the spring of 1948, the benefits liberalism promised – stable democratic government in the 
Americas – appeared unattainable. To U.S. diplomats, Latin America seemed only poorer and 
more volatile. In the aftermath of the Bogota uprising, U.S. government officials and industry 
executives judged economic liberalism too ineffective to inoculate the hemisphere against 
communist penetration. The United States then shifted its policy focus to seek stability through 
military security – based on covert and direct military action – instead of pursuing liberal 
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economic development. 
     U.S. Cold War containment policies served different purposes in different parts of the globe, 
but in Latin America they were a response to economic nationalism. The communist label was 
slapped on economic nationalism and populism in Latin America not only because it struck the 
right chord with the public in America, but because it served commercial and political interests. 
Communism conjured visions of Bolshevik conspirators, radicals, and un-American activity. 
The Red Army may have posed a threat in Europe and the so-called Red Chinese may have 
been a menace in Asia. But the root of the trouble in the Americas was the unbridgeable gulf 
between liberals and nationalists. By 1950, the consensus among U.S. policy-makers was that 
economic nationalists did not make for Good Neighbors. Thomas Mann, one of the State 
Department's authorities on Latin America, concluded in late 1951 that populists like Juan 
Peron in Argentina, Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico, Jorge Gaitan in Colombia, Romulo Betancourt 
in Venezuela and Ramon Grau San Martin in Cuba had been too ineffective to justify U.S. 
support. As for the future, populist, nationalist movements promised to strain relations between 
government and foreign businesses. Mann wrote: "These forces represent the great majority of 
the people and will not always fail. As they succeed they will, at least temporarily, increase the 
problem of political instability and will demand increasingly larger participation through the 
taxes in the profits of foreign and local investments.”425 
      Mann’s views matched widely-held fears within the State Department. In early 1952, the 
department circulated its “Latin America and U.S. Policy” blueprint for hemispheric relations. 
The document reasserted that the region was passing through an intense period of social 
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dislocation and class readjustment fueling volatility. This shake-up held ramifications for U.S. 
policy, the document stated. “One of the consequences of these internal adjustments,” the paper 
said, “is political instability which is itself enfeebling. Another is the weakening of respect for 
property rights; agrarian and similar ‘reform’ laws designed to break up the power of the 
‘oligarchs’ are applied without distinction to national and foreign owners and with inadequate 
regard for compensating” those who lost property. In addition, the paper noted that 
“revolutionary movements” are “controlled by immature and impractical idealists” who are 
“unprepared to conduct government business efficiently but [also] lack the disposition to 
combat extremists within their ranks, including communists, since they consider themselves 
revolutionaries."426 
     Some voices in the United States accused the U.S. government of overreacting. Critics of 
U.S. policy insisted that neither Colombia nor Latin America would go the way of Eastern 
Europe, even after the bogotazo scare. Dismayed by the red baiting, Samuel Inman, an advisor 
to the U.S. delegation at Bogota, turned critical of U.S. policies. “It seems to me we used 
precisely the same tactics that play into the enemy's hand,” he said. “[We] team up with the 
extreme right, condone dictators, ignore justice and poverty; and then, when the people rise in 
anger and destroy their oppressors, pass resolutions blaming all on the extreme left.”427 Another 
bogotazo survivor omitted the communists in projecting the post-riot political landscape. “What 
will happen next in Colombia,” writer Olive Holmes said, “depends ultimately on whether 
leaders of the various factions within the [Conservative and Liberal] parties can satisfy the 
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popular sentiment for reform that the Gaitanista movement had unleashed.”428 
     Precisely. The call for reform unleashed in the bogotazo – as well as in Cuba 1933, 
Mexico 1938 and Argentina 1945 – was the common denominator in each confrontation. 
Such reform was simply incompatible with the liberal economic blueprint advocated by U.S. 
officials. Truman’s diplomats recognized full well that threats to U.S. interests arose from 
within, not from abroad. The Good Neighbor program hoped to reassert the pre-1930 liberal 
order – but instead may have only opened the door to nationalist challenges. The resistance 
against the U.S. liberal blueprint manifested the desire for greater political and economic 
experimentation in Latin America. An editorial published in an Argentine newspaper after 
FDR’s 1936 tour of Buenos Aires points to the duality of hope and skepticism that greeted 
FDR in Latin America. The editorial congratulated FDR for “raising the morale of 
discouraged people” in the United States. But the editorial then proclaimed the New Deal as 
“the beginning of a fight against the commercial monopolies and the financial consortiums that 
had brought [the United States] to that dreadful Depression."429 This statement reveals the 
ambiguity that surrounded and eventually unraveled Good Neighbor liberalism. While Latin 
American politicians and public commentators were quick to embrace the idealistic goals of the 
New Deal, they were just as quick to disdain the corporations and multinational businesses that 
were to carry out FDR’s Good Neighbor on their block. 
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Epilogue 
 
     A dissertation that focuses on the failures of liberalism in inter-American political and 
economic diplomacy seems oddly timed in the face of the ongoing liberal renaissance. The 
rollback of protectionism since 1990, and of forty years of nationalism in the process, has 
been remarkable. Foreign direct investment in Latin America has averaged well over $100 
billion a year in the past decade as multinational corporations from the United States, Asia, 
and Europe purchased telephone companies, power plants, banks, and a slate of other 
properties at discount prices. The number of state-owned enterprises in the region has shrunk. 
And those corporate entities that remain under government control are forced to compete 
against a broad array of private sector rivals. 
     Nevertheless, the Pan American liberal-nationalist dialectic and the synthesis that marked 
the earliest years of Cold War in Latin America remains a relevant topic even in the current 
Pax Liberal era. The path back toward liberalism from 1950 to 2000 is one marked by fits 
and starts, steps forward and back, achievements and setbacks. Even though free traders 
appear to enjoy a policy and ideological monopoly, the region has seen enough fissures and 
challenges to raise questions about the longevity of today’s lurch toward liberalism. 
     Cold War inter-American diplomatic history was largely an unhappy experience. In at 
least three well-recorded occasions, the U.S. government sent troops into Caribbean and 
Central American countries, first to root out communists in the Dominican Republic and 
Grenada, then to squelch the drug-dealing regime of Manuel Noriega. In Cuba and Nicaragua, 
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the U.S. trained and armed mercenaries waged war on governments that Washington 
despised. There have also been numerous covert operations in which U.S. policy-makers 
were involved to varying capacities, in Guatemala, Guyana, and Chile. In other places, the 
United States sent military advisors and aid to bolster friendly governments engaged in hot 
wars with revolutionaries and militias. Interspersed with these efforts have been numerous 
financial carrots, from Truman’s Point IV program to John Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress 
to Ronald Reagan’s Caribbean Basin Initiative.  
     The result of all this is a half century of deepening poverty, war, and migration. During the 
first half of the twentieth century, hemispheric migration patterns centered on the movement 
of people from Europe to the hemisphere. This pattern shifted during the Cold War as 
migration patterns centered on intra-hemispheric movement. No country in the hemisphere, 
seemingly, has not at one time or another seen people and capital take flight due to either 
political instability or economic disruption. The preferred destination for émigrés has been 
the United States. Legal migration to the U.S. alone was calculated at about 600,000 people a 
year in the 1980s, double the average rate in the 1960s. By most accounts, illegal migration 
into the U.S. increased at a rapid pace as well. The latest census figures show that Hispanics 
are the fastest growing demographic group in the United States. A significant factor in these 
struggles and trends was, and remains, the liberal-nationalist dialectic. 
U.S. Liberalism to 2000 
     In the closing months of World War II, U.S. and Allied officials wrote the liberal rulebook 
that has, more or less, governed international economics in the past half century. Meeting at 
Bretton Woods in the summer of 1944, U.S. and British officials mapped a global financial 
system that pegged the dollar to a gold standard that simplified payment systems. 
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Governments also lowered tariffs during a separate set of discussions, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. The GATT talks and the Bretton Woods summit created a framework 
to regulate global commerce along a liberal path. To be sure, the pace of progress often 
lagged and sometimes stalled. But the direction has nearly always been pointed toward an 
open door program. 
     Bolstered by fixed exchanges and lower tariffs, the post-war industrial marketplace 
boomed in a commercial “golden age.” Between 1950 and 1973, the industrial nations 
witnessed average growth in gross domestic product of 4.8 percent.430 The volume of cross-
border trade, which rose at just a 4 percent annual rate between 1845 and 1945, grew at an 
annual rate of 7 percent from 1946 to 1973. During the 1950s and 1960s, global commerce 
increased by a factor of five.431 U.S. companies accounted for 13 percent of international 
trade by 1970, up from 9 percent twenty years before. In 1970, some 3,500 U.S. 
multinationals possessed direct investments in over ten thousand foreign enterprises. Those 
investments accounted for 8 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, more than double the 
sum in 1946.432 
     The marketplace richly rewarded the U.S. multinationals that dominated the landscape. By 
1965, International Business Machines World Trade Division topped the $1.1 billion mark in 
sales, almost 50 percent of the company’s total revenues. In 1950, U.S. factories built almost 
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80 percent of the automobiles produced across the world. In 1973, some eighty-nine U.S. 
companies employed at least forty thousand people around the world. Great Britain, which 
listed only thirty companies with that many workers, ranked second in this category.433  
     North American liberalism did struggle through crises, particularly at times when the 
economic cycle sank into recession. The reduction in tariffs opened channels for foreign 
competition at various points, creating competition and dislocating industries and workers 
unable to adjust. The revitalization of Western Europe and Japan, combined with lower U.S. 
industrial productivity, has over time weakened the U.S. grip on the global marketplace. In 
the late 1950s, Volkswagen attempted to compete against General Motors and Ford by 
introducing its smaller, lighter weight Beetle. GM responded with a line of smaller vehicles 
and Ford produced the Mustang, and those autos stemmed the challenge from Germany. The 
1970s oil shock produced a more serious and lasting challenge. Skyrocketing petroleum costs 
in the fall of 1973 sapped U.S. manufactures and zapped consumers. The 1974-1975 
recession was arguably the worst decline in post-war America. The resulting stagflation, an 
unprecedented mix of relatively flat economic growth with inflation, left the North American 
economy in an anemic state for nearly 10 years. 
     At the same time, U.S. liberals accommodated the need for some protective rules within 
their own borders. The regulations, most of which were created during the Depression, 
buffered the country’s labor force against the very type of downturn witnessed in the 1930s. 
Labor laws, state-funded social safety net programs, and agricultural subsidies increased 
government budgets as well as personal and corporate taxes. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the Civil Aviation Board kept close watch over the country’s highways and 
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airways. The Securities and Exchange Commission regulated capital markets. U.S. political 
leaders, and the electorate that supported them, continued to accept that the state had a role in 
economic regulation despite their advocacy of a free marketplace. 
     But, over the past quarter century, the liberal marketplace gradually won more 
elbowroom. In the 1980s, major industries, from airlines to banking, were deregulated. In 
addition, social “safety net” programs, such as the Civilian Employment and Training Act, 
which created government-funded jobs in the public and private sector, and the so-called 
Assistance to Families with Dependent Children program for impoverished single-parent 
homes were phased out. In their place, taxes have been reduced and Americans have placed a 
greater share of their earnings than ever before in the largest and most capitalist instrument of 
all, the country’s stock markets. 
     Most importantly, government has consistently stepped away from protectionist policies. 
In the 1970s, political and economic leaders did little to stop the importation of smaller and 
more fuel-efficient Japanese autos at the expense of U.S. Big Three automobile makers. In 
the 1980s, the U.S. policy-makers pushed for open markets in China and the Pacific Rim. 
When the Soviet Bloc unraveled, liberals capitalized on opportunities in the emerging former 
Iron Curtain countries as well as in European Union markets. In 1994, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement opened the borders with Mexico and Canada. NAFTA extended trade 
and investment in the Americas even further than a previous free trade initiative, the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative that reduced tariffs and quotas on textiles and other products a 
decade earlier. 
     The U.S. public initially greeted these efforts with a measure of skepticism, but soon 
embraced them. Understandably, U.S. labor organizations, and their rank-and-file, worried 
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these agreements would lead to the transfer of productive capacity and the loss of jobs. They 
were right. But in return, workers who lost jobs in “restructuring” programs found work in 
other sectors. To be sure, many displaced workers have found new jobs in less skilled 
workplaces and in service industries that do not pay as well as manufacturing. But some of 
these losses have been offset, at least in theory, by the accessibility of inexpensive consumer 
goods from abroad. Younger workers, too, are not as interested in Old Economy 
manufacturing positions but instead are lured by positions in high technology and financial 
services, arguably the best-paying industries in the world.  
     Of course, U.S. political leaders and their constituents may accept liberalism only as long 
as macroeconomic results bring individual good fortune. The U.S. polity today enjoys record 
low unemployment. Stock market valuations have appreciated consistently for the past eight 
years. New technologies facilitate communications, entertainment and leisure. The boom, 
dubbed the New Economy, has done little to disappoint voters and consumers. And they 
continue to signal that they see little reason to change political and or economic policies. 
Latin America: From Nationalism to Liberalism 
     By contrast, Latin American political economy continued its shift from a liberal to a 
protected marketplace in the post-World War II era. Governments set tariffs to protect 
nascent industry against foreign competition. Raw materials previously earmarked for export 
were directed at internal production. Extractive industries, such as mining, and large service 
companies, including electric and telephone utilities, were nationalized or purchased from 
foreign owners. The goal was to produce locally for domestic consumption, even if to the 
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detriment of the export economy.434 Of course, this process began in the early decades of the 
twentieth century and prior to government policies and think tank research papers that 
ultimately provided the introverted program with a name, import-substitution 
industrialization.435 But with the weight of economic theory and political consensus behind it, 
nationalism dominated the public policy arena in the following generation. 
     A landmark moment for Latin America protectionism, and import substitution, in 
particular, occurred in 1947. In that year, the Economic Commission for Latin America was 
established in Santiago, Chile, under the auspices of the United Nations. Under the leadership 
of economist Raúl Prebisch, ECLA assembled a team of economists and sociologists charged 
with designing solutions to cure the ailments hurting the hemisphere’s economies. The ideas 
and strategies developed by ECLA altered the political discourse in Latin America for the 
next two decades.436 Pre-ECLA economic nationalism had begun the transition away from 
liberalism, but it was ECLA that gave anti-liberalism a theoretical underpinning, and 
legitimacy, by producing coherent and consistent import-substitution models for the region to 
follow.  
     Prebisch and ECLA converted the political, anti-Yankee language of nationalism into a 
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theory of underdevelopment and a blueprint for progress. The ECLA-fashioned “structural” 
theory explained Latin American economics in terms of a center-periphery relationship 
between the region and the industrial powers. This center-periphery model, ECLA surmised, 
was the source of development and underdevelopment in the world economy. The center 
countries, possessing industry and technology, held the advantage in terms of trade and 
capital accumulation. By contrast, the peripheral societies faced a technological gap in 
comparison to the advances in the industrial core. The technological deficiency figured 
prominently in the productivity and levels of the export-oriented and subsistence sectors 
(generally agriculture and mining). Compounding those problems, the peripheral countries 
also faced a surge in surplus labor that kept wages low and stunted the per capita buying 
power needed to obtain capital goods, consumer products and technology. 
     Prebisch and ECLA agreed that increasing the volume of trade with the center would not 
break this cycle. They argued that the deficiencies were the result of the international trade 
system that coalesced in the late nineteenth century. Structuralists claimed the Industrial 
Revolution transformed the center countries into industrial powers and relegated the 
peripheral nations to producers of primary products. The rise and fall in the fortunes of the 
peripheral nations simply depended on the ability of these countries to produce the raw 
materials demanded by industry in the center.  
     To ameliorate these ills, ECLA’s economists devised import-substitution programs. This 
industrial policy aimed at lessening the dependency on imported manufactured goods by 
producing those products in domestic industry. ECLA believed import-substitution offered 
two positive results. First, industrialization allowed developing countries to spend less on 
consumption, thus promoting savings and shoring up their financial position. And by 
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producing their own capital and consumer goods, countries buffered themselves against 
periodic shortages and inflationary bouts. Prodded by ECLA’s promise of an ISI utopia, the 
region turned toward import-reducing industrialization as the guidepost economic policy in 
the 1950s. 
     The ISI model produced significant achievements at the outset. Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, gross domestic product in the region grew at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent. 
Manufacturing output grew at a rate of 6.5 percent during the decade, and beyond. Mexico, 
Brazil, Venezuela and Peru posted average yearly GDP growth of 5.5 or more during the 
decade. The growth in the manufacturing sector produced the desired economic 
diversification. Between 1950 and 1973, agriculture’s share of GDP growth in the region fell 
from 18 percent to 12 percent. The robust growth was heartily welcomed in a region that had 
grown skeptical about its reliance on international commodity and financial markets.   
       However, the ISI model stumbled soon after. As output increased, manufacturers realized 
that the markets for their goods, typically domestic consumers, were too small. Factories in 
Argentina and Chile found it difficult to tap economies of scale by selling goods over a 
broader area to reduce costs and promote efficiency.437 At the same time, the demands of 
industrialization curtailed the export sector. Primary materials that were once exported to the 
industrial countries were now earmarked for the domestic manufacturing sector. As a result, 
Latin America’s trade surplus, which accounted for nearly 4 percent of GDP in 1950, 
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dropped precipitously to .7 percent in 1960. The fizzling of the export market undermined the 
ability of the Latin American economies to generate revenues and secure financing, and this 
trend ultimately constrained productivity, employment and investment needed for advanced 
technology.438 
     ISI then came under attack from another group of economists and researchers. These 
critics argued that the capitalist world economic system assigned each region a station and 
that it was difficult to recast that role without a complete break from the system. Those 
peripheral countries, thus, were stuck in a perpetual state of capitalist underdevelopment and 
programs such as ISI could not reform that reality.439 By the time of Prebisch’s death in 1985, 
the failures of the import-substitution model and the inward-growth strategy during the 1960s 
and 1970s left his ideas in a state of discredit – even though scholars accept that ISI did lead 
to growth and did produce some successes.440    
     The oil shock of the 1970s sparked the transition from ISI to another macroeconomic 
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trend, debt-led growth. The sudden surge in oil prices affected the region in different ways. 
The economies of some countries, like Chile, spun into recession, as happened in the 
developed industrial nations. Most of the other petroleum dependent nations, including 
Brazil, responded by borrowing heavily from international sources to cover costs and to 
prime the economy. The oil exporting countries, Venezuela, Mexico and Peru, turned to 
lenders, too, but for a different reason. They mortgaged future revenues by pledging that 
potential money up front for loans. They then spent the money on imported capital and 
consumer goods in ways that ranged from prudent to inefficient to wasteful. As they did, the 
region’s indebtedness surged throughout the 1970s. Between 1973 and 1981, Latin America's 
imports from the United States doubled from $44 billion to $93 billion. The region’s current 
account deficit also quadrupled to $40 billion during that time. The lend-and-spend binge 
essentially replaced ISI as the guiding development model. 
     Debt-led growth was short-lived. The petroleum glut that formed in 1982 led to loan 
defaults, currency devaluations and austerity programs. Almost overnight, the international 
banks stopped lending to the region as oil prices and revenues fell. The end of the credit line 
forced Latin American countries to begin repaying the debt from export revenues, not 
through additional borrowing. This resulted in a series of painful measures. The region 
reduced its take of U.S. goods and services by almost 40 percent in 1984 when currencies 
were devaluated. The decreased worth of paper money plus shortages in imported goods 
created the worst inflationary spiral in the region’s history. Prices increased at annual rates of 
672 percent rate in Argentina, 586 percent in Brazil and 132 percent in Mexico at various 
points during the 1980s. For the balance of that decade, the combination of flat or declining 
growth hyperinflation, a mix dubbed hyper-stagflation, sapped the Latin American economies 
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in a “lost decade” crisis that rivaled the declines of the Great Depression. 
     The malaise ended in the early 1990s with the privatization programs that attracted huge 
capital flows into the region. The funds flow began with a series of accords that renegotiated 
the debt and lured a trickle of investment money. Then the auctioning and selling of state-
owned enterprises to global multinational companies at discount prices sped the flow of 
cross-border capital. Finally, the type of trade liberalization that Hull, Welles and other 
Roosevelt liberals dreamed of in the 1930s took hold from the Southern Cone to the Arctic 
Circle. The European Union, NAFTA and regional pacts like Mercosur in southern South 
America fueled intercontinental and cross-continental commerce. As the industrial countries 
entered the 1990s economic boom, they purchased more and more raw materials and low 
technology manufactured products from Latin America. With that, the nationalist era begun 
by the politics of Cardenas, Vargas and Peron – and later professionalized by Prebisch and 
ECLA – gave way to a return to liberalism.   
     The liberal renaissance has permeated Latin American intellectual quarters. Fernando 
Enrique Cardoso, a critic of liberalism as an intellectual in the 1960s, served as Brazilian 
president and proved himself as one of the most adamant advocates of privatization and 
market economics. Cardoso positioned Brazil as a basket for global capital flows, not as a 
bulwark of protectionism. As a result, Sao Paulo, the site of the largest stock exchange in 
Latin America, is now seen as a bridge for international corporations, accounting firms and 
both portfolio and direct investment.441 Even the economists at the United Nation’s 
Economic Commission for Latin America, a former hub of protectionism, concede today that 
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they must also accept liberalism as the dominant paradigm. Rather than oppose “the tide of 
market reforms,” ECLA recently said in a mission statement that it prefers to advocate for 
privatization and trade regimes consistent with a structural reform model adapted to the new 
era of openness and globalization. 
     So, it is tempting to now proclaim the death of nationalism, except that history cautions 
against it. A hundred years ago, liberalism was the dominant paradigm at the dawn of the 
twentieth century. Across the hemisphere, export-oriented growth was the rule with few 
exceptions. Then, as this dissertation has shown, a combination of factors altered political 
economy about 1930. For the following six decades, the region’s politicians, citizenry and 
economists struggled with and against changing financial tides and currents. True in light of the 
broad liberal renaissance, the nationalists of the 1930s seem out of place. But are they that more 
of an anachronism today than Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Cuba’s Fidel Castro, the rebel army in 
Colombia, or even Peru’s Alberto Fujimori? The fact is that the inter-American political and 
economic present, like the past, remains shaded more by cross-currents and inconsistencies than 
by defined, pronounced and uninterrupted marches.     
Conclusion: Pax Liberal or Prelude to Neo-Nationalism? 
     It should not surprise anyone to find that a certain measure of ambiguity in political 
economy has greeted the twenty-first century. Macroeconomic indicators show persistent 
success in the United States and renewed strength in most Latin American countries. As long 
as they do, contemporary liberals can continue to claim victory and a mandate for their 
agenda. On the other hand, the popularity of nationalists such as Venezuelan president Hugo 
Chavez, the importance that Mexico’s Vicente Fox is placing on migration issues and the 
chronic difficulties of liberal finances in countries like Ecuador may foreshadow shifts in 
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public opinion and conventional wisdom. They may, at least, suggest that the march toward 
liberal hegemony has stopped and that opportunities exist for either nationalists or those who 
harbor doubts about liberalism to offer reforms and counter measures. In fact, it is fair to say 
that political economy in the Western Hemisphere is at a crossroads.  
     Liberals will correctly argue that the region has weathered plenty of setbacks, crises and 
contretemps in the past decade. The 1994 Mexican peso crisis, the insurgency in the Chiapas 
region and the scandals that rocked former President Carlos Salinas and his family did little 
to unwind Mexico’s liberal realignment with the United States. Neither have significant 
military victories by a rebel army in Colombia, high unemployment in Argentina, currency 
devaluation in Brazil, political uncertainty in Venezuela, bank collapses in Ecuador or a 
recession in Chile succeeded in busting the liberal backbone in these countries. Skeptics may 
argue the resiliency of today’s brand of liberalism is a matter of default: Without a competing 
model, there is no alternative to which the frustrated may turn. So liberals may feel at ease 
now that the margin for error is greater. Liberalism is the only option: Take it or leave it. 
     Nevertheless, this dissertation should be a warning to today’s bullish liberals. This project 
demonstrates how in five significant countries, economic nationalism served as a reaction 
against uneven wealth distribution and unequal trade and investment relationships that 
dogged the liberal order in Latin America. In Cuba, the Grau government, and the political 
actors and groups behind it, advocated for a stronger and proactive state with an eye on 
widening the distribution of the fruits of the export-oriented economy. In the 1930s, Getulio 
Vargas imposed exchange restrictions to serve as a throttle on financially destabilizing capital 
flight out of Brazil. In Mexico, the Cardenistas turned to expropriation as a last gasp measure 
to extract a larger share of profits from Mexican oil. And in Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, 
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and Cuba, governments attempted to reorient state-multinational relations to improve the 
welfare of the citizenry. 
     The lesson of the 1930s and 1940s is that efforts to build a lasting liberal economy in the 
Western Hemisphere depended on political economy. As patience with liberalism dwindled, 
inward-looking and nationalist models molded a political and economic consensus. 
Nationalization of properties, controls on currency exchanges and repatriation and stricter 
government regulation through labor codes and taxation had at least as much to do with 
political pressure as they did with economic models. Anti-liberalism is not born from foreign 
ideology. It results from frustration over inequities in the global marketplace or within a 
particular country.  
     At the macroeconomic level, some of the weaknesses that undermined the liberal regime 
in the 1930s and 1940s remain in place. Imbalances in trade relations still exist. While the 
U.S. pushes sales of personal computers, software packages and other high-technology 
products, its Latin American trading partners still deal in low profit margin commodities and 
tourism. Workers toiling in maquiladoras and other export factories are paid far less than 
their counterparts in the industrial countries. The wave of economic setbacks and recessions 
in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela resulted largely from a deflation in global 
commodity prices and drops in cross-border capital investments442 – approximately the same 
culprits that caused the malaise of the 1930s and 1940s. Further adding to the financial 
uncertainty is the ebbing of investor interest in Latin America and the resulting surge in 
borrowing by governments in the region. On top of this, there remain grave problems such as 
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widespread poverty, disparities in wealth and per capita income levels that are little higher 
than they were almost 20 years ago. 
      It is no coincidence that the same six nations surveyed in this dissertation are struggling 
in today’s liberal renewal. Colombia and Venezuela are troubled economically and 
politically. Cuba, which is barred from U.S. trade and investment, struggles to recover from 
the loss of its major commercial benefactor, the Soviet Union. Although it recovered from the 
peso crisis, Mexico’s gains from NAFTA commerce are a mixed bag. Argentina and Brazil 
have fared better. But they have done so at the expense of strict austerity measures whose 
longevity and viability are in doubt. 
     It is not inconceivable that out of the current disillusionment with liberalism will come a 
competing model to challenge the free trade, free investment regime. The new liberalism – if 
it is to work in the long run – must ultimately alter the commercial and investment 
relationship in the hemisphere. It must find ways to enact technological transfers so those 
products made in Latin America are of higher value and result in wider profit margins. 
Liberalism must find ways to ensure that manufacturing facilities in the region offer wages 
that provide a greater measure of buying power for the people that work in those factories. It 
must attack the corruption that rewards inefficiency and promotes waste where inefficiency 
and waste are unaffordable luxuries. And it must develop systems to control volatility in 
currency exchanges. The liberals cannot rely unquestionably as they did years ago that 
underdevelopment was not due to the inherent inequalities of capitalism, but rather to the 
insufficient degree of capitalism practiced in the past.443 
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     Today’s liberals, however, must be convinced that to regroup and regain the initiative they 
must realize that the consolidation of their model over the past decade is reversible. A 
nationalist or protective backlash – similar to the one that ended the last liberal order existing 
from 1870 to 1930 – is not out of the question. While liberalism may appear as the only 
viable model right now, history shows us this will not always be the case.  
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